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Related-party (RP) transactions have been widely criticised for contributing to 
wealth destruction and corporate failure. While it is argued that RP transactions are 
normal business activities that fulfil corporate economic needs, prior research 
suggests that many RP transactions appear to be used opportunistically to transfer 
assets or liabilities between related parties. Thus, transparent RP disclosure is 
warranted for effective monitoring of such transactions. Yet despite the criticisms 
there has been a scarcity of research internationally and, in particular, in emerging 
economies where disclosure transparency is often questionable. To address this gap, 
the aim of this study is to investigate the nature and extent of RP disclosure and 
identify factors which explain the variation in disclosure across the Asia-Pacific (A-
P) region. 
Based on an analysis of institutional differences in the A-P region and agency theory, 
it is argued that factors associated with stronger internal and external corporate 
governance influence RP transactions usage and their disclosure transparency. 
Importantly, a number of institutional factors which have been associated with more 
transparent disclosure (common law origin, stronger regulatory enforcement and 
investor protection, and controls for corruption) in other contexts are also expected to 
enhance firms’ RP disclosures. Hypotheses are developed for each major governance 
and institutional factor.   
To capture expected regional differences in RP disclosure transparency and 
institutional factors, a sample of 582 listed companies was selected across six 
countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). 
The sample ensured a wide coverage of companies that differ in legal origin, 
enforcement, shareholders’ protection, and level of corruption. RP disclosures and 
other firm-specific data were hand-collected from the 2009 annual reports. The 
research questions were addressed and hypotheses tested using RP disclosure indices, 
and descriptive-comparative and multivariate analysis methods. 
The results indicate that RP transactions are very common across Asia-Pacific 
countries, with related party loans the most common type of transaction. Importantly, 
factors associated with better internal and external governance contribute to improve 
disclosure scores. With respect to country-level characteristics, companies in a 
country with stronger enforcement and control for corruption are associated with 
more transparent disclosure of RP transaction information. Contrary to expectations, 
the strength of a country’s investor protection has an inverse relationship with RP 
disclosure. However, when a more specific measure of investor protection (an anti-
self-dealing index) is used, the findings show a positive association between the 
index scores and RP disclosure. Taken together, the evidence suggests that country-
level factors, including the strength of enforcement by accounting regulatory bodies, 
the protection of minority shareholders against self-dealing actions, and the control 
for corruption influence RP disclosure transparency. 
This thesis makes a number of important contributions. First, it is among the first to 
comprehensively investigate the nature and extent of RP transactions in a cross-
country setting. Second, this study provides empirical evidence of an association 
between financial reporting and corruption in a cross-country setting. This finding 
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supports previous studies in other areas which find that corrupt actions are more 
likely to be discovered when there is greater business transparency. Finally, the study 
offers empirical evidence about corporate RP disclosure practices that may assist 
regulators to introduce more focused compliance programs and more effective RP 
disclosure guidelines and regulations.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding the nature, extent, and consequences of related-party (RP) 
transactions and the disclosure about those transactions by companies in the Asia-
Pacific Region is the focus of this study. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 
Related Party Disclosure defines an RP transaction as “a transfer of resources or 
obligations between related parties, regardless of whether or not a market price is 
charged” (IAS 24, para 9). Parties are considered to be related if one party has the 
ability to control the other party or exercise significant influence over the other party 
in making financial and operating decisions, for example a controlling shareholder, a 
director, key management personnel, or affiliated companies, controlled entities, and 
entities under common control. The critical issue is that RP transactions might not be 
undertaken at market prices, primarily due to the influence of the relationship 
between the two sides to a transaction, that is, the company and the related party. For 
example, the transactions may be conducted using favourable prices or terms and 
conditions, instead of using market prices or normal commercial terms and 
conditions.   
Ideally, RP transactions between companies within a group can increase cost-
effectiveness to meet a firm’s specific economic needs (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 
2004a). However, for both controlling shareholders and insiders, such as 
management, RP transactions can be the mechanism of self-dealing or insider 
opportunism, whereby private benefits of control can be extracted at the expense of 
other shareholders (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; Gordon, 
Henry, & Palia, 2004a, 2004b; McCahery & Vermeulen, 2005). From prior research, 
an examination of links between the nature of RP transactions and firms’ governance 
mechanisms and institutional framework in which firms operate is essential in order 
to understand the contrasting motivations for RP transactions.  
Currently, companies in Asian countries are identified as having potentially higher 
risk of opportunistic RP transactions given their unique institutional setting (Loon & 
De Ramos, 2009; OECD, 2009). Asian countries generally have the characteristics of 
family concentrated ownership, weak control for corruption, enforcement and 
protection of minority shareholders. Family-controlled firms can be more efficient, 
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leading to better performance than firms with other ownership forms (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), particularly given the benefit of reciprocal 
relations between the family and the business (Chrisman, Chua, & Sarma, 2003; 
Sarma, 2004). However in other settings, family-owned firms may suffer from 
inefficiencies, particularly in the absence of strong enforcement and protection of 
minority shareholders, because such a setting allows greater opportunity for 
controlling owners to pursue private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders’ 
interests (Heugens, Essen, & Oosterhout, 2009). It is argued that such self-interested 
practices contributed to the 1997 – 98 Asian financial crisis, as managers engaged in 
a high level expropriation of cash and tangible assets through RP transactions 
(Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000). Accordingly, firms’ commitments to 
fully disclose RP information is important to enable investors and other users of 
financial statements to monitor and assess the impact of the transactions on a firm’s 
performance (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004b). However, the negative perception of 
RP transactions as means of opportunisms may lead managers to refrain from 
disclosing details of information about these transactions since they may want to 
avoid public criticisms. Therefore, it is argued that appropriate regulation and 
enforcement mechanisms are warranted to ensure transparent RP disclosures 
(Djankov et al., 2008; Loon & De Ramos, 2009; OECD, 2009).  
Despite the frequency and growth in concerns, uncertainties, and implications of RP 
transaction and disclosure, there has been little academic research to inform market 
participants and regulators about the effectiveness of RP disclosures. 
1.1.  Research Motivations 
This study is motivated by a number of factors. First, there has been a general lack of 
comparative RP transaction research in the Asia-Pacific region. Extant studies have 
mainly focused on the larger and more economically significant countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia (Gallery, Gallery, & Supranowicz, 2008), 
China (e.g., Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2009; Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009; 
Jian & Wong, 2010), and Hong Kong (Cheung, Qi, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009; Cheung, 
Rau, & Stouraitis, 2006). These studies tend to focus on specific types of RP 
transactions and the wealth effect of the transactions in a single country setting. In 
addition, no prior study has conducted a comprehensive and systematic examination 
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on the extent of corporate RP disclosure in accordance with RP disclosures standards 
on a regional basis. 
Second, corporate financial reporting transparency in the Asia-Pacific region became 
increasingly important following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, particularly as 
poor corporate transparency was identified as a key factor behind the crisis (Morris 
& Gray, 2009). The 2009 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by 
Transparency International shows that the indices for countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region range from the cleanest to the most corrupt with ranks from 3 to 139 out of 
180 (Transparency International, 2009a)1. This variability in transparency raises the 
questions of what is behind the differences and what can countries learn from each 
other in the region. 
A third factor motivating this study is the importance of understanding the influence 
of both country-specific and firm-specific (governance and other) factors on 
corporate RP disclosure transparency. The adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS)2 in almost 100 countries  may not result in higher quality 
financial statements, if country level factors, such as legal systems, are more 
dominant constraints than firm-level factors (Morris & Gray, 2009; Preiato, Brown, 
& Tarca, 2012).  
Fourth, the nature of and motivation for firms entering into RP transactions in the 
Asia-Pacific region vary from those in other regions, particularly those in developed 
countries. In developed economies, companies tend to have diffused ownership with 
clear separation between ownership and control. However in Asia, companies have 
distinct ownership structures which are likely to be concentrated in a single group; 
family or the state (Carney & Child, 2012;  Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Loon 
& De Ramos, 2009). Accordingly, senior management and board positions, including 
                                                          
1
 A country/territory CPI Score indicates the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people 
and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The score is based on 13 
corruption assessment sources developed by different international agencies. For the Asia-Pacific region, the 
2009 scores range from 9.2 for Singapore (rank of 3/180) to 2.4 for the Philippines (rank 139/180) (Transparency 
International, 2009a). 
2
 The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which are developed by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) are becoming the global standard for the preparation of public company financial 
statements (www.ifrs.com). The specific RP international accounting standard (IAS) is IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosure. The terms ‘IFRS’ and ‘IAS’ will be used interchangeably in this study. 
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the chairperson and chief executives, are often filled by family members (in family-
owned enterprises) or political appointees (in state-controlled entities) (Carney & 
Child, 2012; Claessens et al., 2000). These ownership structures in Asia may lead to 
different types of agency conflicts than those in other regions, such as conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders which may lead to different types of RP 
transactions (Loon & De Ramos, 2009; OECD, 2009).  
1.2.  Research Questions 
Drawing from the research issues and motivations mentioned above, this study aims 
to investigate the nature and extent of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region through addressing three primary research questions:  
1. What is the nature and extent of related party transaction and related-party 
disclosures across countries in the Asia-Pacific region? 
2. To what extent do the related-party disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region conform to the IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure within and 
across countries?  
3. What are the governance, country, and other firm-specific factors which 
explain the nature and extent of related-party disclosures by companies in the 
Asia-Pacific region? 
1.3.  Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
This study builds upon prior literature and uses an agency theory framework in 
addressing the three research questions. Agency theory posits that the separation of 
ownership and control between the agent and the principal leads to agency problems 
when agents act opportunistically to maximise their wealth at the expense of 
principals (Berle & Means, 1932; E. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The theory posits that this problem occurs because of goal incongruence 
between owners and managers, or because of information asymmetry between 
owners and managers that restricts the owners from fully monitoring the agents. 
Information asymmetry gives rise to moral hazard when managers, who are usually 
better informed than the owners, pursue their own interests which deviate from those 
of the owners. This situation of goal misalignment leads to agency costs (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  It is argued that one way to reduce such costs is through a greater 
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disclosure in financial statements. A firm’s commitment to disclose will enable 
shareholders to monitor their interests more efficiently and can provide a signal that 
the managers act in the interests of the shareholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Prior 
studies suggest corporate governance can act as monitoring mechanisms to mitigate 
information asymmetries and agency problems between managers and investors 
(Bushman & Smith, 2003; Farinha, 2003; Gillan, 2006; Larcker, Richardson, & 
Tuna, 2007).  
Consistent with agency theory, a review of the literature in Chapter 3 identifies that 
RP transactions can be efficient business transactions that fulfil a firm’s economic 
needs, or transactions that serve the interests of managers and therefore represent a 
conflict of interest between management and shareholders (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 
2004a, 2004b). Under the agency theory framework, it is argued that opportunistic 
RP transactions can facilitate managers/insiders’ opportunistic behaviours, 
particularly given the non-arms-length nature of such transactions. In this case, 
firms’ disclosure of RP transactions can be one way to increase monitoring of such 
transactions. However, companies tend to disclose information if the benefits of 
disclosures outweigh the costs of withholding such information (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Therefore, given the sensitive nature of RP transactions, firms may refrain 
from disclosing opportunistic RP transactions to avoid the costs of releasing such 
information. Accordingly, firms’ decisions to disclose RP transactions may be 
influenced by the type of RP transactions. When RP transactions are efficient 
transactions, the benefits of fully disclosing these transactions are more likely to 
outweigh the costs.  
The agency theory framework also posits that, given the potential agency costs, both 
the owners and managers of the firm have incentives to strengthen monitoring 
systems in the firm to minimise such costs. Corporate governance mechanisms are 
part of monitoring systems to minimise agency problems and ensure that managers 
act in alignment with shareholders’ interests. Effective corporate governance can 
help safeguard an optimal firm’s disclosure policy (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Assuming that effective corporate governance mechanisms can improve firms’ 
monitoring of managers, such mechanisms are expected to result in less opportunistic 
RP transactions and more transparent disclosure of such transactions. Consistent with 
this expectation, prior studies find that better-governed firms are associated with 
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more frequent disclosures of price-sensitive information (Beekes & Brown, 2006) 
and greater RP disclosures (Utama & Utama, 2012).  Full disclosure of RP 
transactions enables shareholders to monitor their interests more efficiently and can 
provide a signal that managers act in the interests of the shareholders, consistent with 
the agency theory framework. 
Within this framework, three research questions and 15 research hypotheses are 
developed to address the study’s objectives. Eleven hypotheses address the influence 
of firm-level internal and external governance characteristics, while four hypotheses 
address the influence of country-level factors, on the extent of RP disclosures.  
1.4.  Research Design 
This thesis focuses on related-party disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region in annual reports for the financial year ending 2009. In particular, this study 
focuses on comparing the disclosure of RP transactions in selected Asian-Pacific 
countries, namely Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. These countries account for a range of differences in legal systems 
(common or code law), ownership characteristics, and the nature of the regulatory 
frameworks (Carney & Child, 2012; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Djankov et 
al., 2008; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006; Morris & Gray, 2009; 
Morris, Susilowati, & Gray, 2012; Tipton, 2009).  
The year 2009 is selected to capture the existing differences in the institutional 
environment of RP disclosure. In 2009, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore mandated the IAS 24 (2003), whereas Indonesia and Thailand used an 
earlier version of IAS 24. In the same year, the IASB issued an amended/revised 
version of IAS 24 (2009), which would be effective from 1 January 2011. 
Accordingly, the year 2009 is selected since the disclosure in the annual reports 
preceded the changes in the disclosure requirements in the six countries. In addition, 
the 2009 annual reports were the most recent reports available in all six countries at 
the time of data collection for this thesis. A one year study period was chosen due to 
the complexity of controlling for the changes in institutional differences and their 
consequences over time and across countries3. 
                                                          
3 A similar argument is made by Aerts and Tarca (2010) in their international disclosure study. 
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The research methods in addressing the research questions and hypotheses consist of 
descriptive/exploratory analysis and multivariate testing of the RP disclosures of 582 
selected firms from the top 100 largest non-financial companies in each country, 
based on the OSIRIS-BVDEP list of market capitalisation as at 31 December 2009. 
The selected firms have fulfilled the selection criteria that they provide RP disclosure 
in the 2009 annual reports, to enable comparison of the level (extent) of RP 
disclosures in the period of 2009. 
The extent of RP disclosure index is measured using a self-constructed RP 
disclosures index (RP_DISC) based on IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure. The RP 
disclosure index (RP_DISC) is represented by three alternative measures of the RP 
disclosure scores, that is, mandatory score of RP disclosures (MSCORE), 
discretionary score of RP disclosures (DSCORE), and overall score of RP disclosures 
(OSCORE).  
The multivariate cross-sectional regression model was developed to investigate the 
influence of firm- and country-specific factors (independent) on the extent of RP 
disclosures (dependent). Additionally, robustness checks are performed to ensure the 
reliability of the findings. The independent variables consist of firm-specific 
governance characteristics (i.e., the independence, size, and financial expertise of 
board of directors and audit committee, ownership concentration, family-controlled 
firms, leverage, audit firm size, and cross-listing status) and country-specific 
characteristics (i.e., country legal origin, enforcement, investor protection, and 
control for corruption).  
1.4.1 Definition of Terms Used for RP Transactions and RP Disclosures 
In this study, RP disclosures are examined in the context of compliance with the 
requirements of the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 Related Party 
Disclosure. This standard requires companies to disclose related parties, 
compensation of key management personnel and the nature of transactions. At the 
the minimum level, the disclosures should include the monetary amount of 
transactions, the amount of outstanding balances, provision of doubtful debts related 
to the outstanding balances, and the expense recognised during the period in respect 
of doubtful debts due from related parties. Detailed information for each category of 
related party is required in order to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of RP 
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transactions. In this study, disclosure conformance is determined using a RP 
disclosure index and therefore it is discussed in terms of the level (i.e., extent) of 
conformance.   
With respect to the RP transactions, this study refers to the transactions between 
related-parties which are reported in the companies’ annual reports, for instance, 
sales to related-parties, purchases from related-parties, or related-party loans. The 
examination of the nature (i.e., the types) and extent (i.e., the dollar amount and the 
number) of RP transactions is conducted in accordance with a codification list of RP 
transactions, focusing on the nature of RP transactions and the nature of relationships 
between related parties. 
 
1.4.2 Scope of Accounting Regulations 
This study focuses on the Related Party Disclosure in relation to the requirements 
contained in the International Accounting Standards (IAS) 24 Related Party 
Disclosure applicable at the beginning of 2009 in all countries of study. Accordingly, 
this study refers to the domestic accounting standards in each of the sample 
countries, namely AASB 124 (Australia), PSAK 7 (Indonesia), FRS 124 (Malaysia), 
PAS 24 (the Philippines), FRS 24 (Singapore), TAS 47 (Thailand). Those domestic 
accounting standards are derived from IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure. A detailed 
discussion about these standards is provided in Chapter 2. 
1.5.  Main Findings 
The descriptive-comparative analysis on the nature and extent of RP transactions 
indicate that RP transactions are common across countries. Of the six countries, 
companies in Thailand report the highest number of RP transactions, followed by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines. Among all types of 
RP transactions, RP loans are the most common type of transactions. Relative to the 
other countries, Thailand and Indonesia report a higher number of RP loans, which in 
many cases are unsecured, interest-free, and repayable on demand. With respect to 
the nature of RP relationship, RP transactions with corporate combinations (i.e., 
subsidiaries, associates and joint venture) are common in all six countries. RP 
transactions with entities under common control are only reported by companies in 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, indicating the dominance of 
family-controlled firms in these countries4. RP transactions with director-related 
entities are more frequently reported in Thailand and Australia.  
The findings are also consistent with the expectations that corporate RP disclosure 
conformance to IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure differs across the Asia-Pacific 
countries (RQ2). The results reveal considerable country variations in the extent of 
RP disclosure conformance to IAS 24 by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. Of 
the six countries, Singapore shows the highest conformance to the mandatory 
requirements, followed by Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. With respect to the discretionary aspects of the RP disclosure 
requirements, Thailand shows the highest average, followed by Indonesia, Australia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. As for the overall disclosure, Australia has 
the highest average, followed by Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. The findings also indicate that companies appear to be more reluctant to 
disclose information regarding RP balances, which is concerning, given the high 
number of RP loans reported by companies in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The results of multivariate analysis support the expectation that the extent of RP 
disclosures by companies in the Asia Pacific region are associated with both firm- 
and country-specific factors of internal and external governance characteristics 
(RQ3). First, the findings reveal the influence of internal governance characteristics 
on the extent of corporate RP disclosures. In particular, smaller boards of directors 
are associated with higher levels of RP disclosures, suggesting that excessively larger 
boards may create redundancies and inefficiencies because, as boards grow, the costs 
of communication and inaccurate decision-making increases. In addition, a fewer 
independent board of directors is found to be associated with greater RP disclosures. 
This finding may be attributed to the substitution effects between board 
independence as a part of the internal monitoring mechanism and corporate RP 
disclosure. Further, companies with more concentrated ownership tend to provide 
                                                          
4
 Entities under common control include those under common control, those under a common ultimate holding 
company, other entities within the group, an entity under common key management, an entity under a common 
major shareholder, a subsidiary of an immediate holding company, an entity subject to common significant 
influence, wholly-owned subsidiaries of the company’s immediate and ultimate holding company, and a 
subsidiary of a holding company. 
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greater RP disclosures. Similarly, family-controlled companies are more likely to 
have higher levels of RP disclosures. Thus, family-controlled and high ownership 
concentration firms appear to be more transparent in their disclosures of RP 
information. 
Second, the findings also indicate the influence of external governance 
characteristics on the corporate disclosure of RP information. Specifically, the size of 
a firm’s external auditor (as measured by Big 4/non-Big 4 grouping) is positively 
related with the level of RP disclosure. Larger external audit firms tend to encourage 
client firms to be more transparent in their RP disclosures. With respect to the 
country-level governance characteristics, stronger control for corruption is likely to 
encourage greater or more transparent disclosure of RP information. Furthermore, 
companies in a country with stronger enforcement are also more likely to provide a 
higher level of overall RP disclosure, suggesting that the more active enforcement 
bodies are likely to encourage greater disclosure transparency of RP information. 
However, the strength of a country’s investor protection has an inverse relationship 
with RP disclosure. One possible explanation is that the investor protection index 
only captures the de jure legal system in a country, which will not be effective in the 
absence of effective law enforcement. Therefore, the enforcement mechanism 
appears to work better, particularly in Asian countries, than the investor protection 
mechanism. A robustness check on the alternative measure of investor protection 
provides support for this possible explanation.   
Taken together, the findings reveal that: (1) corporate RP transactions are common in 
the Asia-Pacific region, however they vary by the nature of transactions and by the 
nature of RP relationships; (2) the extent of RP disclosure conformance to IAS 24 
varies across countries in the region; (3) the extent of RP disclosures by companies 
in the Asia-Pacific region is influenced by both firm- and country-level factors; (4) in 
the firm level, the extent of RP disclosures is negatively associated with board 
independence and board size, and positively associated with ownership 
concentration, family-controlling ownership, Big 4 auditor, and RP transaction 
activity; and (5) in the country-level, greater RP disclosures are associated with the 
level of enforcement, investor protection, and control for corruption.   
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1.6.  Contributions 
Overall, this study’s findings provide a number of contributions to understanding the 
nature and extent of corporate RP disclosure transparency and the firm- and country-
specific factors associated with the disclosure. More broadly, this study contributes 
to the literature in a number of ways. First, this thesis extends prior studies on RP 
transactions which tend to focus more heavily on the “transactions”, either the 
amount or number of specific or general transactions, rather than on the 
“comprehensive disclosure transparency” of RP transactions. This thesis is among 
the first in pursuing the understanding of both of the nature and extent of RP 
transactions as well as the comprehensive disclosure transparency of such 
transactions using cross-countries setting. The cross-countries approach is beneficial 
in informing the influence of country-level factors on the extent of corporate RP 
disclosures. The study’s findings show that the country-level factors influence the 
disclosure transparency of RP information by companies in the Asia-Pacific region.   
Second, this thesis also provides empirical evidence on the link between accounting 
and corruption in a cross-country setting. There is a lack of research in this area. 
Malagueño, Albrecht, Ainge, and Stephens (2010, p. 375) contend that “[T]here is 
little cross country research that establishes a direct empirical link between 
accounting and corruption”. The evidence shows that less corrupt countries are 
associated with greater disclosure transparency of RP information. This finding 
supports previous studies in other areas which find that corrupt actions are more 
likely to be discovered when there is greater business transparency (Halter, Arruda, 
& Halter, 2009). The findings also suggest that in the absence of efficient control for 
corruption, RP transactions are more prevalent as a means of acquiring self-
interested benefits.  
Third, the findings of the study confirm the reports by OECD (2009, pp. 40–41) and 
CFA (2009, p. 37) which raise the issue of the effectiveness of board independence 
for companies in Asian countries5, particularly in relation to RP transactions. The 
findings reveal that some of the mechanisms (found to be associated with disclosure 
in other studies) were not associated with the extent of RP disclosures by companies 
                                                          
5
 For example, Hong Kong Exchange’s chief executive Paul Chow once mentioned that one challenge of 
corporate governance in Hong Kong is that non-executive independent directors may not be fully independent 
when major shareholders appoint the directors (Loon & De Ramos, 2009, p. 37). 
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in the Asia-Pacific region. The findings may suggest that such governance 
characteristics are not effective in encouraging RP disclosure transparencies by 
companies in this institutional setting. A more effective supervision and regulation 
may be required to ensure the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms as an 
internal monitoring system in a company, particularly given the costly investment 
expended by companies in establishing such mechanisms. For example, the number 
of boards on which an independent director may serve can be limited and the concept 
of independence can be reinforced, which is consistent with the recommendations by 
OECD (2009, pp. 40–41). In addition, a limitation should also be imposed on the 
duration of time that an independent can be appointed on the board as mentioned in 
the CFA report, “Because no limits exist on the number of times independent 
directors may serve on the board, their partiality is also prone to diminishing over 
time” (Loon & De Ramos, 2009, p. 37).   
Finally, the findings of this study provide important implications for standard setters 
and regulatory bodies in relation to a RP disclosure standard. In particular, the 
study’s findings show that the country-level factors, including the strength of 
enforcement by accounting regulatory bodies, the protection of minority shareholders 
against self-dealing actions, and the control for corruption influence corporate 
transparency of the RP disclosures. The disclosure of RP transactions, either in the 
form of mandatory or discretionary disclosures, is an essential component in 
strengthening the protection of minority shareholders, investors and other users 
relying on the financial statements as a legitimate source of information in their 
decision-making process (Lo & Wong, 2011). In this respect, the transparent RP 
disclosures enable users to better monitor transactions that may not be in accordance 
with shareholders’ best interests. As an implication, a more stringent RP accounting 
standard and RP disclosure requirements are warranted to enhance the disclosure of 
RP transactions, particularly as higher standards of RP disclosure are likely to 
strengthen the mitigation of opportunistic RP transactions and increase disclosure 
transparency. Thus, the findings can help policy makers, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific region, in articulating better RP disclosure requirements for listed companies. 
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1.7.  Organisation of the Study 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the 
institutional setting of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on the 
institutional factors potentially associated with RP transactions and the transparency 
of RP disclosures. Chapter 3 presents a review of the RP transactions literature 
relevant to this study. Chapter 4 develops the theoretical framework, research 
questions and research hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes the research design including 
the study period and sample selection, data sources, hypotheses testing procedures, 
and regression models. Chapter 6 presents the descriptive results on the nature and 
extent of RP transactions, the descriptive statistics, univariate results, and the 
multivariate results relating to the hypotheses. This thesis concludes in Chapter 7 
with a summary and discussion of the study’s major contributions, recommendations 
for future studies, limitations and implications.  
Chapter 2: Institutional Setting 
~ 14 ~ 
 
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
 
A country’s accounting and financial reporting in a country is influenced by its 
environment (Belkaoui & Alnajjar, 2006; Ruland, Shon, & Zhou, 2007). 
Specifically, accounting quality and practices are influenced by firm-, market-, and 
country-level factors; including legal and cultural environments, and accounting 
standard setting (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Biddle & Saudagaran, 1989; Rahman, 
2006). Among those factors, differences in legal systems have a profound effect on 
the approach to accounting and financial reporting (Ball et al., 2003; Epstein & 
Mirza, 2002). Similarly, both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that different 
institutional factors are likely to affect the nature and extent of related party (RP) 
transactions and RP disclosures (Djankov et al., 2008; Loon & De Ramos, 2009; 
OECD, 2009).  
RP transactions are presumably normal transactions, as emphasised in IAS 24 (Para. 
5): “Related-party relationships are a normal feature of commerce and business. For 
example, entities frequently carry on parts of their activities through subsidiaries, 
joint ventures and associates”. Based on this presumption, RP transactions are 
efficient transactions to obtain specific economic needs and rationally fulfil the 
economic demands of a company (efficient transaction hypothesis) (Gordon, Henry, 
& Palia, 2004a, 2004b). However, owing to the nature of the relationship between 
the entity and the related party, these parties may enter into transactions that are not 
on “arm’s-length” terms. The non-arm’s length term of RP transactions provides the 
opportunity for an agent to pursue personal interest at the expense of the principal’s 
interest (opportunistic or conflict-of-interest hypothesis) (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 
2004a, 2004b). Corporate governance systems and the economic environment, in 
which the firm operates, influence the economic rationale of a firm to enter into RP 
transactions (Pizzo, 2009). Additionally, previous studies on RP transactions suggest 
that a firm’s decision regarding RP transactions and their disclosures are associated 
with the firm’s ownership structure (Cheung, Qi et al., 2009), accounting regulation 
(Arshad, Darus, & Othman, 2009) and, importantly, institutional factors (Djankov et 
al., 2008; Jian & Wong, 2010).  
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This chapter presents an analysis of institutional factors across countries that are 
relevant to this study and documents the accounting regulation affecting RP 
disclosures. Section 2.1 examines institutional factors associated with RP 
disclosures, including ownership concentration, capital market development, the 
legal system and corporate governance principles. Section 2.2 discusses the evolution 
of international accounting standards on RP disclosures. Section 2.3 outlines the 
development of RP disclosure standards in selected Asia-Pacific countries. Finally, 
the chapter finishes with a conclusion in Section 2.4. 
2.1.  Country Factors Associated with RP Disclosures 
An extensive line of research suggests that country-specific factors play an essential 
role in influencing accounting practices and incentives (for example, Ball, 2006; 
Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Biddle & Saudagaran, 1989; Doupnik & Salter, 1995; 
Perera, 1989; Ruland et al., 2007)6. Perera (1989, p. 41) argues that “accounting is a 
product of economic environment, and a particular environment is unique to its time 
and locality”. In addition, a country’s accounting practices are influenced by the 
structure and level of its capital market development (Biddle & Saudagaran, 1989). 
Similarly, Doupnik and Salter (1995) suggest that external environment and 
institutional structure have significant influences on the development of accounting 
standards. Further, Ball et al. (2000) find that the role of accounting information is 
less effective in environments with low investor protection and a more concentrated 
ownership.  
Unlike current RP transactions studies, which tend to focus on the United States or 
other developed economies, this study focuses on Asia-Pacific countries, which 
provide a unique setting to investigate RP disclosures. First, firms in the Asian 
setting are commonly characterised by dominant shareholders and family ownership 
(Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Notably, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have a relatively higher number of 
family-controlled firms than the other countries. Second, Asia-Pacific countries also 
differ in legal origin, capital market development, enforcement, control for 
                                                          
6
 Ball et al. (2003) suggest that managers’ incentives in preparing financial reports are influenced by the 
interaction between the market and political forces in the reporting country. Market forces include the amount of 
publicly traded equity, the size of the market for public debt and the extent of private versus public contracting. 
Political forces include the extent of government involvement in codifying and enforcing accounting standards. 
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corruption, and corporate governance structures, including capital market 
development and strength of law enforcement. While those unique characteristics 
provide an important setting to investigate the nature and extent of corporate RP 
disclosures (Djankov et al., 2008; Loon & De Ramos, 2009; OECD, 2009), there are 
no known prior studies examining these institutional characteristics. This section 
identifies and discusses differences in institutional factors across key Asia-Pacific 
countries that are relevant to RP transactions and their disclosures.  
Table 2.1 presents comparative institutional factors affecting accounting disclosures 
in the countries of study; discussion of those factors follows. 
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Australia Common Law 128.8% 11 0.784 0.76 8.7 0.28 10.0 n.a n.a. 
Malaysia Common Law 132.7% 9 0.729 0.95 4.5 0.52 51.5 76.3 70.9 
Singapore Common Law 170.5% 6 0.770 1.00 9.2 0.49 60.2 75.9 74.0 
Indonesia Code Law 33.0% 4 0.507 0.65 2.8 0.58 57.3 68.1 58.2 
The 
Philippines 
Code Law 49.8% 8 0.812 0.22 2.4 0.57 78.5 66.4 71.0 
Thailand Code Law 52.3% 7 0.373 0.81 3.4 0.47 37.8 65.9 65.2 
Note: Legal origin is the origin of legal system of commercial code or company law in each country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, p. 
1122 citing Reynold & Flores, 1989); Stock Market Cap./GDP is the stock market capitalisation  as a percentage of GDP (ADB, 2010, p. 200); Enforcement 
Index is an index measuring cross-country differences in the enforcement of accounting standards in 2008 which ranges from 0-12, in which 12 is the strongest 
enforcement (Preiato et al., 2012); Investor Protection Index is a country’s securities regulation an index concerning legal protection of shareholders, which 
consists of the principal component of the indices of disclosure requirements, liability standards, and anti-director rights (La Porta et al., 2006); Anti Self-Dealing 
Index represents the protection of outside shareholders against self-dealing by insiders or controlling owners, which consists of ex-ante control, ex-post control, 
and public enforcement of anti-self-dealing practices (Djankov et al., 2008); Control for Corruption Index is a 2009 corruption perception index by Transparency 
International which ranges from 0-10 in which 10 is the cleanest from corruption (Transparency International, 2009a). For each proxy of enforcement, a higher 
score implies stronger enforcement. Ownership Concentration is the average ownership stake of the three largest shareholders among its 10 largest publicly 
traded companies (La Porta et al., 1998, pp. 1146-1147). Family is the number of firms controlled by family – using 10% as the criterion for control -- in a given 
country. Family ownership data for Australia is taken from La Porta et al. (1999, p. 493); whereas those of the other five countries are taken from Carney and Child 
(2012, p. 12). The sample of La Porta et al.’s (1999) dataset consists of top 20 firms ranked by market capitalisation of common equity at  the end of 1995. The 
sample of Carney and Child’s dataset consists of the top 200 largest firms by stock market capitalisation at the end of 2008 for which the ultimate ownership could 
be traced accurately. Controlling Owner Alone equals one if there is not a second owner who holds at least 10% of the stock, zero otherwise (Carney & Child, 
2012, p. 15). Management equals one if the CEO, board chairman, or vice chairman are from the controlling family, zero otherwise (Carney & Child, 2012, p. 15).  
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2.1.1 Legal Origin 
Table 2.1 identifies the legal origin of each country, distinguishing between common 
law and code law legal origins, following the classification of La Porta et al. (1998) 
and La Porta et al. (2006)7. The legal systems of Australia, Malaysia and Singapore 
are originated from common law, whereas those of Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand are from code law8.  
Code law is rooted in Roman law and has a greater emphasis on codes and statutes 
established by legal scholars (La Porta et al., 1998 citing Merryman, 1969). In 
contrast to the Code law, Common law – which originated in England – has a greater 
reliance on the precedents of judges’ decisions on particular disputes (La Porta et al., 
1998). Through colonisation, the Common law legal origin was disseminated to the 
U.K. and British colonies including, for example, the U.S., Canada, Australia and 
India (La Porta et al., 1998).  
The financial reporting system in a country may be influenced by its legal origin 
(e.g., Archambault & Archambault, 2003). A review on international accounting 
research by Meek and Thomas (2004, p. 29) suggests that “the international 
accounting literature has recognised for at least 30 years that accounting in common 
law countries differs from accounting in code law countries”9. Prior studies have 
provided evidence on the link between countries’ legal origin and accounting 
practices and disclosures10.  La Porta et al. (1998) classify countries into the British 
common law and the family of civil law legal origins (i.e., French, German and 
Scandinavian) and report that the legal origin in a country influences its accounting 
standards, shareholders’ rights and capital market development. Specifically, La 
Porta et al. find that law enforcement and shareholders’ protection are typically 
stronger in countries with British common law origins than in countries with French 
civil law. Consistent with this notion, Jaggi and Low (2000) find that firms in 
common law countries tend to have greater financial disclosures than those in code 
                                                          
7 La Porta et al. (1998, p. 1119) note that, “Thailand’s first laws were based on common law but since received 
enormous French influence”. This thesis classifies Thailand as a civil/code law country, which is also consistent 
with Nenova, Claessens, and Djankov (2000). 
8 As mentioned in Jaggi and Low (2000, p. 499, also citing Ball, 1998 and Ball et al., 1998), “The civil law 
countries have also been referred to as code law countries.” This thesis uses the code law terminology. 
9 Further, Meek and Thomas (2004, p. 29) also cite previous literature (e.g., Nobes, 1983; Berry, 1987; and 
Doupnik & Salter, 1993) that “The legal basis for accounting differences is a significant input into proposed 
classification of accounting systems worldwide.” 
10 For example, Archambault and Archambault (2003); Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000); Ball, Robin and Wu 
(2003); Hope (2003a, 2003b); Jaggi and Low (2000); La Porta et al. (1998). 
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law countries. Hope (2003b) also finds a positive association between common law 
legal origin and the levels of annual report disclosure. In addition, the accounting 
systems in common law countries tend to be more fairly presented, have greater 
transparency and a higher level of disclosure than those in code law countries (Meek 
and Thomas, 2004, p. 29).   
Compared to code law countries, common law countries generally have more 
developed capital markets and greater mandatory disclosure requirements which 
include the disclosure of RP transactions (La Porta et al., 2006, p. 6). Additionally, 
Djankov et al. (2008) find that the common law countries tend to have stronger 
regulations concerning the mitigation of companies’ self-dealing compared to the 
worldwide average. Following the findings of the previous studies, common law 
legal origins are expected to influence greater disclosure transparency. 
Table 2.1 also shows country differences in the development of capital market, the 
strength of enforcement, level of protection for investor, and control for corruption. 
2.1.2 Capital Market Development 
A country’s legal origin may also affect the development of its capital market. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that the size and extent of 
a country’s capital markets are associated with their legal environment – that is, both 
legal rules and their enforcement. “[A] good legal environment protects the potential 
financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs; it raises their willingness to 
surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence expands the scope of capital 
markets” (La Porta et al., 1997, p. 20). La Porta et al. (1997) find that common law 
countries are associated with more developed capital markets and stronger investor 
protections than code law countries. More recently, La Porta et al. (2006) developed 
a disclosure index and examined the association between the index and stock market 
development across 49 countries around the world. The disclosure index includes 
insiders’ compensation, ownership by large shareholders, inside ownership, contracts 
outside the normal course of business, and transactions with related parties (La Porta 
et al., 2006, pp. 10-11). They find a strong positive association between the 
development of capital markets and disclosure requirements, suggesting that a 
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developed capital market tends to have a more extensive disclosure requirement, 
including the disclosure of transactions with related parties11.  
Table 2.1 shows the average stock market capitalisation across six countries in 2009, 
measured by the percentage of stock market capitalisation relative to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). The stock market capitalisation of Australia, Malaysia and Singapore 
exhibits higher ratios than the other three countries, which may indicate that these 
three countries have more developed capital markets relative to the others. 
Djankov et al. (2008) investigate the influence of anti-self-dealing regulation on the 
development of capital markets across 72 countries around the world and find 
positive associations between capital market developments and the anti-self-dealing 
regulation12.  
Based on the findings in La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008), these more 
developed capital markets are expected to have more regulations concerning RP 
transactions and greater requirements of RP disclosures.  
2.1.3 Enforcement, Investor Protection and Control for Corruption 
In addition to the legal origin and capital market development, prior research in other 
areas of international accounting (e.g., earnings management) provides evidence on 
the association between the quality of accounting and the strength of enforcement 
(Ball et al., 2003; Hope, 2003a; Preiato et al., 2012), investor protection (Durnev & 
Kim, 2005; Francis & Wang, 2008; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003), and control for 
corruption (Kimbro, 2002; Malagueño et al., 2010). Table 2.1 shows the differences 
in the strength of enforcement, investor protection and control for corruption across 
the selected Asia-Pacific countries.  
Enforcement 
The quality of financial information is influenced by both the quality of accounting 
standards and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these accounting standards 
(Kothari, 2000). Ball (2006) argues that the quality of the enforcement of standards is 
                                                          
11
 La Porta et al. (2006) use seven proxies to measure the development of the stock market, including the ratio of stock market 
capitalisation to GDP scaled by the fraction of the stock market held by outside investors. They note that “the results are 
qualitatively similar for the unadjusted ratio of market capitalisation to GDP” (La Porta et al., 2006, p. 13)    
12
 The stock market development is represented by a ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 445). 
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a more credible signal of financial reporting quality rather than the standards per se, 
because assuring high enforcement standards would alter local political and 
economic interests. Stronger enforcement will ensure that disclosure requirements 
can provide better access to basic financial information (Morris & Gray, 2009). In a 
poor enforcement environment, a high quality disclosure requirement alone is not 
sufficient in developing high quality financial reporting, despite it being an essential 
step (Preiato et al., 2012).  
To represent the quality of a country’s enforcement of law, La Porta et al. (1998) 
develop a “law and order” proxy which includes the efficiency of the judicial 
system13, the respect for the rule of law, and the level of corruption14 in a country. 
Based on those developed measures, La Porta et al. (1998) report that common law 
countries tend to have stronger enforcement. However, La Porta et al.’s (1998) 
measures are constructed using the data from 1983–1995; hence they do not 
incorporate any recent institutional changes which may have been happening after 
the period (Preiato et al., 2012, p. 16). A more recent study by La Porta et al. (2006) 
examines securities laws concerning public enforcement and investor protection 
across countries. The public enforcement index is derived from the mean of 
supervisor characteristics, rule-making power, investigative power, orders, and 
criminal indices (La Porta et al., 2006, p. 9).  
The currently available enforcement proxies, however, tend to emphasise the general 
legal setting rather than accounting enforcement (Preiato et al., 2012, p. 2). 
Accordingly, Preiato et al. (2012) offer a self-constructed enforcement index, which 
emphasises countries’ accounting enforcement. The index captures the existence, 
activity, involvement, and responsibility of a country’s enforcement body or bodies 
in relation to the quality of financial reporting and standard setting outcomes. 
Specifically, the index measures seven enforcement items in a country, which are: 
whether a country has a security market regulator or another body monitors financial 
reporting, whether the body regulates audit firms, has power to set accounting and 
                                                          
13
 The rule of law reflects assessment of law and order tradition in the country, adapted from the country risk rating agency 
International Country Risk (ICR), and scored from 0-10 with lower scores indicating less tradition for law and order. The 
efficiency of judicial system is the assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms” adopted from the country risk rating agency Business International Corp and scored from 0-10 
(lower scores indicate lower efficiency). 
14
 The rule of law reflects the law and order tradition in the country, whereas the efficiency of judicial system considers the 
“efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms”. 
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auditing standards, reviews financial statements, provides a report about its review of 
financial statements, has taken enforcement action regarding financial statements, 
and what is the level of resourcing by the securities market regulator. The value of 
the index ranges between 0-12 with higher values for stronger enforcement. Based on 
the index, Preiato et al. (2012) find that countries with more developed capital 
markets tend to have stronger enforcement; however, they do not examine firms’ 
disclosure practices. Table 2.1 shows that, of the six countries, Australia has the 
highest enforcement index, whereas Indonesia has the lowest.  
Investor Protection  
In addition to the strength of enforcement mechanisms, extant research indicates that 
strong investor protection laws are warranted for high quality accounting (Leuz et al., 
2003; Meek & Thomas, 2004).  
La Porta et al. (1998) investigate the strength of investor protection laws across 49 
countries and their associations with the legal origin and the development of a capital 
market. To measure the strength of protection to shareholders’ rights, La Porta et al. 
(1998, p. 1127) develop an anti-director index which represents “how strongly the 
legal system favours minority shareholders against managers or dominant 
shareholders in the corporate decision-making process, including the voting 
process”15. Index scores (untabulated) range from zero to six, comprising the sum of 
one share/one-vote, proxy by mail, unblocked shares, cumulative vote/proportional 
representation, pre-emptive rights, oppressed minority, and percentage of shares 
needed to call a shareholder meeting (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1123).  Using La Porta 
et al.’s (1998) anti-director right and legal enforcement indices, Leuz et al. (2003) 
investigate the differences in earnings management across 31 countries. Leuz et al. 
predict and find evidence that stronger investor protection decreases earnings 
management, suggesting that the stronger investor protection reduces insiders’ 
private control benefits and thus increases the quality of accounting information.   
La Porta et al.’s (1998) anti-director index, however, has been criticised as being 
dated and not capturing the important aspects of the law (e.g., P. Brown, Beekes, & 
Verhoeven, 2011; Preiato et al., 2012). More recently, La Porta et al. (2006) develop 
an investor protection index which consists of a revised anti-director, a disclosure 
                                                          
15
 The selection of companies in each of those 49 countries is based on the largest stock market capitalisation in 1993.  
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requirement, and liability standard indices based on the securities laws for initial 
public offerings to examine the determinants of stock market development. Unlike 
the La Porta et al.’s (1998) original anti-director index which is collected through the 
“ad-hoc” inspection of company and bankruptcy laws across countries, the revised 
investor protection indices “are based on answers to a questionnaire by attorneys in 
the sample…” (La Porta et al., 2006, p. 5). The revised anti-director rights index is 
an aggregate index of shareholder rights according to the laws and regulations 
applicable to publicly traded firms in May 2003. The index is a summative of six 
items: vote by mail, shares not deposited, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, 
pre-emptive rights, and capital to call a meeting (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 455). The 
findings show that larger stock markets tend to be associated with both disclosure 
requirements and the liability standard in securities laws, but not related with all 
aspects of public enforcement. The findings may suggest the complementary role of 
securities regulation concerning protection for investors to the public enforcement 
(e.g., the active regulatory bodies or criminal sanctions). Table 2.1 indicates that the 
Philippines has the highest investor protection index, while Thailand has the lowest. 
Djankov et al. (2008) investigate the strength of investor protection across 72 
countries by specifically measuring the protection to minority shareholders against 
self-dealing by controlling owners. They develop an anti-self-dealing-index based on 
the six aspects of self-dealing regulations (i.e., approval by disinterested 
shareholders, ex ante disclosure, ex ante private control of self-dealing, disclosure in 
periodic filings, ease in proving wrongdoing, and ex post private control of self-
dealing). Djankov et al. (2008) find positive associations between capital market 
developments and each of the aspects as well as the overall anti-self-dealing index16 
(Djankov et al., 2008).  
Following previous empirical findings on the association between the strength of a 
country’s investor protection and firms’ disclosure practices (e.g., La Porta et al., 
2006; Djankov et al., 2008), firms in countries with stronger investor protection are 
expected to have a greater level of RP disclosures. As shown in Table 2.1, Singapore 
shows the highest value of the anti-self-dealing index and the Philippines the lowest.  
                                                          
16
 The stock market development is represented by a ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 445). 
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Control for Corruption 
A country’s control for corruption is argued to be an important component of an 
effective institutional regulatory framework (Transparency International, 2009b). 
The risks of corruption exist both inside and outside companies, therefore stronger 
control for corruption is expected  to mitigate corrupt acts in the public and private 
sectors (Aldrighi, 2009). Inside a company, corrupt acts may be in the form of 
opportunistic behaviours by managers or controlling owners. For example, 
controlling owners may exert their influence to expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders or managers may opportunistically pursue short-term profits to obtain 
private benefits at the expense of long-term profitability (Aldrighi, 2009, p. 16). A 
commitment towards greater transparency is argued to be one way to mitigate 
corrupt practices (e.g., Malagueño et al., 2010). Therefore, firms in countries with 
stronger control of corruption are expected to have greater disclosure transparency of 
RP information. Table 2.1 shows that Singapore has the highest score of corruption 
perception index, which means that this country is the least corrupt compared to the 
other five countries, whereas the Philippines has the lowest score of corruption (i.e., 
the highest level of corruption). 
2.1.4 Ownership Concentration 
In corporations with dispersed ownership, conflicts of interest exist between 
powerful controlling managers and shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In the corporations with dispersed ownership, RP transactions can 
increase the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, as the non-arm’s 
length nature of RP transactions can provide an opportunity for managers to pursue 
personal interests at the expense of other shareholders. However, in an environment 
with highly concentrated ownership structures, there is potentially additional agency 
conflict between the controlling owner (who is often also the manager) and 
outside/minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In this case, the controlling 
shareholders have the opportunity to exercise their private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders.  
Table 2.1 shows the ownership data taken from Carney and Child’s (2012) and La 
Porta et al.’s (1999) studies. La Porta et al. (1999) investigate the ownership 
structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies including Australia and 
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Singapore. Using similar definitions of ownership structure and year as La Porta 
(1999) but with a different sample, Claessens et al. (2000) investigate the ownership 
structure of East-Asian corporations. More recently, Carney and Child (2012) 
investigate the ownership and control of East Asia’s largest companies in 1996 and 
200817 by mirroring the dataset, variables and sources of Claessens et al.’s (2000) 
study.  As shown in Table 2.1, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
have a higher number of family-controlled firms than the other countries. In these 
four countries, control of listed corporate assets lies in the hands of a small number 
of families. The controlling owner alone, as shown in the table, indicates that more 
than 30% of listed firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand are controlled by a single shareholder. Additionally, more than 60% of 
firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have managers who are 
members of the controlling family, suggesting that the separation of management 
from ownership control is uncommon. Such a relationship (between the controlling 
family and management) is relatively infrequent in the Philippines, which is most 
probably due to a preference in that country for interlocking directorates and 
management boards18 (Claessens et al., 2000; citing Tan, 1993).  
The studies by La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Carney and Child 
(2012) document that family-controlled firms are very common among listed 
companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand but are 
very rare in Australia. The concentration of ownership and the presence of family 
ownership raise conflicts of interest between the controlling and minority 
shareholders. The concentrated ownership of Asian corporations, including family-
controlled ones, is most probably associated with weak enforcement of property 
rights. Such ownerships’ structure could be used as mechanisms to tackle weak legal 
systems, poor law enforcement and corruption (Claessens et al., 2000). Ownership 
concentration and family ownership can form institutional arrangements to facilitate 
related transactions. In such an arrangement, the transaction costs among family 
members can be reduced. Moreover, closely affiliated companies have lower 
                                                          
17 Carney and Child (2012, p. 2) state: “[T]o map changes since 1996 our data set mirrors that of Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) with respect to the variables and sources used so as to ensure consistency”. 
18 Interlocking directorates and management boards exist when member(s) of a controlling family serve on the 
board of directors or management board of companies which are controlled by other family(ies) (Claessens et al., 
2000, citing Tan, 1993). 
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information asymmetry, which may otherwise exist in transactions among unrelated 
parties (Claessens et al., 2000).  
2.1.5 Corporate Governance Principles 
It is claimed that effective corporate governance mechanisms play an essential role in 
monitoring RP transactions, particularly in ensuring efficient transactions and 
preventing opportunistic transactions (OECD, 2009; Loon & De Ramos, 2009). Prior 
studies suggest that the critical components of effective corporate governance 
include the mandatory establishment of an audit committee in the listed companies, 
the financial expertise of audit committee members, and the board’s independence, 
as well as board competence and financial expertise19 (OECD, 2009, pp. 37-42). In 
addition, a formal and transparent board nomination and election process is 
considered vital (OECD, 2004). Those factors are likely to be fundamental to 
ensuring the disclosure transparency and credibility of company financial statements, 
specifically the disclosure of RP transactions. 
As previously discussed, the Claessens et al. study (2000) shows that companies in 
East Asian countries (including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand) tend to have high family-concentrated ownership. In those companies, the 
board of directors and top management are typically dominated by the controlling 
shareholders, who tend to have family relationships. In addition, a study by Asian 
Development Bank reports that prior to the Asian financial crisis, listed companies in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand rarely had both independent boards of directors 
and audit committee (Nam & Nam, 2004). Since the crisis, a number of corporate 
governance reforms have been implemented by the Asia-Pacific countries in order to 
strengthen the efficacy of the board of directors’ internal oversight role (Nam & 
Nam, 2004).  
                                                          
19
 For example, as a response to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, the U.S. SEC defines a financial expert (in the 
audit committee) as “a director who (1) understands GAAP and financial statements; (2) can assess the 
application of GAAP for estimates, accruals, and reserves; (3) has prepared, audited, analyzed, or evaluated 
financial statements similar to those of the company or has experience supervising those who performed these 
functions; (4) understands internal controls and financial reporting procedures; and (5) understands audit 
committee functions. Directors may acquire these attributes through education and experience as (or by 
supervising) a principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, controller, public accountant, or auditor; by 
overseeing or assessing companies or public accountants in the preparation, auditing, or evaluation of financial 
statements; or from other relevant experience. See the SEC document at www.sec.gov/rules/final/” (The 
Corporate Governance of Listed Companies CFA, 2009, p. 14). 
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Various recent reforms and enhancements in corporate governance rules and 
guidelines are evident across the Asia-Pacific region. In Australia, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) was established in 2002 to provide 
guidelines to improve corporate governance practices. The ASX CGC issued 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations in 2003 and a revised 
edition in 2007 (ASX CGC, 2007). The ASX Listing Rule (4.10) requires listed 
companies to disclose their corporate governance practices in the annual reports, 
according to the best practice recommendations in the reporting period (Plastow, 
2011). Further, ASX Listing Rule (12.7) mandates the establishment of an audit 
committee for the top 300 ASX listed companies (Munro & Buckby, 2008)20. In 
addition, the ASX CGC recommends that an audit committee has at least three non-
executive directors, who are mostly independents, and is chaired by an independent 
director, who is not chair of the board (ASX CGC, 2007).  
Following the Asian financial crisis, Asian countries have intensified their efforts in 
developing better governance to monitor firms and enhance their accountability and 
transparency. In March 2000, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was 
formulated and incorporated in Chapter 15 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
requirements and became effective in January 2001  (Morris, Pham, & Gray, 2011). 
The code is mainly based on the Cadbury Report 2002 and Hampel Report 1998 
(Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007). The code requires listed companies to have 
independent directors (with at least the higher number between two directors and 
one-third of the board), an audit committee (at least three directors who are mostly 
independent), and appoint an external auditor (Morris et al., 2011). Following a 
revision to strengthen corporate governance in 2007, several key amendments were 
incorporated into the code. The amendments include the establishment of the 
Auditing Oversight Board under the support of the Securities Commission, 
prohibition of executive directors from becoming members of the audit committee, 
and a mandatory internal audit for all publicly listed companies (Wan-Hussin, 2009).  
In the Philippines, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the code 
for Corporate Governance in 2002 and the code became effective in that year. The 
                                                          
20
 “ASX Listing Rules are contractually binding on ASX listed companies and are enforceable under sections 
793C and 1101B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)(Commonwealth of Australia 2001)” (Munro and Buckby, 
2008). 
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code requires public companies to establish a board of directors, which includes at 
least two independent directors or at least 20% of the total of board members 
(whichever is the lesser). In addition, public companies must have an audit 
committee of at least three board members, preferably with accounting and finance 
background (one of whom should be an independent director and another to have 
related audit experience). The chairperson of the audit committee should be an 
independent director. Failure to comply with the recommendation would subject the 
firm to a penalty of PHP100,000 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002).  
In Singapore, the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) adopted the Code of Corporate 
Governance (CCG) in April 2001 (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). The CCG was reissued in 
2005 and became effective in January 2007 following the recommendations and 
review by the Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance (CCDG), a body 
established in August 2002. All of the recommendations were accepted, except two  
which were related to the definition of the independent director (which excluded the 
independence from substantial shareholders) and detailed disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration (CFA, 2011). In September 2007, the corporate governance (CG) 
oversight responsibilities were transferred to the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) and the SGX. The listing rules of the SGX have been criticised as they do 
“not always back up the code” (CFA 2011, p.4). For example, the code recommends 
that a minimum of one-third of the board be independent directors. However, the 
SGX listing rules require only two independent directors on each board (CFA, 2011).   
In Thailand, the Thai Stock Exchange (SET) reissued the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 2006. The code incorporates the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Principles of 
Corporate Governance and follows the World Bank’s recommendations in the Report 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (CG-ROSC). The Thai corporate 
governance principles require a minimum number of independent directors (at least 
one-third of the board size but not less than three). The principles also require the 
chairman of the board to be an independent director and the establishment of an audit 
committee, remuneration committee and nomination committee for all listed 
companies (SET, 2006). 
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Lastly, in Indonesia, the corporate governance model differs from the rest of other 
countries in the region. Indonesian Company Law21 (1995, revised in 2007) requires 
a two-tier corporate governance structure of Indonesian listed companies: that is, the 
board of commissioners and the board of directors. Similar to independent non-
executive directors, the board of commissioners provides direction and supervision to 
the board of directors in managing the day-to-day operation of the firm (Morris, Ho, 
Pham, & Gray, 2004). The Company Law (1995, revised in 2007) requires public 
companies to have at least two members on the board of commissioners22.  
In addition, the stock exchange listing regulation (JSX 2000, revised in 2001) 
requires listed companies to have independent directors who make up at least 30% of 
the board
23
. Listed companies are also required to establish an audit committee with 
at least three members, one of whom is an independent director. The others should be 
independent professionals in accounting or finance, recruited from outside of the 
company.  
Overall, each of the six countries in the Asia-Pacific region has embarked on a 
number of reforms to strengthen the efficacy of the oversight role of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Specifically, the corporate governance code in all countries 
requires independent directors on the board, establishment of an audit committee 
with an independent chair, and competence of the board members as well as audit 
committee members. These corporate governance reforms are expected to impact 
corporate RP transactions, that is to minimise abusive RP transactions and influence 
more transparent RP disclosure. However, the differences in legal systems in each 
country may affect the effectiveness of corporate governance rules. For example, in 
countries with weak law enforcement, the rules and requirements of corporate 
governance mechanisms can be cut short, impeding their role in mitigating 
abusive/opportunistic RP transactions and ensuring the disclosures of RP 
                                                          
21
 Article 94 (2) of the Company Law (1995), revised in Article 108 (5) of the Company Law (2007). 
22
 Hereafter, for comparative purposes, the term “board” or “directors” is used in reference to the Indonesian 
board of commissioner (in a two-tier structure) or board of directors (in a one-tier structure), unless stated 
otherwise. Such approach in terminology is consistent with previous studies (for example, Morris et al., 2004; 
Siregar & Utama, 2008).  
23 JSX (Jakarta Stock Exchange) was the Indonesian stock exchange based in Jakarta, Indonesia. In 2007, JSX 
merged with the Surabaya Stock Exchange and changed its name into the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
(http://www.idx.co.id/en-us/home/aboutus/history.aspx). 
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transactions. Accordingly, this study aims to investigate the associations of both 
corporate governance mechanisms and law enforcement with corporate RP 
disclosure practices. 
2.1.6 Summary of Institutional Factors Affecting RP Disclosures 
In summary, there are a number of key institutional factors across countries which 
are relevant to this study of RP transactions and RP disclosures. First, there are 
differences in the origins of legal systems across sample countries which are likely to 
affect corporate accounting practices and disclosure transparency. The legal systems 
in Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand originated from common law, 
whereas those of Indonesia and the Philippines originated from code law. Second, 
certain countries have more developed capital markets and relatively stronger law 
enforcement than the others. The differences in the stock market development may 
affect the regulation of RP transactions and their disclosures, as more developed 
stock markets tend to require greater disclosure in general. Third, there are also 
differences in the degree of ownership concentration and family ownership across 
countries. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have a relatively higher number of 
family-controlled firms than the other countries. Finally, despite a number of 
corporate governance reforms implemented in each of the six countries in the Asia-
Pacific region, the differences in the strength of enforcement may impact the efficacy 
of the oversight role of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating RP 
transactions and ensuring RP disclosure transparency. Those unique characteristics 
provide an important setting to investigate corporate RP disclosures, in particular, 
whether those characteristics impact on the nature and extent of RP disclosures.  
2.2.  Evolution of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 
While institutional factors may influence the extent of RP transactions, knowledge of 
those transactions by stakeholders is essential to their effective monitoring. Public 
disclosure of RP transactions enables users of financial statements to fully assess a 
firm’s operations, its associated risks, and opportunities. Consistent with this notion, 
Henry, Gordon, Reed, and Louwers (2012, p. 190) point out the critical concern 
regarding the disclosure of RP transactions: “The issue is whether reported 
transactions, if not identified as being with a related party, might distort the 
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economic reality of the company’s financial position”. For example, 
sales/loans/receivables to a related party may not be made on similar terms as sales 
to third parties; or sales to a related party may not be as sustainable as sales to third 
parties  (Henry et al., 2012). Given the possibility of opportunistic behaviour, it is not 
surprising that disclosure standards have evolved in an attempt to facilitate effective 
disclosure of RP transactions. 
Table 2.2 presents the introduction and evolution of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure 
over time. As shown in Table 2.2, the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) published an Exposure Draft (ED 25) on RP disclosures in March 1983. 
Following the comment period and after examining submissions, IAS 24 Related 
Party Disclosures was released by the IASC in July 1984, effective from 1 January 
1986. The disclosure requirements of the standard were similar to those of the U.S., 
that is, Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 57 Related Party Disclosure, which 
was issued in 1982. Both standards require detailed disclosures of RP transactions, 
including: 
(1) information about the parent company  
(2) information about the nature and amount of transactions  
(3) information about the nature of relationships with related parties 
Table 2.2 also shows that IAS 24 (1984) was reformatted in 1994 in order to align 
with the presentation of IASs issued from 1991 onwards (Epstein & Mirza, 2002). 
There was no substantial change or revision in the 1994 reformatted version (Epstein 
& Mirza, 2002). A few years later, in October 1995, the U.K. standard, FRS 8 
Related Party Disclosures was issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 
Table 2.2 History of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure 
Date  Activity 
March 1983  Exposure Draft E25 Disclosure of Related Party Transactions 
July 1984  Issuance of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure 
1 January 1986  Effective date of IAS 24 (1984) Related Party Disclosure 
1994  Issuance of reformatted IAS 24  
16 December 2004  Issuance of Revised IAS 24 (Effective from 1 January 2005) 
February 2007  Issuance of ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 24  
11 December 2008  Issuance of Revised ED of Proposed Amendments to IAS 24  
4 November 2009  Issuance of Revised IAS 24 (Effective from 1 January 2011) 
Source: Adapted from http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard22 
Chapter 2: Institutional Setting 
~ 32 ~ 
 
Following the IASC’s restructuring process in March 2001, an Exposure Draft on its 
Improvement Project was published by the IASB in May 2002
24
. This project 
proposed amendments to 12 of its 43 active standards, with the objective to 
“eliminate certain conceptual inconsistencies among the standards, provide 
additional guidance on implementation, improve required disclosures, and ameliorate 
poorly drafted language and structure of certain extant standards” (Epstein & Mirza, 
2004).  Included in the Exposure Draft is IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures, which 
was finalised on 1 December 2003 and became effective for annual accounting 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005 (Epstein & Mirza, 2005)
25
.  According 
to the standard, the objective of Related Party Disclosures (IAS 24, 2003, para. 1) is 
as follows: 
[T]o ensure that an entity’s financial statements contain the disclosures 
necessary to draw attention to the possibility that the reported financial 
position and results may have been affected by the existence of related 
parties, transactions or outstanding balances with such parties.  
In the standard, a related party transaction is defined as “any transfer of resources, 
services or obligations between related parties, regardless of whether a price is 
charged” (IAS 24, 2003, para. 9)26. The definition of related parties includes parties 
with joint control over the reporting entity, joint ventures in which the reporting 
entity is a joint venturer, individuals who control the reporting entity, post-
employment benefit plans for the benefit of employees of the entity, or of any entity, 
that is a related party of the entity, and non-executive directors (para. 9). IAS 24 
(2003) also provides detailed definition of “close family members” which includes 
“domestic partners and children or dependents of the individual or domestic partner”. 
The state-controlled entities are also required to disclose RP transactions entered into 
with other state-controlled enterprises. 
                                                          
24
 The IASB was constituted to carryover the main task of achieving the convergence of national accounting 
standards and ensuring the promotion of IAS from March 2001 (Epstein & Mirza, 2003). 
25
 Having been finalised, the revised IAS 24 was not officially issued as the IASB decided to wait until all 
standards under the Improvements Project were completed. Therefore, as shown in Table 2.2, the revised IAS 24 
was officially issued in 16 December 2004. 
26
 This definition is consistent with the previously applicable IAS 24 (1984 and 1994), which defines related-
party transactions as “dealings between related parties involving transfer of resources or obligations between 
them, regardless of whether a price is charged for the transactions”.  
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The standard requires a reporting entity to disclose the name of its parent and the 
ultimate controlling party, if different (IAS 24, 2003, para. 12). When neither the 
entity’s parent nor the ultimate controlling party produces public financial 
statements, the entity shall disclose the name of the next most senior parent that does 
so (IAS 24, 2003, para. 15). The identity of the parent company is essential 
information to clarify a complex business structure which the reporting entity is a 
part of. Information about the parent’s identity enables users of financial statements 
to trace the parent’s or ultimate controlling party’s financial statements if such a 
report is required in the decision-making process (Mackenzie et al., 2012).  
Paragraph 16 of IAS 24 (2003) also requires detailed disclosure of key management 
personnel (KMP) compensation, which includes five categories of compensation in 
addition to the total amount. Such disclosures are subject to criticisms. Firstly, 
detailed disclosure of KMP remuneration is deemed as very sensitive information in 
some jurisdictions, hence an aggregated amount is often preferred than more detailed 
amounts. Secondly, it is argued that the approval processes for KMP remuneration 
already exist within the reporting entities (for example, through the remuneration 
committee), which should prevent abusive practices or excessive remunerations. 
Despite these criticisms, detailed KMP compensation disclosures are mandatorily 
required in IAS 24 (2003) as such details are relevant for users’ decision-making and 
they, undoubtedly, are RP transactions (Mackenzie et al., 2012). 
Regarding the RP balances, paragraph 17 of the standard requires companies to 
disclose the amount of outstanding balances, and terms and conditions of the 
balances. The requirements include detailed information of whether the balances are 
secured, how repayments will be made (e.g., settled by cash), details of guarantees 
given or received, the amounts of bad debt provisions and bad debts expenses 
recognised. It is argued that these details should provide better economic assessment 
on RP transaction balances and may reveal any irregularities, for example, whether 
any provisions are provided for and/or written-off from RP bad debts and, if so, 
whether the amount is reasonable (Epstein & Mirza, 2006).    
Interestingly, comparisons of the amounts of RP transactions to arm’s length 
amounts are no longer required in IAS 24 (2003), owing to the difficulty in 
determining arm’s length pricing with sufficient accuracy and reliability (IAS 24, 
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2003, para. 21). Based on the presumption that RP transactions are not arm’s length 
by their nature, IAS 24 (2003) highlights: “Disclosures that related party transactions 
were made on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s length transactions are 
made only if such terms can be substantiated” (IAS 24, 2003, para. 22, emphasis 
added). Accordingly, firms/managers have to justify the arm’s length value of RP 
transations if they wish to indicate the transactions are under arm’s length terms 
(Mirza, Holt, & Orell, 2006). Nonetheless, the justification is likely to involve 
discretionary judgment by the reporting entity’s management. 
Paragraph 22 of IAS 24 (2003) advises that: “items of a similar nature may be 
disclosed in aggregate except when separate disclosure is necessary for an 
understanding of the effects of related party transactions on the financial statements 
of the entity”. Aggregation can simplify the presentation of financial statements and 
thus provide a greater focus in analysing the nature of transactions; however, 
separate disclosure may also be needed for certain information. For example, RP 
balances need to be disclosed separately for each RP owing to the different 
materiality and risk of RP balances with the party. For instance, the balance of loans 
provided to the director is deemed to have higher materiality and risk than a similar 
balance with a subsidiary (Epstein & Mirza, 2005).  
Overall, IAS 24 (2003) improved guidance on RP disclosures. However, the standard 
still leaves room for discretionary judgment by reporting entities. As an endeavour to 
further improve IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures and in particular its acceptance 
worldwide, the IASB issued ED Amendment of IAS 24 in February 2007. 
Specifically, the amendment aimed to clarify and remove inconsistencies in the 
definition of a related party by removing the disclosure requirement for transactions 
between state-controlled entities. Following the comment period and after studying 
submissions, the amended IAS 24 was issued in November 2009 and became 
applicable from 1 January 2011 (http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/2012/ 
ias24.pdf).   
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures (2009) amends the requirements to: provide a 
partial exemption from related party disclosure requirements for government-related 
entities, clarifies the definition of a related party (to remove inconsistencies), and 
includes an explicit requirement to disclose commitments involving related parties. 
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In comparison, the disclosure requirements in IAS 24 (2009) are not substantially 
different from those of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures (2003). However, since 
IAS 24 (2009) is effective from 1 January 2011, the revised requirements apply to 
reports ending on or after 31 December 2011. Accordingly, IAS 24 (2003) is used as 
the applicable international standard for this study due to the study period being 
fiscal year 2009. 
2.3.  RP Disclosure Standards in the Asia-Pacific Countries   
This section outlines domestic regulation on RP disclosures in Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In 2009, the accounting standards 
in all those countries were based on IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures. Accordingly, 
as discussed in the previous section, IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures (2003) is used 
as a benchmark for cross-country comparison. Table 2.3 presents the extent of IAS 
24 adoption across six countries. 
Table 2.3 Extent of Conformance to IAS 24 and Relevant Regulatory Authority in 
Fiscal Year 2009 
Countries Extent of IAS 24 
Conformance* 







Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission 
(ASIC) 
Requires additional KMP 
disclosures (Aus25.1 to 
Aus 25.9.3). 
Indonesia Partial disclosure 
(PSAK 7) 
Capital Market Law 
1995  
Company Law 40 
(2007) 
Bapepam –LK (Capital 
Market and Financial 
Institutions Supervisory 
Agency) 
Less disclosure for joint 
venture, post 
employment benefit 






Act 1997 (Amended 
2004) 
Securities Commission State-controlled entities 
are exempted. 
Thailand Partial disclosure 
(TAS 47) 
The Accounting Act 
B.E. 2543 (2000) 
 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission Thailand 




















Note: *Extent of IAS 24 conformance means conformance to the IAS 24 (2003). Full-plus disclosure = RP disclosure standard 
requires additional paragraphs of disclosure requirements; full disclosure = RP disclosure standard requires full disclosure; 
partial disclosure = RP disclosure standard requires less disclosure; all are in comparison with IAS 24 (2003).  
Sources: www.aasb.gov.au; www.iasplus.com; www.iaigobal.or.id;www.bapepam.go.id; the Philippines Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (www.picpa.com.ph); www.iasb.org. 
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Table 2.3 indicates that the level of conformance to the IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosures in the year 2009 differs across countries. Specifically, domestic 
accounting standards for RP disclosures in Indonesia and Thailand were based on 
IAS 24 (a 1984 version and a reformatted 1994 version, respectively), whereas those 
of other countries were based on IAS 24 (2003). Owing to the differences in the 
extent of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure conformance, there were several notable 
differences in the component of RP disclosure requirements across countries. RP 
disclosure requirements in conformance with IAS 24 (2003) in each selected country 
are further discussed below.   
2.3.1 Australia   
Table 2.3 shows that Australian Accounting Standards are issued by the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB) and have the legal backing of the Corporations 
Act (2001). The Australian accounting standards regulating RP disclosures have 
experienced several changes. The first accounting standard addressing RP 
transactions in Australia, AASB 1017 Related Party Disclosures, was issued in 1989 
and last revised in 1997. Consistent with IAS 24 in determining the existence of 
related party relationship, AASB 1017 emphasised the substance of the relationship, 
rather than its legal form (para. 3).   
AASB 1017 required reporting entities to disclose the details of relationships, 
transactions and balances within three classes of related parties (directors and their 
related entities, members of a wholly owned group, and other related parties). 
Following the need for a more comprehensive disclosure for transactions relating to 
company officers, AASB 1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing 
Entities was then issued by the AASB in January 2004. 
Upon full convergence with IFRS, effective in July 2004, companies were required 
to comply with AASB 124 Related Party Disclosure, which is equivalent to IAS 24 
(2003). Further, AASB 124 was reissued in December 2005 following an amendment 
in December 2004 as a process of integrating the requirements of AASB 1046 
Director and Executive Disclosure by Disclosing Entity. Since the disclosure-
requirements for key management personnel (KMP) compensation in AASB 124 are 
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less extensive27 than those in AASB 1046, additional requirements of Other Key 
Management Personnel Disclosure by Disclosing Entity are added in paragraph 
Aus25.1 to Aus25.9.3 of AASB 124. This additional paragraph is intended to make 
the KMP disclosures in AASB 124 equivalent to AASB 1046, and simultaneously 
comply with IAS 2428 (2003) (AASB, 2008; ICAA, 2008). Accordingly, as shown in 
Table 2.3, the extent of conformance is labelled as “full-plus disclosure”. 
2.3.2 Indonesia  
The Indonesian Accounting Standards Board (DSAK)29 promulgates the accounting 
pronouncements in Indonesia. DSAK – a body established by the Indonesian 
Institute of Accountants (IAI) – issues Statements of Financial Accounting Standards 
(PSAK) and their interpretations (ISAKs). As shown in Table 2.3, the financial 
accounting standards have legal backing through both the Capital Market Law (Law 
8/1995) and the Company Law (1995, revised in Law 40/2007).  
In 1973, IAI codified the first Indonesian Accounting Principles (PAI), which is 
sourced from Grady’s (1965) Inventory of GAAP for Business Enterprises (as cited 
in Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia, 2007; Saudagaran & Diga, 2000). In 1984, the PAI 
were revised to integrate several Indonesian business concepts. Further, from 1987 to 
1991, several statements of accounting principles based on the U.S. accounting 
treatments were issued. Then, in September 1994, IAI undertook a major revision by 
adopting 21 International Accounting Standards (IAS), renamed as “Financial 
Accounting Standards” or “Standar Akuntansi Keuangan” (SAK), and made those 
standards mandatory for all publicly listed companies (IAI, 2007; Saudagaran & 
Diga, 2000). In the same year, IAI decided to fully harmonise, the term later revised 
as “adopt”, its accounting standards to IAS/IFRS30. Among those newly adopted 
                                                          
27
That is, the term specified director, executive and specified executive are replaced by key management personnel (KMP) as a 
sole definition in AASB 124 (including a removal of the requirement to describe at least five executives with the highest 
authority). 
28
 AASB 124 states (AASB 124, p.7), “Entities that comply with AASB 124 will simultaneously be in compliance with IAS 
24.” Further, “Compliance with the additional individual key management personnel disclosure requirements in paragraphs 
Aus29.1 to Aus29.9.3 of AASB 124 is not needed for IFRS compliance.”  
29
 DSAK (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan) has been so named since September 1998. Previously this authoritative body 
was established in 1973 as Komite IAI (IAI, 2007). 
30
 On 23 December 2008, IAI announced a formal statement of its plan and roadmap to fully adopt the IFRS starting 1 January 
2012 (IAI, 2009). The Exposure Draft of PSAK 7 (2009 revision), adopted from IAS 24 amended in 2009, was released on 15 
December 2009. This PSAK is effective from 1 January 2012. 
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standards was “Pernyataan Standard Akuntansi Keuangan” or PSAK 7 (1994) 
Related Party Disclosure, which refers to IAS 24 (1984) 31.  
In addition to PSAK 7, the Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory 
Agency (BAPEPAM-LK) as the enforcement authority requires listed companies to 
disclose related party transactions in the audited annual and semi-annual reports 
(Rule VIII.G.7 and IX.E.1)  (BAPEPAM, 2000; OECD, 2009) 32. In comparison with 
IAS 24 (2003), Indonesian GAAP has four notable differences. First, there is no 
specific requirement to disclose the name of the ultimate parent entity, unless there is 
a transaction with the party (Deloitte, 2007; KPMG, 2008; PWC, 2005; IAI, 2007). 
Second, while a company needs to disclose the total compensation of key 
management personnel, there is no requirement for detailed disclosures by category 
of compensation (KPMG, 2008; PWC, 2005; IAI, 2007). Third, in relation to the 
related party definition, Indonesian GAAP defines that an entity which has a 
common director or other member of the key management personnel with the 
reporting entity is deemed to be related. Lastly, Indonesian GAAP requires firms to 
disclose the pricing for RP transactions and the reasons for providing allowances for 
outstanding receivables (IAI, 2007; KPMG, 2008; BAPEPAM, 2000). Accordingly, 
as shown in Table 2.3, the extent of conformance is labelled as “partial disclosure”. 
2.3.3 Malaysia 
The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) issues Malaysian Accounting 
Standards (MAS), and is an independent authoritative body established under the 
Financial Reporting Act 1997 (refer to Table 2.3 above).  
Historically, Malaysia followed the U.K. in setting their domestic accounting 
standards. However, after the IASC formation in 1973, Malaysia announced their 
support for the IASC Standards (Saudagaran & Diga, 2000). As early as 1977, the 
professional accounting bodies, which include the Malaysian Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (MACPA) and the Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
(MIA), endorsed IAS adoption (Ball et al., 2003).  
                                                          
31
 The original title is PSAK 7, Pengungkapan Pihak-Pihak yang Mempunyai Hubungan Istimewa (IAI, 2007) 
32
 Bapepam-LK is the securities and non-bank financial institutions regulator and has issued a number of 
corporate governance related regulations (ROSC CG, 2010). 
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Effective for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2000, listed 
companies in Malaysia are required to comply with MAS 8 Related Party 
Disclosure. In 2005, the MASB embarked on a restructuring process of the 
accounting standards, by renaming and renumbering all the applicable MASB 
Standards as Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs). In the restructuring process, 
MASB issued Exposure Draft of MAS 8 Related Party Disclosure on 1 July 2004. 
Following the comment period, MAS 8 was superseded by FRS 124 Related Party 
Disclosure, which is equivalent to IAS 24 (2003) (IASPlus, 2009). Accordingly, as 
shown in Table 2.3, the extent of conformance is labelled as “full disclosure”. 
2.3.4 The Philippines 
The Philippines Accounting Standards (PAS) are issued by the Accounting Standards 
Council (ASC), an organisation established in 1981 by the Philippines Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (PICPA). Historically, accounting standards in the 
Philippines were drawn from the U.S. accounting sources, in particular from the 
recommended treatments by the U.S. standard-setting bodies. Domestic standards 
based on the U.S. pronouncements were developed in the 1980s (Saudagaran & 
Diga, 2000). However, in 1994, the Philippines accounting standard setting body 
decided to move toward full adoption of international accounting standards (Fajardo, 
2009). In November 2004, the ASC approved the adoption of IAS and IFRS, which 
were then renamed as Philippines Accounting Standards (PASs) and Philippines 
Financial Reporting Standards (PFRS), respectively. The standards were adopted 
with very minor modification such as the effective dates, and became effective in 
January 2005 (Fajardo, 2009). 
The Philippines related party disclosures, regulated under the Philippines Accounting 
Standard (PAS) 24 Related Party Disclosure, have become effective for accounting 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2002 (IASPlus, 2009). Subsequently, in 
2005, following the Philippines adoption to IFRSs without modification, IAS 24 
(2003) was adopted and renamed as PAS 24. Accordingly, as shown in Table 2.3, the 
extent of conformance is labelled as “full disclosure”. The standard became effective 
from 1 January 2005. 
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2.3.5 Singapore 
Similar to Malaysia, Singapore followed the U.K. in setting their domestic 
accounting standards. However, they announced their support for the IASC 
Standards upon the formation of the IASC in 1973 (Saudagaran & Diga, 2000). The 
professional accounting body, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of 
Singapore (ICPAS) was established in 1987 and since then has been relying on the 
IASC as its main guidance for standard setting (Ball et al., 2003).  
In 2001, the Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee (DASC) of ICPAS 
recommended the adoption of the IFRS. Following the recommendation, the Council 
on Corporate Disclosure and Governance (CCDG), an authoritative body with the 
main task of promulgating Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (FRS), revised 
and issued the FRSs in 2004. All the revised FRSs were “almost identical” to the IAS 
(IASPlus, 2010)33.    
Listed companies in Singapore are required to disclose their RP transactions based 
on FRS 24 (2003) Related Party Disclosure. The standard was then superseded by 
FRS 24 (2004), which is equivalent to IAS 24 (2003) and became effective for 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005 (www.icpas.org.sg)
34
. Accordingly, as 
shown in Table 2.3, the extent of conformance is labelled as “full disclosure”. 
2.3.6 Thailand 
Table 2.3 shows that accounting practices in Thailand are regulated by the 
Accounting Act (2000), the Civil and Commercial Code, and the Securities and 
Stock Exchange Act (1992, revised in 2001). Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) are 
issued by Federation of Accounting Professions (FAP), the successor of Institute of 
Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT). Accounting standards in 
Thailand were heavily drawn from the U.S. accounting sources. Thailand included 
several accounting concepts from the U.K. and Germany (e.g. the concept of 
prudence), however, its Recommended Accounting Concepts and Principles are 
mostly based on U.S. GAAP. While Thailand continues to draw upon U.S. 
pronouncements, it gradually started to adopt IAS (Saudagaran and Diga, 2000). 
                                                          
33
 CCDG, successor to the ICPAS as the accounting standard setter for companies incorporated in Singapore, was 
replaced by Singapore Accounting Standards Council in 2007 (www.iasplus.com).  
34
 The FRS 24 (2004) is accessible in www.icpas.org.sg/Handbook/Vol%201/FRS/FRS%2024.doc. 
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The first Thailand Accounting Standard (TAS) regulating RP disclosure is TAS 47 
Related Party Disclosure, which became effective for periods beginning on or after 1 
January 200035. This standard is based on IAS 24 (1994) and has two notable 
differences with IAS 24 (2003). First, disclosure of compensation for key 
management personnel is not required under the current TAS 47. Second, TAS 47 
requires companies to disclose their transfer pricing policy. In addition to the TAS, 
the Thai Securities and Exchange Commission regulation requires listed companies 
to comply with the Checklist for Disclosure of Connected Transactions in Notes to 
the Financial Statement (SET, 2010). Further, Form 56-1 Annual Registration 
Statement requires more specific information such as the nature of business 
operations, description of each product line, risk factors of the business, legal 
disputes, and research and development activities (World Bank, 2008). In addition, 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) also issued a Listed Companies’ Handbook, 
which contains guidelines for information disclosure for Thai listed companies, 
including Connected Transactions (SET, 2009).  
2.3.7 Summary of Regulations on RP Disclosure  
Based on the above review, this section compares the domestic accounting standards 
of all selected countries. In 2009, the accounting standards in Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were based on IAS 24 Related 
Party Disclosures. Several notable differences and similarities are identified and 
summarised in Table 2.4.  
There are two notable differences in RP disclosure requirements by local accounting 
standards across the countries. First, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore adopted IAS 24 (2003) in 2009. However, additional disclosures about 
KMP compensation and information about the parent entity are required by 
Australian accounting standards. Specifically, paragraph Aus 12.1 of AASB 124 
states that: “[A]n entity shall: (a) identify which of those entities is incorporated 
overseas and where; and (b) disclose the name of the ultimate controlling entity 
incorporated within Australia”. Second, Indonesia and Thailand adopted – and 
                                                          
35
 TAS 47 is issued by The Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors in Thailand (ICAAT) on 1 January 2000. Following 
revision of the standard, TAS 24 Related Party Disclosures has been issued and effective for annual periods beginning on or 
after 1 January 2011 (Charoenthaveesub, 2011).  
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translated into domestic languages – the older version of IAS 24, with some 
adjustments in each domestic standard.   
Panel B. The Country-by-Country Applicability of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures, as at December 31, 2009 
Countries National Accounting Standards Effective Date IFRS-Reference 
Australia      AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures 1/01/2005 IAS 24 (2003) 
Indonesia PSAK 7 Related Party Disclosures 1/01/1994    IAS 24 (1984)(iii) 
Malaysia  FRS 124 Related Party Disclosures 1/10/2006 IAS 24 (2003) 
The Philippines PAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 1/01/2005 IAS 24 (2003) 
Singapore FRS 24 Related Party Disclosures 1/01/2005 IAS 24 (2003) 
Thailand TAS 47 Related Party Disclosures 1/01/2000 IAS 24 (1994)(iii) 
Note: (i) M =  the information is mandatory under the country’s GAAP; shaded area = the information is not mandatory;  
(ii) Item 14 Pricing Policy is only required by IAS 24 (1984, reformat 1994) which was applicable in Indonesia and 
Thailand; (iii) IAS 24 (1994) is a reformat of IAS 24 (1984), there is no substantial difference other than the presentation of 
the standard (Epstein & Mirza, 2003) 
 
Table 2.4 Comparative Related Party Disclosure Requirements in 2009 
Panel A. The Applicability of Related Party Disclosures’ Components  
Disclosure Item IAS 24 (2003) 
(Para) 
Applicability 
Aus Ind Mal Phil Sing Thai 
Information about Parent company 
   
 
   
1. Relationships between parent and subsidiaries. 12.1 M(i) M M M M M 
2. The name of the parent. 12.2 M  M M M  
3. The name of the ultimate controlling party/next most 
senior parent. 
12.3 M  M M M  
4. Where the parent is incorporated/constituted. Aus12.1 (a) M      
5. The name of the ultimate controlling entity 
incorporated within Australia. 
Aus12.1 (b) M      
Information about Key Management Personnel 
Compensation   
   
 
 
6. KMP compensation in total. 16.1 M M M M M M 
7. Short-term benefit. 16 (a) M  M M M  
8. Post-employment benefit. 16 (b) M  M M M  
9. Other long-term benefit. 16 (c) M  M M M  
10. Termination benefit. 16 (d) M  M M M  
11. Share-based payment. 16 (e) M  M M M  
Information about the Nature of Transactions 
  
   
 
 
12. Information about the transaction. 17.1 M M M M M M 
13. Quantitative amount of the transaction. 17.2 M M M M M M 
14. Pricing policy.(ii) 
 
 M    M  
Information about the Outstanding Balances 
  
   
 
 
15. Aggregate quantitative amount for the outstanding 
balances.  
17.3 M M M M M M 
16. Information on whether the balances are secured. 17.4 M  M M M  
17. Information on the nature of consideration to be 
provided in the settlement of the balance e.g. to be 
settled by cash. 
17.5 M  M M M  
18. Details of any guarantees given or received. 17.6 M  M M M  
19. Information about provision for doubtful debts. 17.7 M M M M M M 
20. Expense recognised for bad or doubtful debts due from 
related parties. 
17.8 M M M M M M 
Information about the Nature of Relationship 
 
      
21. Nature of relationships. 18.1 M M M M M M 
22. Quantitative amount for the nature of relationships. 18.2 M M M M M M 
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In Indonesia, IAS 24 (1984) was adopted and translated into the Indonesian language 
(i.e., Bahasa Indonesia). In Thailand, IAS 24 (1984, reformatted 1994) was adopted 
and translated into the Thai language. In Indonesia and Thailand, the accounting 
standards require companies to disclose the pricing policy of the RP transactions36. 
Despite those differences, Table 2.4 shows that a number of RP disclosure 
components are consistently required in all six countries.  
2.4.  Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the institutional factors influencing RP disclosures, the 
evolution of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures, and the development of domestic 
accounting standards of RP disclosures in selected countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The review provides information on the background, development, and the 
extent of adoption of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures by each country. The 
financial reporting regime plays a significant role in the shaping, monitoring and 
enforcement process of accounting standards, as well as influencing the extent of 
compliance with those standards. 
Family-controlled firms are very common among listed companies in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand but very rare in Australia. In 
addition, a more developed stock market tends to be associated with greater 
disclosure requirements, including RP disclosure. Countries with common law legal 
system traditions have had better disclosure requirements and more stringent rules in 
mitigating self-dealing than countries with civil law legal systems. Also, countries 
with stronger law enforcement and shareholders’ protection tend to have greater 
financial disclosure. Lastly, all six countries in this study have embarked on 
governance reforms following the Asian financial crisis. The revised code of 
corporate governance in each of the countries requires the presence of independent 
directors on firms’ board of directors and audit committees. In addition, the board 
members and audit committee members are expected to have appropriate financial 
expertise. These reforms should increase governance effectiveness in mitigating 
abusive/opportunistic RP transactions and ensure more complete and transparent RP 
                                                          
36
 As previously mentioned in Section 2.2, IAS 24 (1984) was reformatted in 1994 in order to align with the presentation of 
IASs issued from 1991 onwards (Epstein & Mirza, 2002). Accordingly, there was no substantial difference between those two 
versions of IAS 24. 
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disclosure. However, weak legal systems may impede the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms in monitoring RP transactions and their disclosures. 
Accordingly, this study incorporates both country legal systems and corporate 
governance mechanisms as potential factors associated with variation in RP 
disclosures across the region. 
Overall, IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure is used as the basis for the development of 
national accounting standards for RP disclosures in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, although each country has had a different 
pace of conformity. All six countries rely on IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures as the 
main source for regulating accounting disclosure of corporate RP transactions. In 
2009, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore fully adopted IAS 24 
(2003) Related Party Disclosure; however, Indonesia and Thailand were still 
conforming to a previous version of the standard.  
The following chapter reviews the existing RP and related disclosure literature, 
including studies that examine the association between RP disclosures, corporate 
governance, and relevant institutional factors. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The increasing significance of related-party (RP) transactions and the considerable 
impact of those transactions have stimulated a growing body of research in both 
finance and accounting. This study aims to examine the nature and extent of RP 
transactions, their disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region, and the 
potential factors associated with the disclosures. To achieve this objective, this 
chapter reviews extant research in corporate financial disclosures, firm-level and 
country-level governance characteristics, and RP transactions. First, the overview of 
information asymmetry and financial disclosure is outlined and the underlying 
motivations of RP transactions are discussed. Second, research on the nature and 
extent of RP transactions are examined and findings on potential determinants of RP 
transactions are identified. Third, studies investigating the firm-level and country-
level governance characteristics influencing corporate disclosures are examined and 
the findings on potential determinants of corporate disclosures are identified. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with the gaps in the existing RP disclosure research, which 
provide the basis for the theory and hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. 
3.1 Information Asymmetry and Financial Disclosure 
3.1.1 Agency Theory and Information Asymmetry 
Agency theory posits that the separation of corporate managers from outside 
investors potentially creates conflict of interests in which the managers may not act 
in the investors’ best interest (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Managers (insiders) are likely to have superior information about their firms 
compared to investors (outsiders), resulting in information asymmetry between the 
insiders and the outsiders (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009). Furthermore, 
information economics research shows that information asymmetry can create 
incentives for managers to withhold or distort certain information. Such information 
problems are known as “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” in a capital market 
(Cooper & Keim, 1983).  
The moral hazard problem arises as managers have opportunities to withhold and 
utilise private information to maximise their personal benefits (Scott, 2006). 
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Managers can make inefficient investment or operating decisions that are detrimental 
to the interests of outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). This problem leads to 
adverse consequences in the allocation of capital. Furthermore, the adverse selection 
problem arises when investors are unable to distinguish between good and bad 
investments, a situation known as the “lemon problem” (Akerlof, 1970; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Scott, 2006). Investors may be reluctant to invest in firms they are 
unfamiliar with, even when those firms provide good investment opportunities. 
Consequently, those firms will be unable to attract sufficient funds to finance their 
business plans. The information asymmetry problem can lead to a failure 
(inefficiency) in the functioning of capital markets (Akerlof, 1970; Cooper & Keim, 
1983) including reduced liquidity in the stock markets (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985).  
3.1.2 Information Asymmetry and Disclosure 
Disclosure of financial accounting information is claimed to be an important 
monitoring mechanism to reduce information asymmetry (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & 
Walther, 2010; Bushman & Smith, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). Bushman 
and Smith (2001) argue that financial disclosure can assist managers in channelling 
resources towards good investments and may prevent wealth expropriation. Beyer et 
al. (2010) contend that financial disclosure enables potential and current shareholders 
and creditors to assess the expected return of their potential investments and evaluate 
the usage of the entrusted capital. Furthermore, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2012) state 
that greater disclosure may help reduce the incidence of outright fraud and theft by 
insiders.  
Financial accounting information disclosure can be classified into two types: (1) 
discretionary disclosure and (2) mandatory disclosure (see for example Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Cooper & Keim, 1983). In the context of discretionary disclosures, 
firms have incentives to disclose more than the minimum information required when 
the benefits of reducing information asymmetry outweigh the associated costs (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001; Marston & Shrives, 1991; Verrecchia, 1983). For example, some 
studies (e.g., Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991) find that 
greater disclosures are likely to lower transaction costs, increase liquidity and reduce 
cost of capital. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that a firm’s commitment to 
voluntarily disclose private information is likely to reduce information asymmetry 
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and narrow bid-ask spreads. The reduced spreads will, in turn, increase the liquidity 
of firms’ securities and thus reduce the opportunity cost of equity capital (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986). Extending this argument into debt financing context, Sengupta 
(1998, p. 473) finds that firms with high disclosure quality (i.e., disclosures which 
are regarded as having higher degree of detail, timeliness and clarity by financial 
analysts) are likely to have lower debt issuing costs because borrowers and 
underwriters consider the quality of disclosure in estimating the firms’ default risk.  
Prior studies discuss several motivations for firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose 
financial accounting information (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Armitage & Marston, 
2008). For example, firms with better performance are motivated to disclose greater 
financial information to distinguish themselves from firms with poor performance 
(Verrecchia, 1983). Managers are motivated to disclose unfavourable information 
when they want to minimise reputation impairment costs, arising from delayed 
negative earnings surprises (Skinner, 1994). Managers are motivated to disclose 
greater levels of information when they have more accurate information, as they are 
concerned about potential legal costs of investors relying on inaccurate information 
(Richardson, 2001). For instance, information on property values is likely to be 
disclosed when managers have more certainty about the valuations (Richardson, 
2001).  Based on interviews with firms’ executives, Armitage and Marston (2008, p. 
315) find that managers are motivated to make greater disclosure because they want 
to increase firms’ “reputation for openness” and shareholder confidence which may 
lead to higher share prices or commercial benefits. 
Under certain circumstances, however, managers may have incentives to avoid 
disclosing financial information. For example, managers tend to withhold 
information of a proprietary nature to avoid the increased costs of such disclosure 
(Richardson, 2001; Verrecchia, 1983, 1990). Moreover, managers may want to 
withhold bad news when they want to prevent a reduction in firm value (Lundholm 
& Van Winkle, 2006).  
It is argued that disclosure regulations serve as a mechanism to ensure “investor 
confidence” for efficient functioning of the financial market (Cooper & Keim, 1983, 
p. 198). The imperfections in the market for financial information arising from 
information asymmetry necessitate government regulation to ensure equitable and 
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efficient production and dissemination of corporate financial information (Cooper & 
Keim, 1983). Regulatory intervention intends to rectify the reluctance of managers to 
disclose information and to lower information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors by ensuring a minimum level of disclosure to investors and 
other stakeholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001). While regulation can minimise the 
information asymmetry problem through mandated disclosure, managers may have 
incentives to distort or withhold information, particularly in the case of sensitive 
information (e.g., Kolhbeck & Mayhew, 2010; Rodrigues & Stegemoller, 2009; 
Nelson, Gallery & Percy, 2010).  
In the U.S. setting, Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2009) investigate the disclosure of 
ethics waivers associated with RP transactions that are granted to U.S. top three 
corporate executives (i.e., CEO, CFO and CAO). They argue that managers have 
incentives not to disclose RP transactions, because the true non-disclosure of such 
transactions is hard to detect. By matching a companies’ disclosure through 
overlapping disclosure requirements, Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2009) confirm that 
companies delay the disclosure of ethics waiver granted to their top officers. The 
finding implies that managers have incentive not to disclose such information, 
because non-disclosure is hard to detect37 (Rodrigues & Stegemoller, 2009). 
Similarly, Kohlbeck, and Mayhew’s (2010) investigate RP disclosures by U.S. 
companies and find that many companies choose to disclose RP transactions in their 
annual proxy statements rather than in the financial statements, despite the fact that 
the accounting standard (FAS 57) requires financial statement disclosure of material 
RP transactions. Furthermore, an Australian study by Nelson et al. (2010) examines 
the disclosures of executive stock option (ESO) plans (a component of RP 
disclosure) and finds that firms are more likely to withhold more sensitive 
remuneration information (i.e., value and price-related options), compared with non-
sensitive remuneration information. Lower compliance with these sensitive items is 
masked by apparently high overall compliance, which highlights the need to 
distinguish between different types of disclosure in disclosure research, particularly 
                                                          
37
 In the U.S., Section 406 of Sarbanes Oxley requires companies to disclose their codes of ethics (or explain why 
they do not have them) and then, at the time when the transaction occurs, to disclose any waivers from that code 
granted to top corporate officers. Meanwhile, Item 404 of Regulation S-K requires firms to disclose related-party 
transactions in their year-end proxy statements. After examining both disclosures, Rodrigues and Stegemoller 
(2009) find that firms do not disclose any waivers at the time the transactions arise (thus violating Section 406 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley). Instead, those transactions are disclosed in the year-end proxy statements, indicating 
“disclosure arbitrage” (Rodrigues & Stegemoller, 2009, p. 3).    
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in the contexts where managers have strong incentives to avoid disclosure 
obligations. Those three studies indicate that disclosures can be sub-optimal or 
distorted, even in the environment with high-quality accounting regulations, 
particularly when management has incentives to withhold sensitive information. 
Overall, the small literature on corporate disclosures of RP transactions or sensitive 
information has used the agency theory and information economics theory to provide 
possible explanations for firms’ decision to disclose or not disclose information.  
Also, past studies on mandatory and discretionary disclosure provide empirical 
findings on the motivations and the extent and quality of the disclosure. In general, 
the literature indicates that firms have incentives to disclose more information when 
benefits of disclosure (e.g., lower cost of debt or equity) outweigh the costs of 
disclosure (e.g., reputation costs). Research focusing on sensitive information 
disclosure suggests that the information could be distorted when managers have 
incentives to withhold, particularly where there are weak enforcement and 
governance mechanisms. However, firms also have incentives to disclose 
sensitive/unfavourable information to avoid litigation or reputation impairment costs 
of withholding such information. Therefore, given the sensitive nature of RP 
transactions, a number of factors are likely to influence the level of RP disclosure, 
including corporate governance, regulatory enforcement, and firm-specific factors. 
The next section discusses the literature on RP transactions and RP disclosures. 
3.1.3 The Motivation for Related Party (RP) Transactions and RP Disclosures 
Prior U.S. studies by Gordon et al. (2004a) point out two main views (or hypotheses) 
for why firms enter into RP transactions. One view is that RP transactions are 
considered to be normal business transactions to fulfill a firm’s economic needs and 
increase the firm’s efficiency, or are a bonding mechanism between the party and the 
company (Gordon & Henry, 2005). Gordon and Henry (2005) argue that, as a 
bonding mechanism, RP transactions would bind the related parties to the company 
and reduce incentives for those parties to engage in opportunistic behaviours that 
could jeopardise the company. RP transactions can also improve contracting 
efficiency by reducing delays or obstacles in contract negotiation, which often occur 
in contracts with third parties (Ryngaert & Thomas, 2012). Moreover, a related party 
may be more willing to provide finance to a firm when external funding is difficult to 
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obtain since there is a lower information asymmetry between a firm and a related 
party, than with an unrelated party (Ryngaert & Thomas, 2012, p. 849). 
The second view of RP transaction is from an agency theory perspective which 
considers them to be a conflict of interest between management and shareholders 
(Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004a). Agency theory posits that agency problems arise 
when managers opportunistically maximise their benefits at the expense of 
shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932; E. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). In that regard, managers may act in a self-interested way through 
opportunistic RP transactions that expropriate firms’ resources or transfer the wealth 
of the firms to the hands of managers or controlling owners. For example, a number 
of RP transaction studies find that the transactions are associated with tunnelling38 
(e.g., Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000), asset 
transfers (e.g, Cheung, Qi, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009), or earnings management (e.g., 
Jian & Wong, 2010).  
The non-arms-length nature of RP transactions raises concerns about opportunism 
arising from management or other insiders’ (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010; Loon & De 
Ramos, 2009; OECD, 2009). When RP transactions are perceived as opportunistic 
(i.e., an agency conflict), investors are likely to perceive the transactions negatively 
and price protect against it (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010). Owner-managers, who 
want to avoid the price protection, would likely implement monitoring mechanisms 
to mitigate opportunistic RP transactions (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010, p. 120). As 
discussed earlier (Chapter 2), RP disclosure requirements, corporate governance 
mechanisms, and strong investor protection can help mitigate opportunistic RP 
transactions. For example, an international study by La Porta et al. (2006) reports 
positive association between regulations relating to RP disclosure requirements and 
stock markets development, which may indicate that disclosure minimises 
opportunistic RP transactions. Djankov et al. (2008) contend that common law 
countries have better regulation which mitigates self-dealings than civil-law 
countries. Moreover, Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) argue that while RP disclosures 
do not eliminate RP transactions, the disclosures provide an opportunity for 
                                                          
38
  “[t]he diversion of corporate resources from the corporation (or its minority shareholders) to the controlling shareholder”  
(Johnson et al., 2000, p. 10).  
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interested parties to either discipline opportunistic behaviour or take precautionary 
action (e.g., through lower firm valuation).  
The next section discusses the literature on the nature and extent of corporate RP 
transactions and the disclosure of such transactions. The discussion leads to the 
identification of factors potentially associated with RP disclosure. 
3.2 Nature and Extent of Corporate RP Transactions and RP Disclosures  
RP studies tend to focus on the nature and determinants of RP transactions based on 
the assumption that the disclosures on RP transactions capture the full extent of the 
transactions. Those studies examine either comprehensive RP transactions, for 
example, the number or the total amount of RP transactions (e.g., Gordon et al., 
2004a, 2004b) or specific RP transactions, for example, transfer of assets, RP sales, 
RP purchases, and RP payments. While those studies do not focus on RP disclosures, 
they provide empirical insights on the relationships between firms’ corporate 
governance mechanisms, institutional factors, and RP transactions. Given the focus 
of this thesis is the Asia-Pacific region, the following review of extant RP studies are 
classified into U.S. Studies and Asia-Pacific/Non-U.S. studies.  
3.2.1 RP Transactions – U.S. Studies 
Motivated by the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act which imposes a stricter 
regulation on RP  transactions, Gordon et. al., (2004a) investigate 112 publicly listed 
firms in the U.S. that disclose RP transactions in 2000 and 2001. Those firms mainly 
operate in the manufacturing, wholesale and retail industries. Their analysis shows 
that, on average, each firm discloses 3.9 RP transactions of which real estate 
transactions, RP sales, and RP loans are the most common types of the transactions. 
Extending their previous study by using a similar sample, Gordon et al. (2004b) test 
the competing hypothesis of whether RP transactions support efficient contracting or 
are a product of agency conflicts39. They find that RP transactions are common in all 
sample companies, (i.e., 878 RP transactions in 224 firm-years), but are less common 
                                                          
39 Gordon et al. (2004b) divide RP disclosures according to the types of parties’ involved as well as type and amount of 
transaction. Related parties are characterised as “primary related party”, i.e., when the party has the most direct or senior 
relationship with the firm and “secondary related party”, i.e., when the party is a family member of, or the company owned by 
or affiliated with the related party. Further, according to the type of transaction, RP transactions are identified into six main 
types of transactions, including employment/direct services between related parties or the related party and the company; 
purchases of goods or services from the RP; sales to the RP; loans to or from the RP; investments; and others. Those types of 
transactions are then sub-categorised into 18 different kinds of transactions. The amount of each type of RP transaction is then 
analysed following the classification.  
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
~ 52 ~ 
 
in companies with stronger corporate governance mechanisms, suggesting that these 
mechanisms mitigate RP transactions. Lastly, they find that the number and 
magnitude of RP transactions are negatively related with industry-adjusted returns.  
Using a longitudinal time frame, Kahle and Shastri (2004) examine executive loans 
in the U.S. during 1996 – 2000 and find that the loans, particularly for relocation and 
personal home loans, are provided at lower interest rates than arm’s-length loans. 
Interestingly, other results indicate that loans provided for stock purchases are 
beneficial in increasing executives’ ownership, suggesting that the loans align 
managers’ incentives with shareholders’ interest (i.e., the efficient-transaction view).  
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) argue that RP disclosures provide information needed 
by investors to discipline insiders’ opportunistic behaviour. However, they note that 
following the RP disclosures, investors have little ability to discipline and prevent 
such opportunistic behaviour. Investors’ ability is limited to selling or refusing to buy 
the stocks of the offending firms, or instigating ex-post litigation against 
opportunistic insiders. However, insiders with less than 100% ownership will not 
fully bear the consumption of firms’ benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); therefore 
they may have incentives to engage in opportunistic RP transactions. Additionally, 
investors who choose price protection through reducing stock purchases will have 
less power to protest about the opportunistic RP transactions. Such a situation creates 
an equilibrium RP transaction disclosure level and a lower firm valuation (Kohlbeck 
& Mayhew, 2010). 
Focusing on the valuation implication of U.S. corporate RP disclosures, Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew (2010) investigate RP transaction disclosures in the 2001 year annual 
reports and proxy filings of 1,194 firms in U.S. S&P 1500. They classify RP 
transactions into three broad categories: loans, other simple transactions and complex 
strategic transactions. The findings suggest that firms which disclose RP transactions 
are associated with lower stock returns and negative market values (as measured by 
Tobin’s Q) compared to firms which do not disclose any RP transactions. 
Interestingly, while firms that engage in relatively simple RP transactions (including 
loans and other simple transactions with directors, officers and shareholders) are 
valued negatively, those that engage in complex transactions are not valued 
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negatively. These findings suggest that complex transactions are not well understood 
by the market as the quality of disclosure varies widely across firms.  
Also from a valuation perspective, Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) examine how the 
timing of RP transactions (i.e., “ex-ante” and “ex-post” RP transactions) affect firm’s 
financial outcomes40.  They use a sample of 234 small to medium-sized U.S. firms in 
the fiscal year 1999 and find that in general, RP transactions do not affect firms’ 
operating and overall performance, suggesting that they are “benign” transactions. 
However, further analysis shows ex-ante (ex-post) RP transactions are positively 
(negatively) associated with firm value. Ryngaert and Thomas conclude that the 
timing of RP transactions is likely to determine the wealth consequences of RP 
transactions for outside shareholders. 
Overall, prior U.S. studies on RP transactions generally support the conflict of 
interest view. This opportunistic view argues that RP transactions can facilitate 
wealth transfer to managers, particularly given the non-arms-length nature of such 
transactions. Additionally, the findings of Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) and 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) suggest that the wealth effect of RP transactions differs 
across the nature and timing of such transactions. 
3.2.2 RP Transactions – Asia-Pacific Studies41 
While in the U.S. setting RP transaction practices commonly involve related entities 
and managers individually, RP transaction practices in Asian countries mostly 
involve major shareholders or controlling owners and the company as a whole (Loon 
& De Ramos, 2009). All of those studies focus on single country setting and can be 
categorised into three different areas of research: (1) RP disclosure transparency, (2) 
general RP transactions, and (3) specific RP transactions. 
                                                          
40 The “ex-ante” RP transactions occurred prior to public listing or the time that the counterparty becomes an 
official related party, whereas the “ex-post” took place after public listing or the time that the counterparty 
becomes an official related party (Ryngaert & Thomas, 2011). 
41This section discusses RP transaction studies in the Asia-Pacific context. However, there is a relevant study 
which does not belong to this region (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Zamarripa, 2003). In a context of high 
ownership concentration, La Porta et al. (2003) investigate bank lending to companies controlled by the bank’s 
owners (related lending) in Mexico in the 1990s, and find such lending exists in 20% of all loans issued. 
Compared to loans with an unrelated party, RP loans have lower interest rates, are more likely to default, and 
have lower recovery rates when they do default. The results indicate looting by insiders from depositors and 
minority shareholders.  
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RP Disclosure Transparency  
A number of studies in the context of Asia-Pacific countries specifically investigate 
the determinants of RP disclosures in single country settings, for example, in 
Malaysia (Arshad et al., 2009), China (Lo & Wong, 2011) and Indonesia (Utama & 
Utama, 2012).  
Using the annual reports of 144 Malaysian listed companies, Arshad et al. (2009) 
investigate the effects of IFRS adopted standard, board members with accounting 
professional affiliations, board interlocks, family members, government ownership 
and  independent non-executive directors on the extent of RP disclosure in two 
disclosure regimes (2002 and 2007). They measure RP disclosure as the aggregate 
number of words related to RP disclosure in the annual reports and find a significant 
increase in the extent of RP disclosure in 2007 when the IFRS adopted standard 
became mandatory. Based on this finding, they argue that more detailed disclosure 
requirements limit the amount of accounting choices, or less discretionary 
disclosures, to managers.  They also find a positive association between the extent of 
RP disclosure and professional affiliations and company size, but do not find any 
support for other variables (i.e., family ownership and independent non-executive 
directors).  
In a Chinese context, Lo and Wong (2011) investigate the influence of corporate 
governance structure (i.e., independent directors and ownership structure), RP 
transactions and legal environment on the firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose 
transfer pricing policies, and earnings management. For the period 2004 – 2005, they 
document an association between voluntarily disclosure of RP pricing methods and 
higher proportions of independent board directors and higher percentage of 
government ownership.  
Also from an RP transaction/governance perspective, Utama and Utama (2012) 
examine the influence of corporate governance characteristics and ownership 
concentration on the RP disclosure of Indonesian listed companies in 2006. The 
disclosure requirements of Indonesian Capital Market and Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK) are used to measure the extent of RP 
disclosures, whereas corporate governance practices are measured by using a 
composite corporate governance index (CGI) issued by a rating agency. The results 
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show that RP disclosure is positively associated with the corporate governance index 
and the size of RP transactions. However, the Arshad et al. (2009) and Utama and 
Utama (2012) studies do not consider the potential joint impact of a comprehensive 
set of corporate governance mechanisms and enforcement in monitoring and 
disciplining managers’ disclosure behaviour (for example, the role of an audit 
committee and the financial expertise of the committee as well as individual board 
members were not considered).  
General RP Transactions 
In a unique setting of commitment-test entities (CTEs) firms that listed in the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) between 2000 – 2005, Gallery, Gallery et al. 
(2008) examine the associations between RP transactions and governance and 
performance42. They find that both related party payments (RPPs) and related party 
loans (RPLs) are common throughout the CTEs, but RPPs are more prevalent than 
RPLs. Based on a number of internal (i.e., the proportion of independent directors, 
the presence of independent chairman, and the presence of audit committee) and 
external (i.e., the size of audit firms, firms’ size and firms’ reporting history) 
governance mechanisms investigated in the study, the findings show a negative 
association between board independence and RPPs suggesting that non-executive 
directors may restrict payments to related parties. There are also positive associations 
between RPPs with both operating and R&D cash outflows, which may imply that 
RPPs serve as “part of legitimate cash outflows for productive activities” (Gallery, 
Gallery et al., 2008, p. 162). However, other findings show that greater amounts of 
RP transactions are associated with poor performance, consistent with the findings of 
Gordon et al. (2004b) that, on average, RP transactions do not serve shareholders’ 
interests. 
Chen, Chen and Chen (2009) investigate the influence of comprehensive types of RP 
transactions on the operational performance of listed companies in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2002 – 2006 43. They find negative relationships 
                                                          
42
 The commitments test entities (CTEs) are the smaller, newly listed companies in the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX). CTEs are subject to the additional reporting requirements by ASX, including the mandatory 
requirements to provide quarterly cash flow reports for the first eight quarters after listing. Included in the report 
is the disclosure of cash outflows for related party payments and loans to directors and related entities (Gallery, 
Gallery et al., 2008, p. 148). 
43
 Chen et al. classify RP disclosures into the following seven categories: RP sales, RP purchase, RP asset, RP 
loan, RP guarantee, RP lease, and “other transactions”. The extent to which companies are engaged in each type 
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between RP_Sales, RP_Loan, RP_Guarantee, and RP_Lease and financial 
performance (Tobin’s Q) when the listed company is the controlled party, which may 
suggest that these transactions damage firms’ market performance. However, when 
the listed company is the controlled party, they find significant positive relationships 
between RP_Purchase and operating performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) which may 
indicate that this type of RP transactions increases firms’ market performance.  
In a Malaysian study, Munir and Gul (2010) investigate 462 annual reports in 2004 
and 2005 to find any relationship between RP transactions and firm-performance, 
particularly whether RP transactions in family firms are used as a mechanism to 
expropriate minority shareholders. Their results indicate that RP transactions, 
measured as the amount of RP transaction scaled by total assets, are negatively 
associated with firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA). In addition, 
they find that the negative association is stronger for family firms than non-family 
firms. Based on these findings, they argue that RP transactions serve the 
entrenchment argument and tunnelling practice, indicating supports for conflict-of-
interest (opportunistic) hypothesis for RP transaction usage.   
In a more recent Malaysian study, Wahab, Haron, Lok, and Yahya (2011) investigate 
the relationship between RP transactions, internal and external corporate governance, 
and firm performance. Based on the examination of 448 annual reports of Malaysian 
listed companies during 2005 – 2007, Wahab et al. find a negative association 
between RP transactions and firm performance, suggesting a conflict-of-interest 
argument. Further analysis reveals that executive remuneration, the proportion of 
board independence, and the presence of a Big-4 auditor mitigates the negative 
impact of RP transactions on firm performance.  
Specific RP Transactions  
A growing body of research in accounting and finance focuses on the specific nature 
of RP transactions. Those studies were predominantly conducted in Chinese and 
Hong Kong settings. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of RP transaction is measured by the values of each type of RP transaction divided by total assets. The sample 
firms are further partitioned into three categories according to the listed company’s controlling status: “no control 
relationship”, “the listed company is the controlling party”, and “the listed company is the controlled party”. 
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Cheung, Jing et al. (2009) investigate RP transactions of Chinese publicly listed 
firms in the year 2001 – 2002 to identify tunnelling and propping up incidence by 
controlling shareholders44. Based on 292 RP transactions reported in the filings 
submitted to stock exchange authorities, they classify RP transactions into those 
which are “ex-ante potentially tunnelling transactions” and “ex-ante potentially 
propping transactions” (Cheung, Jing et al., 2009, p. 377). They find that both 
tunnelling and propping up activities are common in the sample, but tunnelling is 
more prevalent. Propped-up firms show worse operating performance in the year 
prior to the RP transaction announcement. Following the classifications of RP 
transactions into the ex-post value-destroying and value-enhancing transactions 
based on the sign of CAR, the value-destroying ones appear to be less informative. In 
addition, firms announcing RP transactions appear to have value reductions. 
However, firms which are cross-listed in Hong Kong or the U.S. and firms which 
voluntarily disclose more information about RP transactions (i.e., submitting 
“fairness” opinion from independent financial advisors) are associated with positive 
excess returns. Lastly, Cheung, Jing et al. (2009) document a negative relation 
between ROE and excess returns, indicating that the best performing firms have the 
largest value losses in tunnelling. These results suggest that RP transactions are used 
to exert the controlling owners’ opportunistic behaviour, by tunnelling assets out of 
well-performing firms to prop-up poorer-performing firms.   
In the context of loan guarantees, Berkman et al. (2009) examine 88 RP loans in 
1999 annual reports for listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges45. Their results show that RP loan guarantees are less likely to be found in 
profitable firms, smaller firms, or firms with higher growth. Moreover, they find that 
firms issuing related loan guarantees tend to have lower performance (i.e., as 
measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA), lower dividend yield and higher leverage, lending 
support to the prohibition of loan guarantees by Chinese Securities regulators.  
                                                          
44
 Cheung et al. (2009) refer the definition of “prop up” to that of Friedman, Johnson & Mitton (2003 p. 1) which 
is the use of private funds to benefit minority shareholders. Friedman et al. (2003) develop a model to detect the 
existence of propping.  
45
 In China, listed firms may issue such loan guarantees to their controlling block holder (or to entities controlled 
by the controlling block holder), however, the practice was prohibited by Chinese Securities regulators after June 
2000. Berkman et al. (2009) argue that these related-party loan guarantees represent an “unambigous and direct 
method of tunnelling”. 
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Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) investigate whether RP sales are used by management as 
an earnings management tool by examining the transfer prices of RP sales for 266 
Shanghai stock exchange listed firms that disclose 2004 gross profit ratios on RP 
transactions. They detect earnings management for any difference between the gross 
profit margins on RP transactions and on normal sales to external customers. The 
results further show that transfer pricing manipulations are less frequent in firms with 
a higher proportion of independent directors,with a lower proportion of “parent” 
directors (i.e., those who represent the parent companies of the listed firms), where 
there is a different person serving as the company chair and CEO (i.e., non-duality 
firms), and where there are financial experts on the audit committee.  
Aharony, Wang and Yuan (2010) examine RP transactions and the incidence of 
tunnelling by firms that made a first-time issue of common shares to the public on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 1999 – 200146. They find evidence of 
tunnelling practices among Chinese companies, through non-repayment by Chinese 
parent companies of net outstanding corporate loans made to them by their newly 
listed subsidiaries. In addition, they find that RP sales of goods and services could be 
used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period. They 
argue that such behaviour could be motivated by the prospect of tunnelling 
opportunities in the post-IPO period, that is, transferring economic resources from 
minority shareholders for the benefit of the parent company.  
Jian and Wong (2010) investigate firms’ propping through abnormal related sales of 
Chinese listed firms over the 1998 to 2002 period47. They find higher incidence of 
related sales propping in firms which are state-owned and firms with domiciles in 
Chinese regions with a relatively weak economic institution (i.e., measured by a 
market development index and a deregulation index). They argue that controlling 
owners use such intercompany trades to maintain listing status and meet rights issues 
qualifications for listed firms.   
Focusing on Hong Kong listed companies; Cheung et al. (2006) investigate the 
incidence of tunnelling, propping or expropriation through RP transactions. They 
                                                          
46
 Aharony et al. (2010, p. 2) define tunnelling following the description by Johnson et al.’s (2000): “the transfer 
of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them”. 
47
 Jian and Wong (2010, p. 71) define “propping” as a situation “[W]hereby a controlling owner uses its own 
resources to manage the listed affiliate’s earnings. This is different from accruals management in which the 
controlling owner or another affiliated firm is not involved in the listed firm’s earnings management”. 
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examine 375 filings of listed firms’ connected transactions during 1998 to 2000 and 
compare companies with and without RP transactions. Firms announcing “connected 
transactions” tend to have significantly lower abnormal returns than firms with 
similar arm’s length transactions. Moreover, the lower disclosure of the connected 
transactions appears to be associated with negative abnormal returns48. While the 
presence of independent directors and CEO duality do not show any significant 
results, the presence of an audit committee seems to have a small mitigating impact 
on the association between the announcement of connected transactions and market 
reactions. Also in the context of Hong Kong’s listed companies, Cheung, Qi et al. 
(2009) investigate specific RP transactions that involve asset transfer to/from related 
parties. Using a similar data-set as used in Cheung et al. (2006), they examine 129 
related party and 125 arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets and find that firms 
deal with related parties using unfavourable prices. Compared to similar arm’s length 
deals, firms pay a higher price when acquiring assets and receive a lower price when 
selling assets to related parties. Also, the presence of an audit committee appears to 
be an effective constraining factor on transaction prices. 
Lastly, a Taiwanese study by Yeh, Shu, and Su (2012) examines related sales, 
lending and guarantee, and related borrowings and the role of corporate governance 
in mitigating those transactions. They find that corporate governance quality has a 
negative association with the level of RP transactions (regardless of the measures and 
type of transaction) and moderates the relation between the level of RP transactions 
and their motives. Firms appear to have higher incentives to prop up their accounting 
numbers when they expect to issue seasoned equity offerings in the following period 
and when their earnings are lower than the prior period.  
Summary of RP Transactions – Asia-Pacific Studies 
Overall, existing research on RP disclosures and RP transactions has highlighted 
some important points. First, current studies generally focus on the RP transaction 
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 Cheung et al. (2006, pp. 354-355) use seven proxies of disclosure of RP transactions which are: (1) a dummy 
variable for transactions which have no amount in the filing; (2) a dummy variable for firms whose auditor is not 
one of the Big 5 audit firms; (3) the number of analysts compiling reports during the fiscal year; (4) a dummy 
variable for firms with Level II and Level III American Depository Receipts traded in the U.S. stock markets; (5) 
a dummy variable for filings that do not include a report by an independent financial adviser; (6) proxy for 
financial adviser reputation, which is a ratio of one divided by the ranking of the adviser in the league table of 
Hong Kong mergers and acquisitions; and (7) a dummy variable to indicate transactions which involve connected 
parties but are not designated as connected in the heading of the filing (and thus do not comply with the 
disclosure requirements for connected transactions).  
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activities (i.e., the nature, amount or number of transactions), rather than the 
disclosure transparency or RP information. In general, those studies find support for 
the conflict-of-interest view. Second, there is a recurrent focus on the monitoring role 
of the board of directors. However, the literature suggests that there seems to be lack 
of research that systematically investigates a comprehensive set of governance 
mechanisms in monitoring RP transactions. Third, there is no known research 
examining comprehensively the nature and extent of RP disclosure. Lastly, there is 
no known comparative research on RP disclosure across countries.  
3.3 Factors Influencing Corporate Related Party Disclosure  
Agency theory argues that companies need to establish monitoring mechanisms to 
minimise agency costs and information asymmetry (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance structures have evolved as 
monitoring mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetries and agency problems 
between managers and investors (Bushman & Smith, 2003; Farinha, 2003; Gillan, 
2006; Larcker et al., 2007). Literature on corporate governance documents this link, 
both theoretically and empirically, between internal and external corporate 
governance characteristics and corporate disclosure (e.g., P. Brown et al., 2011; 
Gillan, 2006). This section discusses potential factors that influence the corporate RP 
disclosure. The potential factors are classified into three groups: (1) internal 
corporate governance, (2) external corporate governance, and (3) non-governance 
factors. 
3.3.1 Internal Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Brown et al. (2011, p. 111) state that a firm’s internal governance characteristics 
refer to “[T]hose that result from the decisions and actions of the shareholders and 
the board, such as the constitution and membership of the board of directors and its 
committees, the structure of share ownership, financing arrangements, and the form 
of executive compensation”. Numerous studies examine internal corporate 
governance factors that potentially influence the corporate disclosure (e.g., Beekes & 
Brown, 2006; Brown et al., 2011; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ho & 
Wong, 2001; Nelson, Gallery, & Percy, 2010). These studies identify board 
characteristics, ownership characteristics and other general factors as determinates of 
corporate disclosures practices.  
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Board Characteristics  
A firm’s board of directors as “the common apex of the decision control system” are 
in charge of advising and monitoring management, as well as ensuring the 
distribution of information to outsiders (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 311). The board of 
directors can serve as a mechanism to reduce agency problems through monitoring 
and disciplining management on behalf of external owners (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Chen and Jaggi (2000) examine the role of independent non-executive directors and 
family control on the comprehensiveness of firms’ mandatory disclosures in Hong 
Kong. They document a positive relationship between the proportion of non-
executive directors and firms’ comprehensive disclosures; however the relationship 
is weaker for family-controlled firms than it is for non-family controlled firms. Ho 
and Wong (2001) extend Chen and Jaggi’s (2000) study by examining the 
monitoring role of the board of directors on the voluntary disclosures of Hong 
Kong’s listed firms. They find that the existence of an audit committee encourages 
firms’ voluntary disclosure, however, both the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board and the CEO duality are not associated with disclosure. Ho and Wong 
attribute the findings to Hong Kong’s institutional setting, where the person who sits 
as Chairperson and CEO typically has large ownership; hence the CEO duality does 
not influence firms’ level of disclosure. Also in the Hong Kong context, Gul and 
Leung (2004) find a negative relationship between CEO duality and firms’ 
disclosures. However, such relationship is weaker for firms with a higher proportion 
of independent and experienced non-executive directors (NEDs), suggesting that the 
independence and experience of NEDs moderates the relationship between CEO 
duality and corporate disclosures.  
Eng and Mak (2003) investigate the influence of board composition and ownership 
structure on the level of voluntary disclosures by listed firms in Singapore. The 
findings show that both managerial ownership and proportion of independent 
directors are negatively associated with the level of firms’ voluntary disclosure. Eng 
and Mak argue that the findings imply a substitute monitoring role between 
independent directors and the level of disclosures rather than a complementary role 
as found in Chen and Jaggi’s (2000) study. Also in Singapore, Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) investigate the relationship between board monitoring (i.e., CEO duality, 
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board independence, and board size) and firms’ voluntary disclosures. While board 
size and CEO duality do not seem to influence firms’ voluntary disclosure, greater 
disclosure is shown to be associated with a higher proportion of independent 
directors. Cheng and Courtenay argue that their finding on the monitoring role of 
independent directors differs from that of Eng and Mak (2003) most likely due to the 
inclusion of “grey” directors in the board independence variable49. Similarly, Barako, 
Hancock, and Izan (2006) report that voluntary disclosure of Kenyan companies is 
negatively influenced by the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and 
contend that this finding may indicate the lack of true independence of outside 
directors.  
An Australian study by Beekes and Brown (2006) examines the influence of 
corporate governance quality (as measured in the Horwath – University of Newcastle 
Corporate Governance Report)  on firms’ disclosure practices. They find that better 
governed firms make more frequent disclosures of price-sensitive information. In a 
follow up study Beekes, Brown, Chin, and Zhang (2012) find that better-governed 
Australian firms tend to release value-relevant information sooner. Also in an 
Australian context, Basset, Koh, and Tutticci (2007) investigate the influence of 
firms’ corporate governance characteristics on their executive stock option (ESO) 
disclosures.  The results show that a better quality external auditor is associated with 
higher mandatory and voluntary ESO disclosures, whereas firms with CEO/Chair 
duality are likely to have lower ESO disclosure compliance. Additionally, findings of 
Lim, Matolscy, and Chow (2007) for Australian firms show a positive association 
between board independence and overall voluntary disclosure. However, the results 
do not hold for all types of voluntary disclosures. While board composition shows a 
positive association with “forward looking quantitative” and “strategic” information 
of voluntary disclosures, it has no significant association with “non-financial” and 
“historical financial” voluntary disclosure (Lim et al., 2007, p. 575).  
An Australian study by Kent and Stewart (2008, p. 656) examines the relationship of 
corporate governance quality on “the extent of disclosure about transition to AIFRSs 
and shows positive associations between board and audit committee diligence and 
greater disclosure. Firms audited by larger external auditor are more likely to provide 
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 A “grey” director is a non-executive director who has an indirect affiliation with management by means of a 
business or family relationship. 
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greater disclosure. However, both the size and expertise of the audit committee are 
negatively associated with disclosure. Kent and Stewart (2008, pp. 667–668) argue 
that these results indicate “substitution effects between expertise and size of the audit 
committee and external auditor with respect to financial statement disclosures”. 
In contrast, a U.K. study by  Li, Mangena, and Pike (2012) shows that a larger audit 
committee size encourages firms’ intellectual capital (IC) disclosures, however there 
is no support for the influence of both the independence and financial expertise of 
audit committee members on the firms’ IC disclosure.  
Also in the Australian context, Nelson et al. (2010) examine the influence of good 
internal (i.e., board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, 
and compensation committee independence and effectiveness) and external (i.e., 
external auditor quality, shareholder activism and regulatory intervention) 
governance on the disclosure of executive stock option (ESO) plans. While the 
findings show that ESO disclosure compliance is positively associated with audit 
committee independence and effectiveness, it is negatively associated with board 
independence. Nelson et al. (2010) argue that companies appear to alleviate agency 
problems arising from a lack of board independence by releasing greater ESO 
disclosures.  
In the cross-country setting, Morris and Gray (2009) investigate the influence of 
country-level and firm-level factors (including governance characteristics) on the 
firms’ overall disclosure in 200250. The findings show that a firm overall disclosure 
is positively associated with the proportion of independent directors and firms’ 
overseas listing status, however, there is no support for the influence of an audit 
committee on the disclosure. Additionally, an international study by Morris et al. 
(2012) examines the influence of country-level and firm-level factors (including 
governance characteristics) on the firms’ overall disclosure in 2002 and 200751. The 
findings indicate that while audit committee and CEO duality do not seem to 
influence firms’ overall disclosures, greater disclosure is shown to be associated with 
the presence of an independent director(s) and concentrated ownership. 
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 Morris and Gray’s (2009) study included Australia (n=50), China (n=50), Hong Kong (n=37), India (n=50), 
Indonesia (n=50), Japan (n=50), Korea (n=50), Malaysia (n=46), the Philippines (n=24), Singapore (n=40), 
Taiwan (n=36) and Thailand (n=36). 
51
 Morris et al.’s (2012) study included Australia (n=41), China (n=12), Hong Kong (n=39), India (n=24), Japan 
(n=46), Malaysia (n=40), the Philippines (n=22), and Singapore (n=41). 
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In the specific context of RP transactions, prior studies have examined the 
association between governance characteristics and RP transactions. A U.S. study by 
Gordon et al. (2004a) investigates the monitoring role of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firms’ RP transactions and finds that firms with stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms (i.e., Log (DirFee), DirStock, % Large Owners, smaller % 
insiders) are associated with fewer numbers of RP transactions with executives, 
whereas higher number of RP transactions with non-executive board members are 
associated with larger boards, DirFee, and DirOptions52. Gordon et al. (2004b) argue 
the findings indicate the influence of stronger corporate governance mechanisms in 
mitigating opportunistic RP transactions.  
An RP transaction study in the Australian context by Gallery, Gallery et al. (2008) 
investigates the influence of internal (i.e., the proportion of independent directors, the 
presence of independent chairman, and the presence of audit committee) and external 
(i.e., the size of audit firms, firms’ size and firms’ reporting history) governance 
mechanisms on RP transactions. Their findings show a negative association between 
the proportion of non-executive directors and RP payments suggesting that non-
executive directors may restrict payments to related parties. 
In Hong Kong, Cheung, Qi et al. (2009) report that the presence of an audit 
committee in the firm’s board appears to be an effective constraining factor on the 
opportunistic non-arm’s-length prices of asset transfers to/from related parties. 
Whereas in China, Cheung, Jing et al. (2009) find that RP transactions firms which 
are cross-listed in Hong Kong or the U.S. are associated with positive excess returns 
when other firms with RP transactions experience value reductions. Lo, Wong, and 
Firth (2010) show that transfer pricing manipulations are less prevalent in Chinese 
firms with higher proportions of independent directors, lower proportions of “parent” 
directors (i.e., those who represent the parent companies of the listed firms), non-
duality CEO position, and financial experts on the audit committee. Lo and Wong 
(2011) show that firms with both a higher proportion of independent directors and a 
higher percentage of government ownership are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
the pricing policy of RP transactions.  
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 Log(DirFee) = annual cash retainer fee paid to board non-executive members; DirStock = a dummy variable, 1 
if company gave stock to directors and 0 otherwise; DirOptions = a dummy variable, 1 if a company gave stock 
options to directors and 0 otherwise; % insiders = percentage of executives on the board (Gordon et al., p. 43).  
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
~ 65 ~ 
 
In Malaysia, Arshad et al. (2009) examine the influence of governance characteristics 
(i.e., board members with accounting professional affiliations, board interlocks, 
family members, government ownership and independent non-executive directors on 
the extent of RP disclosure) and find a positive association between the extent of RP 
disclosure and professional affiliations of board members. In a more recent 
Malaysian study, Wahab et al. (2011) reveal that executive remuneration, the 
proportion of board independence, and the presence of a Big 4 auditor mitigates the 
negative impact of RP transactions on firm performance of Malaysian listed firms. 
Consistent with Arshad et al., Utama and Utama (2012) find that Indonesian firms 
with better corporate governance practices (measured by a composite governance 
index) tend to have greater RP disclosures. 
Overall, the literature on the influence of corporate governance characteristics on the 
firms’ disclosure practices suggest that caution needs to be exercised in generalising 
the findings to the RP disclosure setting, due to the following reasons. First, 
depending on the nature of the disclosure (e.g., sensitive versus less sensitive 
information) the costs and benefits of disclosure may differ considerably and few 
studies have examined RP disclosure and corporate governance. Most RP studies 
tend to focus on the RP transaction activity (i.e., the nature, number or amount of 
transactions), rather than the disclosure transparency of RP information. Second, 
variations in the country setting, study period and sample may lead to the differences 
in findings. Third, different proxies for  corporate governance characteristics may 
contribute to the variation in the results.   
Ownership Characteristics 
In addition to the board and audit committee characteristics, a number of studies 
have examined the influence of corporate disclosures and ownership characteristics. 
In accordance with agency theory, the separation of ownership and control may lead 
to conflicts of interests between owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Greater conflict of interests may be present in the more widely dispersed ownership 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). To reduce the conflict of interests, managers may choose to 
provide greater information disclosure. Alternatively, due to the lack of monitoring 
power, individual shareholders with low ownership stakes may have less influence 
on company’s financial disclosures (Barako et al., 2006 citing Zeckhauser & Pound, 
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1990). In this later context, concentrated owners may possess greater influence on 
corporate disclosures.  
Empirical findings on the association between ownership concentration and 
corporate disclosure are mixed. A Malaysian study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
documents a positive association between ownership concentration and corporate 
disclosures. Additionally, the findings of Chau and Gray (2002) for Singapore and 
Hong Kong listed firms show a positive association between ownership 
concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, the study of Barako 
et al. (2006) on Kenyan companies finds a negative association, whereas the findings 
by Eng and Mak (2003) on Singapore firms reports no relationship between 
ownership structure and voluntary corporate disclosure.  
In addition to the ownership concentration, the previous discussion in Chapter 2 
shows that family control is predominant in many Asian countries. The high family 
ownership concentration may lead to a unique agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. The impact of highly concentrated family 
ownership on corporate RP transactions and disclosures can be explained by the 
entrenchment or convergence-of-interest view (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; 
Chau & Gray, 2010; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Wang, 2006). When the convergence-of-interest dominates, companies are “less 
likely to engage in opportunistic behaviour in reporting accounting earnings because 
it could potentially damage the family’s reputation, wealth and long-term firm 
performance” (Wang, 2006, p. 622). If the convergence-of-interest is more dominant 
than the entrenchment effect, the family firm would tend to be more transparent in 
reporting financial information.  
Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms report higher quality earnings than non-family 
firms. Family firms’ concentrated and under-diversified ownership tends to 
encourage more of a focus on the longer-run investment horizon and higher concerns 
over reputation; hence, they are more affected with both the benefits of disclosure 
and the costs of non-disclosure (Chen et al., 2008). Since the benefits of disclosure 
(e.g., lower cost of capital) and the costs of withholding bad news are more important 
to family owners relative to other shareholders, family owners are more likely to 
provide greater disclosure. Moreover, as family owners tend to have active 
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involvement in their firms’ management, they have direct influence on the firms’ 
disclosure practices. If the convergence-of-interest is more dominant in the family 
firms, it is expected that higher ownership concentration can mitigate 
abusive/opportunistic RP transactions and encourage greater RP disclosure. 
In contrast, when the entrenchment effect dominates, controlling owners may have 
greater opportunity to pursue private benefit of control which gives rise to the agency 
conflict between the controlling and minority owners. For example, based on 
Claessens et al. (2000) ownership data of seven East Asian economies53, Fan and 
Wong (2002) find that the entrenchment effect of concentrated ownership results in 
low quality of accounting earnings information54. Thus, the entrenchment effect 
implies higher information asymmetry between insiders (controlling owners) and 
outsiders (minority owners) due to the increased agency conflicts (Chau & Gray, 
2010). Given the higher agency conflicts, outsiders will increase their monitoring of 
insiders’ potential opportunism. In this case, owner-managers may choose to provide 
greater disclosure as a way to minimise the costs of monitoring by outsiders. 
Accordingly, when there is a high owner-manager’s shareholding, a greater 
information disclosure is expected to enable outsiders to effectively monitor the 
insiders and reduce monitoring costs by outsiders.  
Empirically, a Malaysian study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) shows a negative 
association between the proportions of family members on the board.  Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002, p. 339) argue that there is “less demand for published information as 
owners have better access to internal information”. In the U.S. setting, Ali et al. 
(2007) examine corporate disclosure practices of family firms compared to those of 
non-family firms, and find that family firms report better quality earnings and are 
more likely to disclose bad news through management earnings forecasts. Ali et al. 
(2007, p. 240) contend that family firms have less opportunistic behaviour because 
“the difference in agency costs across family and non-family firms due to Type I 
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 Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
54
 The earnings informativeness is measured by the earnings-return relation (Fan & Wong, 2002, p. 403). 
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agency problems dominate the difference due to Type II agency problems”55. 
Furthermore, Ali et al. (2007, p. 242) argue that:  
When families engage in private rent seeking, their activities may get 
revealed to the market and they may incur substantial cost in the form of 
lower equity value, especially since families have concentrated ownership 
and tend to hold their firms’ equities for long periods.  
Ali et al. also attribute their findings to the strength of legal protection of non-
controlling shareholders in the U.S., as documented by La Porta et al. (2000; 1998).  
Also in the U.S. setting, Chen et al. (2008) investigate the voluntary disclosure 
practices of family firms by using a number of disclosure channels (i.e., earnings 
forecasts, conference calls and earnings warnings). While family firms are less likely 
to provide earnings forecasts and conference calls; they are more likely to disclose 
earnings warnings than non-family firms. Chen et al. (2008) argue that the lower 
disclosure of earnings forecasts and conference calls may indicate that family owners 
prefer less disclosure due to the longer investment horizons which potentially create 
higher costs of disclosing timely information. In addition, since family owners are 
likely to have better access to information, family firms may have less incentive to 
disclose. With respect to the greater likelihood of earnings warnings, Chen et al. 
argue the finding could be explained by reputation costs concerns and greater 
litigation facing family firms. Family owners, which typically hold large, under 
diversified and multi-generations ownerships, appear to avoid potential reputation 
impairment costs of withholding bad news and thus prefer to release greater 
disclosure (Chen et al., 2008, p. 506).    
Wan-Hussin (2009) investigates the influence of board composition on the firms’ 
decision to provide segment disclosures in Malaysia and finds that family firms tend 
to have greater disclosure than non-family firms. Wan-Hussin argues that his finding 
on the influence of family ownership differs from that of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
most likely due to the difference in the breadth of disclosure as a dependent variable 
(i.e., Haniffa & Cooke (2002) include a comprehensive voluntary disclosure whereas 
Wan-Hussin focuses on the segment disclosure). In the context of Hong Kong, an RP 
transaction study by Cheung, Qi et al. (2009) does not find support for the 
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 Type I agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and management, while Type II agency 
problems refer to the agency problems between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Ali et al., 2007 
citing Gilson & Gordon, 2003). 
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association between family ownership and related-party sales of assets. The authors 
contend that family firms may not necessarily expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders. 
Additionally, findings on Hong Kong firms by Chau and Gray (2010) show that 
family-concentrated ownership (with shareholdings of more than 25%) tend to have 
greater disclosure. Chau and Gray (2010) contend that the stronger entrenchment 
effect due to higher levels of family ownership lead to an increased monitoring by 
outsiders. Accordingly, managers are likely to disclose greater voluntary information 
to assure outsiders that their optimal economic interests are safeguarded.  
3.3.2 External Corporate Governance Characteristics – Firm Level 
In addition to the internal governance characteristics, prior disclosure studies have 
provided evidence on the effect of external governance characteristics on corporate 
disclosure policies. Brown et al. (2011, p. 112) point out that a firm’s external 
governance characteristics refer to “[M]onitoring by outside parties such as block 
holders and institutional investors, activists and external auditors”. The most 
predominant external governance characteristics examined in the literature include 
leverage, external auditors, and law/regulation (e.g., P. Brown et al., 2011; Gillan, 
2006).  
Leverage 
Agency theory posits that companies with higher financial leverage have higher 
monitoring costs; therefore they will reduce this monitoring cost by increasing public 
disclosures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, a contradicting argument suggests 
that the agency cost of debt can be effectively minimised using restrictive debt 
covenant agreements, rather than by providing greater disclosure (Jensen, 1986). In 
addition, Gallery, Cooper, and Sweeting (2008) argue that companies with high 
leverage may choose to provide greater disclosure or to have direct communication 
with creditors as they may want to avoid greater public scrutiny. Empirically, Eng 
and Mak (2003) and Hossain, Perera, and Rahman (1995) find an inverse 
relationship between debt and voluntary disclosure, whereas Ferguson, Lam and Lee 
(2002) document a positive association between firms’ voluntary disclosure and 
leverage. Taylor, Richardson, Tower, and Hancock (2012) find that firms with higher 
leverage are likely to provide greater disclosure. 
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External Auditor 
In his pioneering work, DeAngelo (1981) posits that larger audit firms provide better 
quality audits as they have incentives to maintain their reputation and require client 
firms to provide full disclosure. Empirical research tends to support the argument 
that larger audit firm have a positive impact on disclosures. Also, in a more detailed 
examination of auditor influence on disclosure quality, Gallery et al. (2008) find that 
each of the Big 4 auditors has a different influence on the disclosure quality. That is, 
disclosure quality is higher for companies audited by KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers than for companies audited by other Big 4 auditors.  
Cross-listing Status 
Karolyi (2012, p. 516) describes cross-listing as “a strategic choice made by a firm to 
secondarily list its equity shares trading in a home market exchange on a new 
overseas market”. Karolyi (2012, p. 517) argues that firms are motivated to cross-list 
their shares abroad to obtain access to “a larger, deeper market for capital, greater 
diversification of their ownership base, and a more liquid trading environment for 
their shareholders”56. According to agency theory (Coffee, 1998; Karolyi, 2012; 
Stulz, 1999), a firm may opt to cross-list in a foreign capital market because they 
may want to bond to the more stringent requirements of disclosure, accounting, and 
governance. Leuz and Wysocki (2008, pp. 53-54) argue that: 
[F]irms in countries with weak institutional frameworks have difficulties in 
raising external finance because controlling insiders in these environments 
cannot sufficiently assure outside investors that they will not expropriate 
them. Outside investors react to this commitment problem by price protecting 
their investments, which increases the firm’s cost of raising capital. This 
problem matters more to firms with growth opportunities that require outside 
finance and, consequently, these firms have an incentive to seek bonding 
devices that sufficiently reassure outside investors.  
Consistent with this argument, past studies find foreign investors are more likely to 
invest in firms with better quality voluntary disclosures and in countries with better 
disclosure regulation (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008)57.  
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 Citing Bancel and Mittoo (2001, 2008); Fanto and Karmel (1997), and Mittoo (1992). 
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 These studies include, for example, Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004) and Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki 
(2005) (as cited in Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). 
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3.3.3 External Governance Characteristics – Country Level  
In addition to the internal and external firm-level governance factors, more recent 
studies indicate the influence of legal environment as an external governance factor 
(e.g., Farinha, 2003; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008) on firms’ disclosure practice. No prior 
research has specifically examined the influence of the institutional environment 
(country factors) on the use and disclosures of RP transactions. However, research in 
other disclosure contexts has been conducted on a cross-country basis and these 
studies provide insights into how institutional differences may impact on RP 
transactions and their disclosures.  
Prior research investigating the extent of firms’ disclosure in cross-country settings 
includes Craig and Diga (1998), Tower, Hancock, and Taplin (1999), Taplin, Tower, 
and Hancock (2002), Jaggi and Low (2000), Hope (2003b), Archambault and 
Archambault (2003); Al-Shammari, Brown, and Tarca (2008), Morris and Gray 
(2009), and Morris, Susilowati, and Gray (2012). In general, the research finds that: 
(1) companies do not fully conform to the disclosure requirements of IASs; (2) there 
are country differences on the extent of disclosures; and (3) accounting standards 
will be ineffective without adequate enforcement.  
Disclosures and Country of Origin 
One of the earliest cross-country studies of international accounting harmonisation in 
the Asia-Pacific region is Craig and Diga’s (1998) study. Their study examines 
corporate annual report disclosure practices in the fiscal year 1993. The sample 
consists of 145 randomly selected publicly listed companies across five ASEAN 
countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. A 
disclosure checklist containing 530 items is constructed according to the disclosure 
requirements by accounting standards and government regulations. The de jure 
disclosure is assessed by comparing the checklist with each country’s domestic 
disclosure requirements. It infers that Singapore has the most extensive set of 
specific disclosure requirements (74%), whereas Indonesia has the lowest (52%), 
compared to the other selected countries. Further, a checklist of 200 items of IAS-
prescribed disclosure requirements is developed to measure the extent of IAS 
harmonisation with each country’s domestic requirements. It shows that Singapore’s 
set of disclosure requirements show the highest harmonisation (93%) with IAS, 
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whereas that of Indonesia exhibits the lowest (55%). These findings indicate that de 
jure disclosure harmony (i.e., harmony in terms of what is to be disclosed) is high; 
however, there are cross-country differences in the volume and extent of disclosures 
as well as sources of authority.   
Additionally, Craig and Diga (1998) employ a “substantially common” checklist of 
270 specific disclosure requirements to measure de facto disclosure. The checklist 
represents disclosure requirements which were common to at least four of the five 
ASEAN countries examined. The index derived from the checklist shows that the 
average level of disclosure ranges from the minimum of 51% (Indonesia) to the 
maximum of 61% (Singapore). A partition of the index shows that companies are 
more reluctant to disclose sensitive information (i.e., RP transactions and transfer 
pricing policies) than non-financial and social information (e.g., organisational 
structure investment program). After controlling for the effects of firm-specific 
characteristics, their statistical tests confirm the extent of disclosure is significantly 
associated with country of origin, with the average disclosure scores ranging from 
51% (Indonesia) to 61% (Singapore) (Craig & Diga, 1998, p. 253)58.   
A subsequent study by Tower et al. (1999) examines the extent of IAS harmonisation 
across six Asia-Pacific countries: Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Their study focuses on de facto harmonisation (i.e., the 
harmony of company practices), rather than de jure harmonisation (i.e., the harmony 
of accounting regulation). Ten listed companies’ 1997 annual reports were selected 
from each country and analysed against a comprehensive disclosure checklist with 
512 data points constructed from IASC standards. Since many IAS are not applicable 
for sample companies, two compliance index ratios are used. Ratio 1 is calculated by 
excluding non-disclosed items (hence the ratio may be biased upward); whereas 
Ratio 2 is calculated by including the non-disclosed items (thus the ratio may be 
biased downward). Their findings indicate that Australia and Thailand have higher 
scores of Ratio 1 (94% and 93%, respectively) than other countries. The results are 
slightly different for Ratio 2, in which Australia and Hong Kong have higher ratios 
                                                          
58
 The scores of each country, from the highest to the lowest, are as follows: Singapore (61%), Malaysia (59%), 
Thailand (56%), the Philippines (55%) and Indonesia (51%) (Craig & Diga, 1998, p. 253). 
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(54% and 53%, respectively) than other countries59. Consistent with Craig and Diga 
(1998), their findings confirm that firms’ disclosure compliance with IAS is 
significantly associated with country of reporting.  
Disclosures, Legal Systems, and Cultural Values 
Jaggi and Low (2000) examine the influence of legal systems and cultural values on 
firms disclosures in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. The 
International Financial Reporting Index (IFRI) for Industrial Companies developed 
by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) in 1993 is 
used as a dependent variable60. The firm’s cultural values are measured using the 
Hofstede (1984) cultural dimensions of Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, 
Individualism, and Masculinity. Each of the cultural dimensions is tested in separate 
regression. The findings show that firms in common law countries are associated 
with higher disclosures; however, there is no significant association between cultural 
values and financial disclosures. With respect to the findings on cultural values, 
Jaggi and Low (2000, p. 517) offer three arguments: (1) the cultural values may have 
been out-dated due to globalisation and industrial changes; (2) Hofstede’s (1980) 
cultural values may not capture managerial attitudes across countries, particularly 
given that the values were obtained from employees of the multinational IBM 
company, hence they may not fully represent countries’ cultural values; and (3) a 
country’s business environment may have a greater influence on financial disclosures 
than the cultural environment. 
Extending Jaggi and Low’s (2000) study, Hope (2003b) investigates the influence of 
legal origin and/or culture on firm-level disclosures internationally by including a 
larger number of countries61. The disclosure scores from CIFAR in the first half of 
the 1990s (1995, 1993) are used as dependent variables, whereas culture is measured 
using cultural values from Hofstede and Schwartz (1994). The findings show that 
firms’ disclosures are negatively related to both uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance, and positively related to individualism. However, after controlling for legal 
                                                          
59
 The average compliances (Ratio 2) of each country, from the highest to the lowest, are as follows:  Australia 
(54%), Hong Kong (53%), Malaysia (41%), Thailand (39%), Singapore (38%), and the Philippines (28%) (Tower 
et al., 1999, p. 302). 
60
 The IFRI is based on the mean disclosure scores of 90 items on a sample of largest industrial firms in each 
country (Jaggi & Low, 2000, p. 505). 
61
 Hope’s (2003, p. 219) study includes firms which come from between 39 – 42 countries, according to data 
availability for each test. 
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origin, uncertainty avoidance and power distance are not significantly related to 
disclosure levels. Hope (2003) argues that his findings differ from those of Jaggi and 
Low (2000) mainly due to the difference in sample selection. The sample countries 
in Jaggi and Low’s (2000) study “are arguably closer to each other in terms of 
financial reporting and disclosure than most countries” with substantially smaller 
variance of both CIFAR index and cultural values than the overall countries62 (Hope, 
2003, p. 223). 
Archambault and Archambault (2003) investigate the influence of cultural, national 
and corporate factors on firms’ financial disclosures in 33 countries. Disclosure 
scores by International Accounting and Auditing Trends (CIFAR 1995) are used to 
measure disclosure as a dependent variable, whereas the scores of cultural dimension 
are obtained from Hofstede (1991)63. The main findings show that firms in common 
law countries have greater disclosures. For firm-specific factors, disclosures are 
positively associated with foreign sales, dividend payout, foreign exchange listing, 
and Big 6 auditor. The findings for cultural factors, however, are inconclusive. 
Firms’ levels of disclosures are negatively associated with individualism, 
masculinity, and adult illiteracy, but positively associated with uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, and religions. In terms of national political and economic 
systems, the results are also inconclusive. Disclosure is positively associated with 
civil liberties and market capitalisation, but is negatively associated with political 
rights, legal system, newspaper circulation and inflation. Archambault and 
Archambault (2003, p. 192) conclude that “the firm-based financial reporting 
disclosure decision is made within a complex process that considers national as well 
as corporate factors”. 
Disclosures and Enforcement 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) examine the international accounting standards’ (IASs) 
disclosure compliances by firms in the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member 
states (i.e., Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
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 Hope (2003) cites Ball et al. (2000) and Nobes (1983).  
63
 CIFAR index is “a total index disclosure score equal to the average of the disclosure scores of seven 
information categories (number of information variables in parentheses): general information (8), income 
statement (11), balance sheet (14), funds-flow statement (5), accounting policies (20), stockholders information 
(17), and supplementary information (10). The disclosure for each category is equal to the percentage, excluding 
non-applicable items, of information available based on 1993 or 1992 annual reports. Within each category, the 
disclosure score is unweighted index of voluntary and non-voluntary information disclosures. The total index 
disclosure is an unweighted average of the seven categories.” (Archambault & Archambault, 2003, p. 182). 
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Emirates) for the 1996 to 2002 period. Based on a self-constructed disclosure 
checklist, the findings show the highest compliance mean for all years is in the UAE 
(0.80), followed by Saudi Arabia (0.78), Kuwait (0.75), Oman (0.74), Bahrain (0.73) 
and Qatar (0.70). In addition, the disclosure compliance levels differ across countries 
according to the difference in the audit quality and enforcement body activism. 
A study by Morris and Gray (2009) investigates the extent of disclosure of 519 large 
companies from 12 Asian countries. Annual reports of fiscal year 2002 are scored 
against a 441 items checklist constructed from IFRS 2001/2002, resulting in three 
transparency scores (i.e., TRANSP1, TRANSP2, and TRANSP3)64. With respect to 
the scores, Singapore has the highest and Indonesia the lowest TRANSP1 and 
TRANSP3 scores; whereas Australia has the highest and Indonesia the lowest 
TRANSP2 score. In addition to country of reporting and firm-level variables, Morris 
and Gray (2009) investigate sets of country-level variables in the examination of 
firms’ disclosure practices. The variables included country legal system, bank-
oriented economy, stock market prominence, enforcement and culture. The findings 
show that country-level variables (i.e., legal system, enforcement, bank orientation or 
importance of the stock exchange) explain more variance in firms’ transparency than 
firm-level variables. These findings provide evidence that country-factors (i.e., 
regulation and enforcement) matter more in achieving convergence and increasing 
transparency in the region, than firm-level factors. 
Morris et al. (2012) examine the influence of IFRS adoption on the firm-level 
disclosures of 265 companies in eight Asian countries65. A self-constructed 
disclosure checklist of 441 IFRS-based items is used to measure annual report 
disclosures in 2002 and 2007. In 2007, the highest mean disclosure score is obtained 
for the Philippines (0.508), followed by Australia (0.503), Hong Kong (0.499), 
Singapore (0.493), Malaysia (0.469), China (0.461), Japan (0.414), and India 
(0.383)66. The main finding demonstrates that firms in IFRS adopting countries are 
                                                          
64
 TRANSP1 consists of 441 items (the full checklist); TRANSP2 consists of 228 items (based on authors’ 
judgments about which items are likely to be applicable to all firms sampled); whereas TRANSP3 consists of 206 
items (the items which are more likely to have been accurately coded by most coders) (Morris & Gray, 2009, p. 
19). 
65
 Of the eight countries, four countries have adopted IFRS between 2002 and 2007 (Morris et al., 2012). 
66
 The mean scores in 2002, from the highest to the lowest, are as follows: Hong Kong (0.430), Singapore 
(0.416), Australia (0.388), Malaysia (0.363), Japan (0.322), the Philippines (0.316), China (0.315), and India 
(0.290) (Morris et al., 2012, p. 33) 
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likely to have greater disclosures. This finding holds after controlling for country-
level (i.e., legal system, rule of law, local standards, and secrecy), governance (i.e., 
auditor, independent director, audit committee, leverage and top shareholder 
ownership) and other firm-specific variables. With respect to country-factors, the 
findings (of the most comprehensive model) show that firms’ disclosure is positively 
associated with IFRS adoption and rule of law, however there is no support for the 
legal system and local standards. Of the governance variables, firms’ level of 
disclosure is positively associated with leverage, independent directors, and 
ownership concentration. In terms of culture, secrecy has a positive influence on the 
disclosure, which is the opposite of prediction. Based on these findings, Morris et al. 
(2012) argue that IFRS adoption led to greater levels of firms’ disclosure, despite the 
country-level differences. 
Overall, numerous studies have examined the link between the extent of disclosure 
and country-specific factors. However those studies tend to examine comprehensive 
disclosure, instead of specific disclosure or particular standard. Investigating overall 
financial disclosure can overlook the importance of specific disclosure items 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Additionally, the previous discussion in Chapter 2 has 
highlighted that research in other areas indicates the influence of country legal 
origins, strength of enforcements, comprehensive investor protections, and control 
for corruption on the extent of corporate disclosures. Firms in countries with 
common law legal origins, stronger enforcements, more extensive regulations 
concerning investor protections, and stronger control for corruption tend to have 
more transparent disclosures of information.    
3.3.4 Other Firm-Specific Factors Associated with Corporate Disclosure 
In addition to the governance-specific factors, past disclosure studies have found 
firm-specific non-governance variables associated with firms’ disclosure level. Those 
variables comprise size, profitability, and industry type (e.g., Beekes et al., 2012; 
Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008; Taplin et al., 2002). 
An extensive line of studies consistently confirms that larger firms tend to disclose 
more information (Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1989, 1992; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace 
& Nasser, 1995). Larger companies tend to attract more attention, therefore are more 
concerned about the potential political and litigation costs associated with poor 
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disclosure (Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008). Moreover, larger companies are more likely 
to have lower costs of compliance and information production since those companies 
tend to have a more developed and comprehensive internal reporting system 
(Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008). Prior studies find that firm size is positively associated 
with the level of mandatory disclosure (Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005), discretionary 
disclosure (Buzby, 1975; Eng & Mak, 2003; Firth, 1979), and AIFRS disclosure 
quality (Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008).  
In addition to firm size, a number of studies find a relationship between profitability 
and the level of disclosure67. Agency theory suggests that more profitable companies 
tend to disclose externally to support their current financial positions and 
remuneration arrangements, and to avoid undervaluation of their company’s shares 
(Inchausti, 1997). In Southeast Asia, Mitton (2002) finds that firms which have 
higher disclosure quality show higher performance during the 1997 – 1998 financial 
crisis. Gallery, Cooper et al. (2008) show a positive association between the change 
in profitability and disclosure quality. Likewise, Arshad et al. (2009) find that firms 
with higher profitability are more likely to have greater RP disclosure. Beekes et al. 
(2012) find that firm size is positively associated with greater disclosure. 
Cerf (1961) finds that disclosure levels are higher in some industries than others. 
Firms in the resource, manufacturing, finance or service industries are found to have 
greater compliance with international accounting standards (Taplin et al., 2002). 
Beekes et al. (2012) argue that firms’ industry characteristics are likely to affect the 
extent of firms’ disclosures due to the differences in the costs of disclosure (e.g., 
proprietary costs) or regulatory requirements of disclosure in certain industry.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In summary, prior RP transaction studies propose two perspectives on the nature and 
effects of RP transactions in relation to corporate governance effectiveness. First, RP 
transactions are efficient transactions, or alternatively, they involve a conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders (i.e., an agency cost) that appears to 
be mitigated with certain governance mechanisms. Generally, the findings tend to 
                                                          
67
 See, for example: Gallery, Cooper and Sweeting (2008); Owusu-Ansah (1998); Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 
(1995); Singhvi and Desai (1971); Taplin et al. (2002); Tower et al. (1999);  Wallace et al. (1994); Wallace and 
Naser (1995). 
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provide stronger support for the conflict of interest perspective or agency cost 
argument.  
Relevant to this study’s objectives and research questions, a number of gaps are 
evident in the reviewed literature. Despite the documented variations in RP 
disclosures across countries, much of the RP transaction research is confined to a 
particular domestic context, such as the U.S. and China. There is little RP transaction 
research in other Asia-Pacific countries. Further, despite the allegation that 
companies’ ownership and investor protection in Asian countries create higher risk 
of opportunistic RP transactions (OECD, 2009; CFA, 2009), both factors have 
received little attention. Nevertheless, the few extant studies find evidence in support 
of the influence of company ownership, country enforcement and legal origins on the 
extent of firms’ disclosures. 
Whether these results can be generalised beyond the countries examined remains an 
open question as there is no known research investigating the extent of RP disclosure 
across countries. This is despite the fact that IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure has 
been prescribed in most countries in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere for a 
number of years. In fact, information about RP transactions is likely to be very 
sensitive, therefore managers are likely to have a strong incentive to distort or 
withhold information about these transactions. Therefore understanding the nature 
and extent of compliance with disclosure rules within and across countries is an 
important area of research that has been neglected to date. The following chapter 
pursues this further, by developing a theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
to address the study’s research questions. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework and hypotheses to address the 
research questions of the study. First, it reviews relevant disclosure theory, including 
theory derived from agency and information asymmetry theories, corporate 
governance research and research on firms’ incentive to disclose. Second, it develops 
the theoretical arguments leading to expectations on the variation in the nature and 
extent of RP transactions and the disclosures of such transactions across countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Third, it develops the theoretical arguments leading to 
expectations on the extent of IAS 24 disclosure conformance by companies in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Finally, hypotheses are developed relating to the internal and 
external governance factors (including institutional factors) potentially associated 
with RP disclosure.  
4.1 Theoretical Framework – Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterise organisations as legal fictions, which serve 
as “a nexus for contracting” relationships among individuals. The legal fiction acts as 
a focus for a complex process, in which the conflicting objectives of individuals are 
brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In the agency 
theory, an agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which the principal(s) 
engage the agent to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 309). 
Since both the principal and the agent are assumed to be utility maximisers, the agent 
may not always act in the best interests of the principal.  
Agency problems arise when agents opportunistically maximise their wealth at the 
expense of principals (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). It is argued that this problem occurs because of incongruence 
between owners and managers, or because of the information asymmetry between 
owners and managers that restricts the owners from fully monitoring the agents. The 
information asymmetry may lead to a moral hazard when managers, who are usually 
better informed than the owners, pursue their own interests which deviates from 
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those of the owners’. This situation of goal misalignment leads to agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
To align the interests of managers and owners, owners have to bear monitoring costs, 
such as the costs of appointing independent directors and auditors, whereas managers 
have to bear bonding costs, such as the costs of establishing a performance-based 
compensation.  Corporate managers, who are entrepreneurs in this model, have to 
reassure shareholders they will safeguard the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, managers have an incentive to minimise agency costs, by implementing 
effective control mechanisms. One way to reduce such costs is through a 
commitment to greater disclosure. Such a commitment to disclose will enable 
shareholders to monitor their interests more efficiently and signal that managers are 
acting in the interests of the shareholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001). As discussed in 
the previous chapter, prior studies suggest corporate governance operates in 
combination with effective disclosure to mitigate information asymmetries and 
agency problems between managers and investors (Bushman & Smith, 2003; 
Farinha, 2003; Gillan, 2006; Larcker et al., 2007).  
In the context of RP transactions, the prior literature indicates that, consistent with 
agency theory, those transactions may be either efficient or opportunistic. From the 
efficiency perspective, RP transactions are viewed as normal business transactions 
that fulfil a firm’s economic needs and increase the firm’s efficiency, or are a 
bonding mechanism between the agent (the manager) and the company (Gordon & 
Henry, 2005; Gordon et al., 2004a, 2004b). From the opportunistic perspective, RP 
transactions are viewed as a conflict-of-interest between management and 
shareholders (Gordon et al., 2004a, 2004b). Agency theory suggests that agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders can create a moral hazard for managers 
who may want to maximise their wealth at the expense of shareholders. Therefore, it 
is argued that opportunistic RP transactions can facilitate such a wealth transfer to 
managers, particularly given the non-arms-length nature of such transactions. In this 
case, firms’ disclosures of RP transactions are argued to be one way to facilitate 
monitoring of such transactions (e.g., Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
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4.2 The Nature and Extent of RP Transactions and Disclosures across 
Countries (RQ1) 
Companies will disclose more financial information if the benefits of disclosures 
outweigh the costs of withholding such information (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Given 
the sensitive nature of RP transactions, firms may refrain from disclosing 
opportunistic RP transactions to avoid the costs of releasing such information. 
Indeed, prior studies suggest that certain RP transactions are negatively associated 
with stock returns (Gordon et al., 2004b; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010), financial 
performance (Munir & Gul, 2010; Wahab et al., 2011), and/or market values 
(Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010).  
A firms’ decision to disclose RP transactions may be influenced by the type of RP 
transactions. If the transactions are efficient, the benefits of fully disclosing them will 
outweigh the costs. Evidence by Cheung, Qi et al. (2009) based on Hong Kong firms 
indicates that for firms disclosing certain RP transactions associated with value 
losses/reduction, the ones that disclose greater information about the transactions are 
associated with positive excess returns. Importantly, “value-destroying” transactions 
tend to be associated with less information disclosure than “value-enhancing” 
transactions (Cheung, Qi et al., 2009).  
Prior studies have also attempted to distinguish between the efficient and 
opportunistic RP transactions (Kahle & Shastri, 2004; Chen, Chen, & Chen, 2009; 
Gallery, Gallery et al. 2008). A U.S. study by Kahle and Shastri (2004) finds that 
executive loans for stock purchases are associated with an increase on executives’ 
ownership, suggesting that the loans align managers’ incentives with shareholders 
interest (i.e., efficient transactions). Additionally, Chen, Chen, and Chen (2009) 
show RP purchases are positively associated with financial performance in Chinese 
listed firms. In the case of Australian commitment-test entities, Gallery, Gallery et al. 
(2008) find that RP payments are positively associated with both operating and R&D 
cash outflows, which may imply that the transactions facilitate efficient/productive 
activities. 
However, certain other transactions appear to be opportunistic (Berkman et al., 2009; 
Chen, Chen, & Chen; Aharony et al. 2010). Berkman et al. (2009) show that related 
loan guarantees in Chinese firms tend to be associated with lower performance. Also 
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in the Chinese context, Chen, Chen, & Chen, 2009) find that RP sales, loans, 
guarantees and leases are negatively associated with financial performance. In the 
case of IPO firms, Aharony et al. (2010) find that a number of Chinese parent 
companies do not repay the loans received from their newly listed subsidiaries, 
which may indicate that intercompany loans are used to facilitate “tunnelling”68. 
Moreover, RP sales of goods and services appear to be used by managers to facilitate 
income-increasing earnings management in the pre-IPO period (Aharony et al., 
2010). RP sales also seem to be used by controlling owners to “prop-up” newly listed 
Chinese firms to maintain listing status or satisfy requirements for rights issues (Jian 
& Wong, 2010). Such incidence of “propping” is higher in state-owned firms and in 
Chinese regions with relatively weak economic institutions, (i.e., as measured by a 
market development index and a deregulation index) which suggests a regulatory 
influence (Jian & Wong, 2010).  
Recall that Chapter 2 identifies institutional differences across countries in the Asia-
Pacific region, including the legal systems, capital market development, and 
corporate governance principles. Based on the previous findings and given those 
institutional differences across countries, it is expected that there will be differences 
in the nature and extent of RP transactions and in disclosures about those transactions 
by companies in the Asia-Pacific region
69
. What these differences are has not been 
investigated in prior research. Accordingly, this thesis presents the following 
research question:  
RQ1:  What is the nature and extent of RP transaction and RP disclosures across 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region? 
4.3 The Extent of RP Disclosure Conformance to IAS 24 within and between 
Countries (RQ2) 
The second research question aims to investigate RP disclosures by companies in the 
Asia-Pacific region and to determine whether there are differences between practices 
at the firm level and the country level in relation to the IAS 24. As discussed in 
                                                          
68 In China, listed firms may issue loan guarantees to their controlling blockholder (or to entities controlled by the controlling 
block holder), however, this practice was prohibited by Chinese Securities regulators from June 2000.  
69 The nature of RP transactions refers to the types of transaction; whereas the extent of RP transactions refers to the dollar 
amount and the number of transactions, as disclosed in companies’ annual reports. 
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Chapter 2, the IAS 24 (2003) Related Party Disclosure standard is used as a 
benchmark to determine corporate disclosure levels.  
Corporate disclosure is subject to varying regulatory intervention by regulatory 
bodies (Beyer et al., 2010; Arshad et al., 2009; Utama & Utama, 2012). Beyer et al. 
(2010, p. 316) point out that disclosure regulation is an effective way “to commit to 
frequent and detailed future disclosures”. Subject to the extent of the regulators’ 
power to enforce and impose sanctions, regulations are introduced to provide a “level 
playing field” and minimise information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors which should in turn result in lower agency costs and greater 
shareholder wealth creation (Beyer et al., 2010; Shleifer, 2005). However, the 
regulator’s power to enforce and impose sanctions may affect firms’ disclosure 
compliance and ultimately, the level of wealth creation. In addition, firms’ 
governance effectiveness may also influence firms’ disclosure policy. For example, 
better governance is frequently found to be associated with greater disclosure 
(Arshad et al., 2009; Utama & Utama, 2012). In particular, Arshad et al. (2009) find 
greater disclosure of RP information following the adoption of IAS 24 in Malaysia, 
suggesting that better regulation affects corporate disclosures of RP information. 
Also, an Indonesian study by Utama and Utama (2012) shows that firms with better 
governance tend to disclose greater RP information. 
Recall that Chapter 2 discusses the differences in the mandatory requirements of RP 
disclosure across countries as well as other institutional factors, including legal 
systems, capital market development, and corporate governance principles. Based on 
the previous findings and given those institutional differences across countries, it is 
expected that there will be similarities and differences in the nature and extent of RP 
disclosure conformance with IAS 24, by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. Such 
variation in conformance is unlikely to be desirable from a regulatory or an investor 
perspective. Hence it is important to document and analyse these variations.  
Accordingly, this thesis presents the following research question:  
RQ2:  To what extent do the RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region 
conform to the IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure within and across countries? 
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4.4 Research Framework and Hypotheses Development (RQ3) 
Research questions one and two lead to the important question about what factors 
determine the differences in RP disclosure in the region. The question is formally 
stated as follows:  
RQ3:  What are the country, governance, and other factors which explain the nature 
and extent of RP disclosures in the Asia-Pacific region? 
The answer to this question is likely to be of particular interest to regulators and 
market participants who rely on RP disclosures in annual reports in making 
investment decisions. 
Figure 4.1 presents the research framework to address RQ3 (i.e., agency theory 
supports the proposed potential factors that may influence the level of RP 
disclosure). The proposed categories of factors are: (1) internal governance 
characteristics, (2) external governance characteristics, and (3) control factors. Based 
on prior research, the same factors are expected to impact on mandatory and 
discretionary disclosures. Therefore, RP disclosure is classified into three categories: 
(1) mandatory, (2) discretionary, and (3) overall. The sub-classification will enable 
deeper analysis of the extent and nature of governance influence.  
As previously noted the agency relationship may lead to information asymmetry and 
moral hazard, which increases firms’ agency costs. Given the potential agency costs, 
both owners (i.e., shareholders) and managers of firms have incentives to strengthen 
corporate monitoring systems. Accordingly, corporate governance mechanisms 
represent a major monitoring system to minimise agency problems and ensure that 
managers act in alignment with shareholders’ interests. Effective corporate 
governance can help strengthen and add validity to a firm’s disclosure policies 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Assuming that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms can improve firms’ monitoring systems, it is argued that such 
mechanisms will result in less opportunistic RP transactions and more transparent 
disclosure of such transactions. Generally, better-governed firms are associated with 
more frequent disclosures (Beekes & Brown, 2006) and, some evidence suggests, 
greater RP disclosures (Utama & Utama, 2012).  Consistent with these previous 
findings, full disclosure of RP transactions enables shareholders to monitor their 
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interests more efficiently and can provide a signal that managers act in the interests 
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Figure 4.1 Research Framework 
Theoretically, corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., internal and external corporate 
governance characteristics) may have complementary or substitutive relationships 
(Ho & Wong, 2001). When there is complementary influence, better governance 
mechanisms will provide a stronger corporate monitoring system and reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry, leading to a higher level of 
disclosure (Ho & Wong, 2001). Furthermore, in the presence of a strong monitoring 
system, managers are less likely to withhold information about opportunistic 
transactions; therefore a higher level of comprehensive disclosure can be expected 
about such transactions. However, when there is a substitutive relationship, the 
governance mechanisms may simply replace each other, hence greater disclosure 
may not be realised.  
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
~ 86 ~ 
 
Therefore, in examining governance mechanisms, it is important to comprehensively 
consider the different types of mechanisms and their interaction. Accordingly, to 
address the third research question, a number of hypotheses are developed in the 
following sections for the wide variety of corporate governance mechanisms.  
4.4.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and RP Disclosure  
Research reviewed in Chapter 3 reveals relationships between a number of internal 
and external corporate governance characteristics and firms’ disclosures. Based on 
those previous studies, this thesis includes the internal and external governance 
mechanisms that potentially have direct or indirect influence on firms’ disclosure of 
RP transactions. There are three general factors often included in the internal 
corporate governance research. First, a firm’s board of directors is in charge of 
advising and monitoring management, as well as ensuring the distribution of 
information to outsiders (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Second, it is argued that the audit 
committee plays an essential role as a mechanism for reducing agency costs by 
monitoring firms’ financial reporting process. The committee is responsible for 
ensuring the reliability of firms’ financial reports. Third, ownership concentration is 
likely to influence the level of firms’ financial disclosure, including information 
about RP transactions. 
Board Characteristics 
A board of directors as “the common apex of the decision control system” is in 
charge of advising and monitoring management, as well as ensuring the distribution 
of information to outsiders (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 311). The board of directors 
can therefore serve as a major mechanism to reduce agency problems through 
monitoring and disciplining management on behalf of external owners (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001).  Previous studies show that the efficacy of the board in monitoring 
and disciplining managers is influenced by its independence, size and expertise. 
These influences are discussed below. 
Board Independence 
Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that a larger proportion of independent directors on the 
board will increase the effectiveness of monitoring management and limit managerial 
opportunism. Pincus, Rusbarsky, and Wong (1989, p. 246) point out that the 
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presence of independent directors on the boards “should increase the quality of 
monitoring because they are not affiliated with the company as officers or 
employees, and thus, are independent representatives of the shareholders’ interests”. 
Similarly, the presence of independent directors on boards will increase the quality of 
financial information disclosure and thus, firms will be less likely to withhold 
unfavourable information (Forker, 1992).  
The evidence in previous studies on the effect of board independence and corporate 
disclosures is mixed. A Singapore study carried out by Eng and Mak (2003) finds a 
negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and firms’ 
voluntary disclosures. Similarly, Barako et al. (2006) document a negative 
association between board independence and voluntary disclosures of Kenyan firms. 
In an Australian context, Nelson et al. (2010) show board independence is negatively 
associated with firms’ disclosure compliance on the executive stock option 
information. The findings of Eng and Mak’s (2003) and Nelson et al.’s (2010) appear 
to suggest a substitute monitoring role between board independence and the level of 
disclosures. In addition to the substitutive role argument, Barako et al. (2006) argue 
that the negative association between the board independence and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure may also be explained by the lack of true independence of the 
outside directors (often called “grey” directors).  
In contrast, other studies (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Morris & 
Gray, 2009; Morris et al., 2012) find a positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors and corporate disclosures. A Hong Kong study by Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) shows that a more independent board encourages firms’ disclosures of 
financial information. Additionally, a Singapore study by Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) finds that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors have greater 
voluntary disclosure.  
Although the evidence is mixed, an Australian study on RP transactions by Gallery, 
Gallery et al. (2008) documents a negative association between board independence 
and RP payment, indicating the monitoring role of independent directors in 
constraining payments to related party. Also, a recent RP transaction study by Lo and 
Wong (2011, p. 609) shows that Chinese listed firms with a higher proportion of 
independent directors are more likely to voluntarily disclose the transfer pricing 
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method of their RP transactions. Lo and Wong (2011) also find that Chinese firms 
with higher board independence are less likely to be disciplined by the stock 
exchange regulatory bodies for non-compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements of RP transactions than those with a lower proportion of independent 
directors, suggesting that the more independent boards may promote better 
monitoring of corporate disclosures. Assuming Lo and Wong’s findings extend to 
more general RP disclosures, the following is hypothesised:  
H1:  The proportion of independent directors on a firm’s board is positively 
associated with the level of RP disclosure by companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
Board Size 
The size of a board of directors influences its efficacy in monitoring and controlling 
managers (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  Currently, there are contrasting arguments and 
empirical evidence of the influence of a board size on the levels of corporate 
disclosures.  
In favour of larger board size, Williams, Fadil, and Armstrong (2005, p. 483 citing 
Amason & Sapienza, 1997) suggest that larger boards have “more specialized skills 
and opinions among its members than smaller boards, and are better equipped to 
obtain and process a greater deal of information about the firm and its environment. 
Moreover, with smaller boards, there may be a lack of checks and balances in the 
monitoring role due to limited resources (Williams et al., 2005). Consistent with this 
argument, Williams et al. (2005) find a lower possibility of an increase in the 
incidence of violations of regulations for U.S. firms with larger boards, compared to 
firms with smaller boards70.   
In contrast, other studies argue that smaller boards offer more benefits compared to 
larger boards (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; John & Senbet, 1998). Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992, p. 68) suggest that board size should not exceed ten directors, with 
the ideal number of eight to nine, because cautious selection of the board members 
should result in “the breadth of perspective and diversity required”. Moreover, it is 
                                                          
70
 The regulations comprise those of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and/or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Williams et al., 2005, p. 485). 
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claimed that a smaller board allows its members to communicate and reach 
consensus more effectively (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). In addition, Jensen (1993) 
argues that a smaller board size can improve its performance. A board with more 
than eight members might be less effective and can be captured by the CEO more 
easily (Jensen, 1993, p. 865). In addition, John and Senbet (1998, p. 385) argue that 
the increased monitoring capacity of large boards may outweigh the benefits 
because, as boards grow, the costs of communication and inaccurate decision-making 
increases, therefore limiting the size of a board is likely to increase its efficiency. 
Furthermore, a smaller board can have a higher efficacy due to its higher flexibility 
to move quickly and evade lengthy debates (Platt & Platt, 2012). Consistent with 
these arguments, a U.S. study by Yermack (1996) documents a negative association 
between board size and firm value. Additionally, Yermack finds that firms with 
smaller board size are more likely to dismiss CEOs with poor performance, 
suggesting that such boards exert more effective discipline on managers. In the RP 
transaction context, a U.S. study by Gordon et al. (2004b) finds that a smaller board 
is associated with fewer and less significant RP transactions. Additionally, findings 
by Mak and Kusnadi (2005) for Singapore and Malaysia firms show that smaller 
boards are associated with higher firm value, which is consistent with the findings of 
Yermack (1996).  
Other studies are unable to find a relationship between the board size and the 
disclosure level. For example, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find no relation between 
board size and the level of voluntary disclosure. Basset et al. (2007) find no relation 
between board size and the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. However, as 
this study focuses on RP transaction disclosures, the Gordon et al. (2004b) is likely 
to be the most relevant. Hence, the following negative relation is hypothesised: 
H2:  The size of a firm’s board of directors is negatively associated with the level 
of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Board Expertise 
Financial expertise refers to financial and accounting knowledge which enables the 
directors to understand the financial reporting process and the capacity to monitor the 
quality of financial reports and disclosures. Beasley (1996) suggests that directors’ 
expertise influences the board’s ability to effectively monitor management actions. 
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The increase in monitoring expertise is expected to minimise managerial 
opportunism (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004) since their expertise enables them to 
better understand complex financial reporting issues and advise management and 
auditors accordingly (A. Felo, 2010).  
The association between board expertise and RP transactions or RP disclosures has 
been relatively unexplored. However, reports by OECD (2009) and CFA (2009) 
addressing RP transaction practices highlights the significance of financial expertise 
of board members in ensuring board monitoring effectiveness, particularly because 
transactions with related parties are typically complex ones. Consistent with this 
argument, Arshad et al. (2009) find a positive association between the proportion of 
board members with accounting professional affiliations and RP disclosure. Arshad 
et al. (2009) argue that board members with professional affiliations in accounting 
are more motivated to enhance monitoring effectiveness that potentially leads to a 
higher level of RP disclosure. Board members with a professional affiliation are 
required to meet their professional obligations and responsibilities to accounting 
professional bodies in order to maintain their reputations and professional 
membership. Extending the accounting professional affiliation into financial 
expertise to the RP disclosure context leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: The financial expertise of the members of a firm’s board of directors has a 
positive association with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
Audit Committee Characteristics 
Prior studies suggest that the audit committee plays an important role as a 
mechanism for reducing agency costs by monitoring the effectiveness of the financial 
reporting process and output quality (Archambeault, Dezoort, & Hermanson, 2008; 
Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navassi, 2010), and ensuring the objectivity of external audits 
(Uzun, Szewczyk, & Varma, 2004). Additionally, Uzun et al. (2004) find that 
companies with audit committees are associated with lower possibilities of corporate 
fraud, than companies without such committees. Furthermore, Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2004) note that certain audit committee characteristics 
contribute to the efficacy of the committee as a corporate governance mechanism. 
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Not surprisingly, many of these characteristics are the same as those previously 
discussed for the board of directors (i.e., independence, size and expertise).  
Audit Committee Independence 
The presence of an independent audit committee may reduce managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour in their financial accounting choices (Cotter & Silvester, 
2003). Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004) argue that audit committee’s independence 
facilitates a stronger monitoring role since the absence of a current or former member 
of management will strengthen the effectiveness of the internal audit function. 
Moreover, unlike non-independent members of an audit committee, the independent 
members are more likely to be penalised in the external market for outside directors, 
hence are likely to be more diligent and objective in monitoring management 
performance (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Furthermore, independent audit committee 
members are likely to enhance firms’ financial report accountability and audit 
relationships with internal and external auditors, and thus improve the monitoring 
efficiency of the financial reporting processes and internal control systems (Dhaliwal 
et al., 2010). 
Empirically, a U.S. study by Anderson et al. (2004) finds that firms with a greater 
audit committee independence are associated with a lower cost of debt financing, 
suggesting that audit committee independence reassures creditors of the effectiveness 
of the corporate  monitoring system. Similarly, Abbott et al. (2004) find that U.S. 
firms with a more independent audit committee are negatively associated with 
accounting restatements, which suggests that as the proportion of independent audit 
committee members increases, so does the efficacy of audit committees in 
monitoring the financial reporting process. Also in the U.S. context, Vafeas (2005) 
finds support for more insiders on the audit committee increasing the likelihood of 
lower earnings quality. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that audit committee 
independence in U.S. firms is associated with better accruals quality, suggesting that 
the independent audit committee members are better monitors of the financial 
reporting process. Furthermore, a U.S. study on the antecedents of corporate 
bankruptcy by Plat and Plat (2012) finds that firms with more independent audit 
committee membership tend to be more solvent and less likely to file for bankruptcy 
than firms with less independent members. If audit committee independence can 
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facilitate a better monitoring and safeguarding role, they can be expected to 
encourage more transparent disclosure of RP disclosure. Hence, the following is 
hypothesised: 
 H4: The number of independent members on a firm’s audit committee is positively 




Audit Committee Size 
To achieve its efficiency, an audit committee requires sufficient number of members 
that will enable it “[T]o generate substantive discussion and to consider emerging 
issues, as well as access to management, external auditors, internal auditors, the full 
board, and legal counsel”  (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002 p. 
44). Similarly, Felo et al. (2003) argue that a larger audit committee has more 
capacity to ensure the reliability and accuracy of information disclosed in the 
financial statements. Anderson et al.(2004) argue that firms with larger audit 
committees are more likely to devote greater resources in monitoring the financial 
accounting process, for example, they may have more time in monitoring 
management, hiring external auditors and supervising the internal control processes. 
Given these arguments in support of larger audit committees, it could be expected 
that such committees are associated with greater disclosure transparency.  
Despite the supporting arguments the evidence is mixed. Felo et al. (2003) 
investigate the impact of audit committee characteristics on the quality and 
credibility of financial reporting. They find a positive relationship between size of 
audit committee and a firm’s financial reporting quality. Likewise, Anderson et al. 
(2004) investigate the relation between board structure and the cost of debt financing 
and find that firms with larger audit committees tend to obtain lower cost of debt 
financing, indicating that the larger committees may provide greater monitoring of 
the financial accounting process.  
                                                          
71 This study uses the absolute number of independent members on the audit committee to represent AC independence due to 
the institutional differences of AC independence characteristics in the sample countries. For example, Indonesian companies 
tend to have a smaller size of audit committee, which in most cases consists of 100% independent members. In contrast, 
companies in other countries (e.g., Australia and Singapore) tend to have a larger size of audit committee, which in many cases 
have less than 100% independent members. In this case, the proportion of independent audit committee members may not be 
fully representing the degree of audit committee independence. 
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In contrast, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) document a negative association between 
audit committee size and the disclosure of management forecasts for a sample of 
U.S. companies. They argue that a larger audit committee may create diffusion of 
responsibility and free riders as the committee members become more comforted by 
the presence of other members. In an Australian context, Kent and Stewart (2008) 
document a negative association between audit committee size and firms’ disclosure 
of Australian equivalents to IFRS (AIFRS). Regarding the negative finding, Kent and 
Stewart (2008) contend that the smaller audit committees may place greater reliance 
on external auditors. Given the mixed findings and absence of RP disclosure research 
on this characteristic, the following non-directional hypothesis is proposed:  
H5: The size of a firm’s audit committee has an association with the level of RP 
disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Audit Committee Expertise 
It is argued that accounting or financial expertise is an essential requirement of audit 
committees to enhance their monitoring roles in firms (DeZoort et al., 2002; 
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). Audit committee expertise is expected to enhance 
the credibility of the firm’s financial disclosures (Felo et al., 2003). Such expertise 
enables audit committee members to effectively monitor firms’ financial reporting 
practices, since the committee is responsible for tasks that require a high degree of 
accounting knowledge and technical details in financial reporting issues (DeFond & 
Francis, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2010), thereby reducing potential agency costs (e.g., 
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007). From an RP 
transaction perspective, reports by OECD (2009) and Loon and De Ramos (2009) 
highlight the significance of audit committee financial expertise in ensuring effective 
monitoring of RP transactions and their disclosures, particularly given the 
complexity of such transactions.  
As predicted, Felo et al. (2003) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010) both find a positive 
association between the proportion of audit committee members with the financial 
expertise and financial reporting quality in U.S. firms. Also in the U.S. context, 
Abbott et al. (2004) find the absence of financial expertise in the audit committee is 
positively related to the incidence of financial misstatements, and Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) find the absence is associated with a higher possibility of 
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internal control problems. Additionally, U.S. studies by Davidson, Xie and Xu 
(2004) and DeFond and Francis (2005) both find positive market reactions following 
the appointment of new audit committee members with accounting expertise, but no 
reaction to the appointment of new audit committee members with non-accounting 
expertise. These results support the argument that the financial expertise of an audit 
committee is likely to enhance the monitoring role of the committee and be 
positively perceived by market participants.  
If the financial expertise of a firm’s audit committee enhances the quality of financial 
reporting, it is expected that this expertise can also encourage the transparency of RP 
disclosure, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H6: Audit committee with at least one director having financial expertise is     
positively associated with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
Ownership Concentration 
Agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership and control potentially 
creates conflicts of interests between owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). A greater conflict of interest may exist when ownership interests are widely 
dispersed than when they are concentrated in the hands of a few owners (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). To reduce the conflict of interests, managers may choose to provide 
greater information disclosure. Alternatively, due to the lack of monitoring power, 
individual shareholders with low ownership stakes may have less influence on a 
company’s financial disclosures (Barako et al., 2006 citing Zeckhauser & Pound, 
1990). In this later context, concentrated owners may possess greater influence over 
corporate disclosures.  
Empirical findings on the association between ownership concentration and 
corporate disclosure are mixed. A Malaysian study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
documents a positive association between ownership concentration and corporate 
disclosures. Additionally, the findings of Chau and Gray (2002) on Singapore and 
Hong Kong listed firms show a positive association between ownership 
concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, the study of Barako 
et al. (2006) on Kenyan companies finds a negative association, whereas the findings 
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by Eng and Mak (2003) on Singapore firms reports no relationship between 
ownership structure and voluntary corporate disclosure. However, as this study 
focuses on the Asia-Pacific countries, the Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Chau and 
Gray (2002) findings are likely to be more relevant. Accordingly, the following 
positive association is proposed:  
H7:   The ownership concentration of a company is positively associated with the 
level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Family-Controlled 
Chapter 2 highlighted the prevalence of family-controlled firms in Asian countries. 
The impact of family-controlled firms on the disclosure practices can be explained 
by the entrenchment or alignment effect. When the alignment effect dominates, 
family-controlled companies are “less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviour in 
reporting accounting earnings because it could potentially damage the family's 
reputation, wealth, and long-term firm performance” (Wang, 2006, p. 622). In this 
case, the family firm would tend to be more transparent in reporting financial 
information. In addition, due to the concentrated and under-diversified ownership of 
family controlling owners, they have longer-run investment horizons and higher 
concerns over reputation; hence they are more impacted by the benefits and costs of 
disclosure and the costs of non-disclosure (Chen et al., 2008). Since the benefits of 
disclosure (e.g., lower cost of capital) and the costs of withholding bad news are 
more important to family owners relative to other shareholders, family owners are 
more likely to provide greater disclosures. Alternatively, when the entrenchment 
effect dominates, owner-managers may choose to provide greater disclosure as they 
may want to reduce the costs of effective monitoring by outsiders.  
The disclosure literature is consistent with these arguments.  A U.S. study by Ali et 
al. (2007) finds that family firms report higher quality earnings than non-family 
firms. Chen et al.’s (2008) study on U.S. firms shows that, relative to non-family 
firms, family firms are more likely to issue bad news earnings warnings, as they are 
more concerned with the litigation-related and reputation costs of withholding bad 
news. In a Malaysian setting, Wan-Hussin (2009) finds that family-dominated firms 
are associated with higher level of disclosure. Additionally, a Hong Kong study by 
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
~ 96 ~ 
 
Chau and Gray (2010) finds a positive association between high family ownership 
and the level of voluntary disclosures.  
If family-controlled firms have greater concern over their reputation, wealth, and 
longer run financial performance, it is expected that controlling family owners are 
more likely to promote greater RP disclosure. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H8:  Family-controlled firms in the Asia-Pacific region have higher levels of RP 
disclosures. 
4.4.2 External Corporate Governance Characteristics and RP Disclosure 
This section presents the external corporate governance factors that potentially 
influence the level of RP disclosure. The factors are leverage, external auditor, listing 
status, and importantly in this study, country-level factors. 
Leverage  
Agency theory posits that external debt creates agency costs between managers and 
debt holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Given that debt holders have monitoring 
incentives, managers also have incentives to provide greater disclosures to ensure 
that managers safeguard debt-holder investments (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
However, debt holders can impose restrictive debt covenants in debt contracts to 
minimise the agency costs of debt (Jensen, 1986). Given this restriction option, debt 
can act as an internal monitoring mechanism on managers’ usage of free cash flow 
which may reduce the need for greater disclosure to debt-holders (Jensen, 1986). In 
spite of these conflicting arguments, Gallery, Cooper et al. (2008) argue that 
companies with high leverage, or ones which may have technically violated debt 
covenant restrictions, may choose to either provide greater public disclosure or to 
have direct communication with debt holders to avoid public scrutiny. Therefore, 
higher debt levels can lead to either greater or lower levels of public disclosure.  
Empirical findings by Eng and Mak (2003) for Singaporean firms and Hossain et al. 
(1995) for New Zealand firms both support a negative association between corporate 
disclosures and debt levels. In contrast, a Hong Kong study by Ferguson, Lam and 
Lee (2002) shows that debt levels are positively associated with greater disclosure of 
strategic, financial and non-financial information. Additionally, Taylor et al. (2012) 
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report a positive association between leverage and the level of mineral reserve 
disclosures by firms in the Australian extractive industry. Given these conflicting 
arguments and inconclusive findings, the following non-directional hypothesis is 
proposed:    
H9:  The leverage of a company is associated with the level of RP disclosures by 
companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
External Auditor  
It is claimed that larger audit firms provide better quality audits as they are more 
concerned about maintaining their reputations (DeAngelo, 1981). The research tends 
to confirm this claim. Audits by larger firms have been associated with higher 
earnings response coefficients, indicating a higher level of credibility (Teoh & 
Wong, 1993). Also, compared to smaller audit firms, larger audit firms invest more 
to maintain their reputation for providing quality audits (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). 
Accordingly, larger audit firms have more incentives to ensure companies comply 
with regulations, including disclosure requirements (Owusu-Ansah, 2005).  
Consistent with the auditor reputation argument, the research finds a positive 
relationship between the type of auditor and the extent of corporate disclosures. A 
Bangladesh study conducted by Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), a New Zealand study 
by Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005), and an international study by Street and Gray 
(2002) all find supports for the positive association between auditor type and the 
firms’ mandatory disclosure compliance. In the Australian context, studies by Basset 
et al. (2007), Kent and Stewart (2008), and Nelson et al. (2010) provide evidence that 
firms audited by a Big 4 auditor have greater disclosures. Also in the context of 
Australian firms, Gallery, Cooper et al. (2008) argue and find evidence that due to 
the technical difficulty of complying with IFRS principle-based standards, managers 
seem to rely on audit firms’ guidance in order to comply with mandatory disclosure 
requirements, and this increases where the firm is audited by a large audit firm.  
If the size of the audit firm gives an indication of the likely quality of its audits, Big 4 
auditors are expected to provide more effective monitors of RP transactions. 
Following the preceding arguments on the influence of larger auditors (i.e., a Big 4 
firm), the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H10:  Companies in the Asia-Pacific region which are audited by a Big 4 auditor 
have higher levels of RP disclosures. 
Listing Status 
There are several reasons to expect that firms with foreign listing status should have 
greater levels of disclosure. Agency theory suggests that companies are motivated to 
cross-list in foreign stock exchanges to bond themselves to more stringent 
requirements for disclosure, accounting and governance (Stulz, 1999). From a similar 
perspective, Leuz and Wysocki (2008, p. 54) argue that “firms in countries with 
weak institutional frameworks have difficulties in raising external finance because 
controlling insiders in these environments cannot sufficiently assure outside investors 
that they will not expropriate them”. Given this problem, investors are likely to price 
protect themselves by increasing the costs of capital to the firm. As a consequence, 
firms have a stronger incentive to assure investors by bonding themselves to a more 
stringent market.  
In addition, Karolyi (2012, p. 517) argues that companies may want to cross-list in a 
foreign market to raise additional capital by obtaining access to “a larger, deeper 
market for capital”. Thus, to obtain the potential benefits of a foreign listing, firms 
have incentives to provide greater disclosure. Consistent with the above argument, 
Basset et al. (2007) find that firms cross-listing in the U.S. have higher voluntary 
disclosure of executive stock option (ESO) information. In the context of Asia-
Pacific firms, Morris and Gray (2009) find a positive association between foreign 
listing status and firms’ disclosures. Thus, this thesis proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H11:  Companies in the Asia-Pacific region which are cross-listed in foreign 
exchange(s) have higher levels of RP disclosures.  
Country-level Factors 
Chapter 2 discussed the institutional factors and the reasons why the extent of RP 
financial statement disclosure could differ by country, while Chapter 3 outlined 
findings on the association between country-specific factors and the nature and 
extent of RP transactions and RP disclosure. The relevant country-specific factors 
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include a country’s legal system, law enforcement, anti-director rights, and stock 
market development.  
Legal Origin 
The empirical evidence reveals that firms in common law countries are associated 
with greater disclosure than firms in code law countries (e.g., Hope, 2003b; Jaggi & 
Low, 2000). Moreover, the self-dealing regulations in common law countries tend to 
emphasise stronger scrutiny of RP transactions than in civil/code law countries 
(Djankov et al., 2008). For these reasons, companies from common law countries 
(e.g., Australia, Malaysia and Singapore) are more likely to have higher levels of RP 
disclosure than companies from code law countries (e.g., Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Thailand).  
H12:  Firms in countries with common law legal origins have higher levels of RP 
disclosures than those in countries with code law legal origins. 
Enforcement 
Differences in each country’s enforcement mechanisms may lead to differences in 
the extent of RP disclosure. Chapter 2 described substantial differences in 
enforcement mechanisms between the countries. Australia, Singapore and Malaysia 
have relatively stronger enforcement than Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. In 
addition, a number of studies reviewed in Chapter 3 demonstrate the relationship 
between enforcement and the extent of corporate disclosure. For example, based on 
an investigation of 12 Asian countries, Morris and Gray (2009) find that country 
regulation and enforcement matters more in achieving convergence and increasing 
transparency in the region, than firm-specific factors. Accordingly, it is expected that 
companies in countries with stronger enforcement practices (Australia, Malaysia and 
Singapore) are more likely to have more transparent RP disclosures than companies 
in countries with relatively weaker enforcement practice (Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand). 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised that:  
H13:  Firms in countries with stronger enforcement have higher levels of RP 
disclosure than those in countries with weaker enforcement. 
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Investor Protection 
In addition to a country’s strength of enforcement, the strength of the legal 
environment in a country is influenced by investor protection (Durnev & Kim, 2005; 
Klapper & Love, 2004). In a stronger investor protection environment, insiders have 
fewer private control benefits and have lower motivation to hide firm performance 
from outsiders (Leuz et al., 2003). Therefore, it is likely that when outside (minority) 
owners have greater legal protection against opportunistic behaviour by 
insiders/controlling owners, firms have incentives to provide greater and more 
transparent RP disclosures than companies in countries with relatively weaker 
enforcement practice. It is therefore hypothesised that:  
H14:  Firms in countries with stronger investor protection have higher levels of RP 
disclosure than those in countries with weaker investor protection. 
Control for Corruption 
It is argued that a country’s control for corruption is an important component of an 
effective institutional regulatory framework and necessary to mitigate corrupt acts in 
the public and private sectors (Transparency International, 2009b). The risks of 
corruption exist both inside and outside companies (Aldrighi, 2009). For example, 
controlling owners may exert their influence to expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders through “self-dealing”, “tunnelling” or “the private benefits of control”, 
or managers may opportunistically pursue short-term profits to increase their bonuses 
at the expense of long-term profitability (Aldrighi, 2009, p. 16). Such risks of 
corruptions are more likely to be present in a country with poorer minority 
shareholder protection (Aldrighi, 2009).  
 
Theoretically, the likelihood of corruptions is determined by both the incentives for 
corruption and the deterrent of corruption (Jain, 2001). The incentives for corruption 
are present when a person/company holds discretionary power and there are 
economic rents associated with this power, whereas the deterrent of corruption refers 
to the failure/inability of the legal system to detect or penalise wrongdoings (Jain, 
2001, p. 77). Kimbro (2002) finds that less corrupt countries are associated with 
better laws, a more effective judiciary, better financial reporting standards, and a 
higher concentration of accountants. Additionally, in the Asia-Pacific setting, Morris 
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
~ 101 ~ 
 
and Gray (2009) find that less corrupt countries tend to have greater financial 
transparency. Also, an international study by Malagueño et al. (2010) shows that the 
perceived quality of accounting  is negatively related with the perceived corruption 
in a country.  
 
Following the above theoretical arguments and empirical findings, in this study 
companies in a country with stronger control for corruption are expected to have 
higher levels of RP disclosure, as specified in the following hypothesis: 
 
H15:  Firms in countries with stronger control for corruption have higher levels of 
RP disclosure than those in countries with weaker control for corruption. 
4.4.3 Other Firm-Specific Factors (Control Variables) and RP Disclosures 
In addition to the governance factors and country factors discussed above, it is 
important to consider other firm-specific characteristics identified in prior research 
(e.g., as determinants of firms’ financial disclosure practices (e.g., Botosan, 1997; 
Chau & Gray, 2002; Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008; Utama & Utama, 2012). These 
characteristics are likely to extend to RP disclosures and include company size, 
profitability, performance, and, specific to this study, the level of RP activity.   
Company Size  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) posit that larger firms attract greater public attention, 
and therefore they are exposed to greater political and regulatory costs. Larger firms 
are expected to disclose more than smaller firms because they have greater resources 
to prepare more sophisticated financial statements (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Buzby, 
1975; Firth, 1979) and are less likely to have a more competitive disadvantage 
compared to smaller firms (Hossain et al., 1995). In addition, larger firms tend to 
have lower costs of collecting and disseminating information and have greater 
demand from financial analysts to disclose information (Hossain et al., 1995). Prior 
studies consistently find a positive associations between company size and firms’ 
disclosures in various contexts (e.g., Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008; Jian & Wong, 
2010; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005).   
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
~ 102 ~ 
 
Performance and Profitability 
Extant literature suggests that a firm’s performance is associated with its financial 
disclosure practices. In the context of RP disclosures, companies that have better 
performances are expected to more fully comply with the relevant regulations. In the 
U.S. context, Gordon et al. (2004b) document a negative association between firms’ 
performance and RP transactions. Gallery, Gallery et al. (2008) also show that 
certain Australian firms with greater RP payments tend to have low profitability. 
These studies both appear to support a conflict of interest view of RP transactions.  
Additionally, unprofitable companies may be less transparent in their disclosures to 
avoid criticism over RP transactions, as previous studies indicate that high levels of 
RP transactions are associated with lower firm value (e.g., Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 
2010). Similarly, Asian studies find that higher RP transactions activities are 
associated with lower performance for listed firms in China (Berkman et al., 2009) 
and Hong Kong (Cheung et al., 2006) than firms which do not disclose such 
transactions.  
RP Transaction Activity 
RP transactions may affect RP disclosures because firms with greater RP transaction 
activities are likely to have greater incentive to disclose more transparent RP 
information. Consistent with this argument, Lo and Wong (2011) investigate factors 
associated with firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose transfer pricing policies for 
RP transactions in China and find that RP transaction activity, measured by the 
natural logarithm of RP transactions, is positively associated with firms’ disclosures. 
Similarly, Utama and Utama (2012) examine the influence of corporate governance 
practices on firms’ RP disclosure for a sample of Indonesian firms and find that RP 
transaction activity is positively associated with RP disclosures72. Therefore, RP 
transaction activity is included as a control variable in this study. 
                                                          
72
 Utama and Utama (2012) argue that disclosure requirement relating to RP transactions by Indonesian 
regulatory body (Bapepam-LK) is expected to influence the levels of RP disclosure. That is, Bapepam-LK 
requires that RP assets and liabilities have to be presented separately in the balance sheet. Therefore, Utama and 
Utama (2012) use the log of RP transaction’s assets plus liabilities to total equity to measure RP transactions as 
an independent variable, whereas the extent of RP disclosure is used to measure the dependent variable.  
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Industry Type 
The level of business competition is likely to differ across industries and may 
influence firms’ disclosure policies, in particular the disclosure of RP information 
(Lo & Wong, 2011). Moreover, industry regulation or convention may also influence 
firms’ disclosure practices. Empirically, in the U.S. context, Cerf (1961) finds that 
disclosure levels are higher in some industries than others. An Australian study by 
Taplin et al. (2002) shows that firms in the resource, manufacturing, finance or 
service industries have a greater compliance with international accounting standards. 
Accordingly, the difference of RP disclosure practices across industries is also 
examined and controlled for in this study. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has developed theory and hypotheses to address the three 
research questions. There are a numbers of governance, country-, and firm-specific 
factors which may influence the nature, extent and compliance of RP disclosures 
within and between countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  With respect to RQ1, given 
the substantial variation in institutional differences across the sample countries, it is 
expected that there will be differences in the nature and extent of RP transactions and 
in disclosures about those transactions by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Similarly, relating to RQ2, it is expected that there will be similarities and 
differences in the extent of RP disclosure conformance in accordance to IAS 24 
Related Party Disclosure, by companies in the Asia-Pacific region.  
To address RQ3, hypotheses on the influence of internal and external corporate 
governance characteristics on the level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region are developed. Those influences are likely to jointly explain the 
decisions made by managers about the nature and extent of RP transactions and their 
level of RP disclosures in financial statements about these transactions.  
Three categories of influences are proposed. First, based on agency theory and prior 
empirical findings, effective internal governance characteristics are expected to 
enhance firms’ RP disclosures. Second, external governance characteristics, 
including the country-level factors, are expected to influence firms’ RP disclosure. 
Specifically, companies in a country with stronger enforcement, investor protection, 
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and importantly, better control for corruption are expected to have greater RP 
disclosures. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the hypotheses proposed and tested in 
this thesis.  




H1: The proportion of independent directors on a firm’s board is positively associated 
with the level of RP disclosure by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
+ 
H2: The size of a firm’s board of directors is negatively associated with the level of RP 
disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
- 
H3: The financial expertise of the members of a firm’s board of directors has a positive 
association with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
+ 
H4: The number of independent members in a firm’s audit committee is positively 
associated with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
+ 
H5: The size of firm’s audit committee has an association with the level of RP 
disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
? 
H6: Audit committee with at least one director having financial expertise is positively 
associated with the higher level of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
+ 
H7: The ownership concentration of a company is positively associated with the level 
of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
+ 
H8: Family-controlled firms in the Asia-Pacific region have higher levels of RP 
disclosures. 
+ 
H9: The leverage of a company is associated with the level of RP disclosures by 
companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
? 
H10: Companies in the Asia-Pacific region which are audited by a Big 4 auditor have 
higher levels of RP disclosures. 
+ 
H11: Companies in the Asia-Pacific region which are cross-listed in foreign 
exchange(s) have higher levels of RP disclosures. 
+ 
H12: Firms in countries with common law legal systems have higher levels of RP 
disclosure than those in countries with code law legal systems. 
+ 
H13: Firms in countries with stronger enforcement have higher levels of RP disclosure 
than those in countries with weaker enforcement. 
+ 
H14: Firms in countries with stronger investor protection have higher levels of RP 
disclosure than those in countries with weaker investor protection. 
+ 
H15: Firms in countries with stronger control for corruption have higher levels of RP 
disclosure than those in countries with weaker control for corruption. 
+ 
 
The next chapter presents the research design developed to address the research 
questions and test the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The previous chapter developed the theoretical framework and hypotheses related to 
the study’s research questions. This chapter presents the research design to address 
these questions. The first and second questions are addressed through analytical 
procedures, and the third question is addressed by testing the related hypotheses 
through multiple regression procedures. The chapter is organised as follows: first, the 
study period, sampling procedure and data sources are described; second, the overall 
research design framework is presented; third, the data classification, measurement 
and testing procedures for testing each research question are described, including the 
research model for jointly testing the hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of regression diagnostic issues and a summary of the research design.  
5.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The year 2009 was selected as the time period for this study for a number of reasons. 
First, the 2009 annual reports were the most recent reports available in all six 
countries, at the time of data collection. Second, 2009 was selected to capture a time 
period in which there are differences in the institutional environment for RP 
disclosure. A one year study period was chosen due to the complexity of controlling 
for the changes in institutional differences and their consequences over time across 
countries73.  
This thesis covers corporate reporting pursuant to IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure 
and the equivalent standards in six countries in the Asia-Pacific region (i.e., 
Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand)74. The 
OSIRIS Bureau Van Dijk database was used to identify the population of firms listed 
on each country’s Stock Exchange in 2009. The  sampling approach is consistent 
with previous studies. One hundred of the largest non-financial companies were 
selected from each country (n=600). The selection was based on the OSIRIS-BVDEP 
                                                          
73
 A similar rationale is provided by Aerts and Tarca (2010) for the study period restriction in their study. 
74
 This selection allows an investigation of RP transactions patterns and disclosure about those transactions where 
large companies have incentives to provide such information, but there are variances in their institutional setting, 
in particular, enforcement (Aerts & Tarca, 2010; Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al. 1998; Rahman, 2010; 
Tipton, 2009). Initially, this study includes the following countries in the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, China, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. However, China, South Korea 
and Japan are removed from the study due to insufficient annual reports available in English. 
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list of the listed non-financial companies ranked by market capitalisation as at 31 
December 2009. Financial companies were excluded because they are subject to 
separate corporate regulation (e.g., Banking Act, 1959 in Australia) and therefore, do 
not have comparable characteristics with non-financial companies, such as sales and 
liabilities. This approach is consistent with prior research. For all firms, the annual 
reports needed to be available in English. Seventeen companies were excluded 
because they used foreign GAAP, undertook corporate restructuring in fiscal year 
2009, did not disclose RP transactions, and/or did not have a complete dataset needed 
in this study.  
As shown in Table 5.1 (Panel A), the sample selection procedures resulted in a final 
sample of 582 firms. Panel B shows the number of companies representing each 
country of study. The selection of the largest listed companies is to ensure that the 
companies are likely to provide RP transaction disclosures and are likely to have 
various types of RP transactions. This procedure introduces a size bias, however, as 
large companies tend to be closely monitored by the investment community, 
regulators, and other interested parties, they are expected to provide more 
comprehensive disclosure (Cooke, 1996, p. 1).  
Table 5.1 Sample Selection and Country Breakdown 
Panel A:    
   Total listed companies selected       600 
Less: 
Companies undertaking corporate 









Companies with incomplete data 
 
11 (18) 
Final sample       582 
Panel B: Country Breakdown   
   
Country Stock Exchanges 
N Listed 
Companies 
N               
Sample 
Percent 
Australia Australia Stock Exchanges 1,966 99 5 
Indonesia Indonesia Stock Exchanges 398 99 25 
Malaysia Bursa Malaysia 959 100 10 
Philippines Philippines Stock Exchanges 248 91 37 
Singapore Singapore Stock Exchanges 773 93 12 
Thailand Stock Exchanges of Thailand 535 100 19 
Total     4,879 582 12 
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Table 5.2 presents the distribution of sample firms among the industry sectors. The 
table shows that all nine GICS non-financial sectors are represented in the sample. 
Sectors representation ranges from 23 (Health Care) to 131 (Industrials). 
Furthermore, the 2009 market capitalisation for companies in each industry varies 
from a mean (median) of US$796M (US$307M) for Consumer Discretionary to 
US$3,604M (US$2,144M) for Telecommunication Services. 
Table 5.2 Sample Distribution across Industries 
Industry Sector (GICS) GICS Code N Percent 
2009 Market Cap  
(Mil US$) 
Mean Median 
Consumer Discretionary 25 106 18 796 307 
Consumer Staples 30 94 16 1,949 371 
Energy 10 61 10 2,756 922 
Health Care 35 23 4 1,585 645 
Industrials 20 131 23 1,689 466 
Information Technology 45 33 6 2,211 869 
Materials 15 83 14 2,290 301 
Telecommunication Services 50 24 4 3,604 2,144 
Utilities 55 27 5 3,149 1,252 
Total   582 100     
 
Annual reports and consolidated financial statements of the sample companies were 
selected from each country as the source of RP disclosures. The annual reports were 
obtained from OSIRIS BVDEP database, the Morningstar FinAnalysis database, and 
the countries’ stock exchanges. RP transactions, the disclosure of those transactions 
(RP disclosure), and corporate governance related data were hand-collected from the 
annual reports and consolidated financial statements. Market capitalisation data were 
obtained from OSIRIS database and the SIRCA Risk Measurement Database (for 
companies listed on the ASX). Other firm-level financial data were collected from 
OSIRIS BVDEP and Connect 4 Database. 
5.2 Overall Research Specification 
Figure 5.1 summarises the overall research specifications for the three research 
questions. It portrays each of the research questions in terms of types, objectives, and 
variable measurements. In relation to RQ1, a descriptive/exploratory procedure is 
selected to describe the nature and extent of RP transactions and the disclosures of 
such transactions by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, for RQ2, a 
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descriptive/exploratory procedure is developed to investigate the conformance of RP 
disclosures by companies in the Asia Pacific region to IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosure. For addressing RQ3 a multiple regression procedure is specified for 
testing the hypothesised associations between RP disclosures and country, 
governance, and other firm-specific factors. 
RQ1 
What is the nature and extent of RP 
transactions and RP disclosures across 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region?
- Type: Descriptive – Exploratory Comparative Analysis
- Objective: To describe the nature and extent of RP transaction 
and disclosure by companies in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Measurement: see Section 5.2.1
RQ2 
To what extent do the RP disclosures by 
companies in the Asia-Pacific region 
conform to the IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosure within and across countries?
RQ3 
What are the governance, country, and 
other firm-specific factors which explain 
the nature and extent of RP disclosures 
in the Asia-Pacific region?
- Type: Descriptive – Exploratory Comparative Analysis
- Objective: To investigate the conformance of RP disclosure by   
   companies in the Asia Pacific region to the IAS 24 RP Disclosure
- Measurement: see Section 5.2.2
- Type: Hypotheses testing
- Objective: To examine factors that potentially influence the level of 
  RP disclosure
- Measurement: see Section 5.2.3
 
Figure 5.1 Overall Research Specification 
 
5.2.1 RQ1: Classification and Measurement of the Information about RP 
Transactions  
To address research question 1, RP transactions were hand-collected from the 
company annual reports for the fiscal year ending in 2009. The disclosures are 
typically provided in the Related Party Disclosures note, the Remuneration of 
Directors and Executives note or in the Directors’ Report. The coding system takes 
into account both the type of related party relationship, and the type of transaction 
(and amount). The classification about the nature of RP transactions and RP 
relationships are guided by prior studies (Cheung et al., 2006; Gallery, Gallery et al., 
2008; Gordon et al., 2004a) and IAS 24 (2003) Related Party Disclosure.  
The types of related parties were classified according to the definition of “related 
party” in paragraph 9 of IAS 24 (2004), as follows: (1) a parent company or entity 
that has significant control or influence, (2) a subsidiary, (3) a joint venture in which 
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the entity is a venturer, (4) an associate of the entity, (5) entity under common 
control, (6) major shareholder, (7) holding company, (8) a member of the key 
management personnel (KMP) of the entity and the close member of the family of 
the KMP, (9) close member of family of KMP, (10) director-related entity, (11) 
director and commissioner (two-tier), and (12) other related party. This final category 
captures the types of related parties which are not commonly reported in all 
countries.  
The types of transactions were classified according to the IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosure and prior studies’ classifications (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004a, 2004b; 
Supranowicz, 2007). The transactions were classified as: (1) purchases of goods and 
services, (2) other purchases, (3) sales of goods and services, (4) other sales, (5) 
other income, (6) other expenses, (7) employment, (8) loans from related parties, (9) 
loans to related parties, (10) transfer of assets, (11) donations, and (12) other 
transactions. Purchases of goods and services transactions were further sub-
categorised into ten major types (as shown in Table 5.3).  
This classification approach captures the range of differences in the nature of related 
party relationships and transactions and is consistent with prior studies (Gallery, 
Gallery et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 2004a). Table 5.3 presents the full classification 
schemes by types of related parties and types of transactions. 
The dollar amount of each transaction was recorded to measure the magnitude of RP 
transactions. In order to enable comparability of the magnitude of transactions across 
countries, all currencies were converted to US$ as the common currency75.  
The remuneration of directors in the ordinary course of business was not regarded as 
a RP transaction, consistent with prior studies (for example, Supranowicz, 2007). 
Remuneration includes directors’ fees, salaries, bonuses, post-employment benefits, 
termination payments, allowances and the value of options and other equity 
investments granted. However, payments to a director or executive for services 
provided outside their normal duties (e.g., consultancy arrangements) are considered 
RP transactions and coded separately from director remuneration. Transactions 
without any monetary value are not coded. 
                                                          
75
The exchange rates are collected from OSIRIS BVDEP database, which provides an individual exchange rate 
for each annual report investigated in this study.  
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Table 5.3 Classification of Related-Parties and Related-Party Transactions 
Type of related party relationship Type of transaction 
1. Parent entity 
2. Subsidiary 
3. Joint-venture in which the entity is a 
venture 
4. Associate 
5. Entity under common control 
6. Major shareholder 
7. Holding company 
8. Key management personnel 
- CEO 
- Executive chairman 
- Executive director 
- Non-executive chairman 
- Non-executive director 
- KMP (All)  
9. Close member of family of KMP 
10. Director-related entity 
11. Director and commissioner (two-tier) 
12. Other related party/company 
 
1. Purchase of goods and services 




- legal services 
- marketing 
- personnel services 
- real estate property 
- research and development 
- operating service (service for day to day 
operation) 
- technical and managerial 
- travel 
- goods  
- inventory 
- goods and services (no additional information) 
2. Purchases of property and other assets 
3. Sales of goods or services 
4. Sale of property and other assets 
5. Other Income 
6. Other Expenses 
7. Employment 
8. Loans made 
9. Loans received 
10. Transfer of assets 
11. Donations 
12. Other transactions 
Adapted from: Gordon et al. (2004a, 2004b); Supranowicz (2007) 
5.2.2 RQ2: Development of RP Disclosure Index 
To address RQ2, an index of comprehensive RP disclosure based on IAS 24 Related 
Party Disclosure is constructed. Since the focus is the disclosure of RP transactions, 
both mandatory and discretionary items are included in the scoring. This approach is 
taken in order to capture both conformance to IAS 24 and the “richness” of 
variations in the RP disclosure practices by companies across six countries. A similar 
approach is used in previous studies (e.g., Cooke, 1996).  
Table 5.4 presents the checklist of RP disclosures, based on IAS 24 disclosure 
requirements. The items included in the checklist are derived from the components of 
disclosure required by IAS 24 (2004) Related Party Disclosure, accounting standards 
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applicable in each country76, and guided by previous disclosure studies in the 
disclosure literature77.  
Applicability of RP Disclosure Items across Countries 
In November 2009, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the 
amended IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure which would be effective from 1 January 
2011. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), this accounting standard, however, 
was firstly issued in 1984, reformatted in 1994 and revised in 2003. As the 2003 
version remained applicable in 2009 it is used in this study subject to some variation 
in the domestic applicability of the standard across the six sample countries. The 
three main differences in mandatory RP disclosures across the six countries are: 
1. Disclosure about the name of the parent, the ultimate controlling party/next most 
senior parent and details of key management personnel compensation are not 
mandated under Indonesian and Thai GAAP, but mandated in Australia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. 
2. Disclosure on where the parent is incorporated and constituted, and the name of 
the ultimate controlling entity incorporated within Australia is mandated in 
Australia, but not mandated in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. 
3. Disclosure about pricing policy is mandated under Indonesian and Thai GAAP, 
but not mandated in Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. 
As a result of these differences, the checklist is divided into three parts:  (1) items 
mandatory in all countries, (2) items discretionary in all countries, and (3) items 
mandatory in some countries (and are therefore discretionary in some countries).  
Consistent with previous disclosure studies (e.g., Morris & Gray, 2009), the 
following procedures have been undertaken to ensure the applicability of each 
disclosure item in each country. First, IAS 24 (2003) Related Party Disclosure was 
used as a starting point to extract all items of disclosure. Second, the national 
accounting standard applicable in each of the six countries was reviewed to ensure 
                                                          
76
 These standards including AASB 124 (Australia), PSAK 7 (Indonesia), FRS 24 (Singapore), FRS 124 
(Malaysia), TAS 47 (Thailand), PAS 24 (Philippines). 
77
 This includes Botosan, 1997; Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Cooke, 1989; Craig & 
Diga, 1998; Elsayed & Hoque, 2010; Gallery, Cooper, & Sweeting, 2008; Hossain, Perera, & Rahman, 1995; 
Jiang, Habib, & Hu, 2011; Morris & Gray, 2009; Yeoh, 2005. 
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the applicability of each item in the checklist. Those standards include AASB 124 
(Australia), FRS 24 (Singapore), FRS 124 (Malaysia), PSAK 7 (Indonesia), TAS 47 
(Thailand), PAS 24 (the Philippines). Third, Big 4 Accounting Firms’ publications 
on the IFRS adoption/convergence status which includes all six countries were 
consulted. Fourth, relevant information from the professional accounting bodies in 
the six countries was reviewed. Lastly, extant studies addressing the convergence of 
IFRS and their applicability to each country were examined.  
Validation of the Disclosure Index 
To validate the disclosure index, the checklist was first checked against model 
accounts produced by the Big 4 Accounting Firms (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Ernst 
and Young, KPMG and Deloitte) to ensure that all relevant items were captured in 
the checklist78. Second, the disclosure scoring sheet was pre-tested on five annual 
reports from each country to ensure the applicability of the checklist across the six 
countries. Third, the checklist was scrutinised by an experienced accountant from a 
Big 4 accounting firm and two researchers with coding experience. Lastly, 300 
annual reports (50% of the sample) selected from all countries and a range of 
industries were scored by two independent raters who have an accounting degree79.  
Those scores were matched against the initial scores and results indicate no 
significant bias introduced by the scorers, suggesting that the disclosure checklist and 
the index for each company is reliable. This approach to the measurement of the 
extent of disclosure is consistent with previous studies (Al-Shammari et al., 2008; 
Cooke, 1989, 1996; Yeoh, 2005). 
Weighting and Scoring the Disclosure Indices 
A final list of 26 items was compiled and labelled as Overall Score of RP Disclosure. 
Table 5.4 presents the checklist of RP disclosures, based on the IAS 24 disclosure 
requirements. As shown in this table, the list is divided into three parts: (1) items 
mandatory in all countries; (2) items discretionary in all countries; and (3) items 
mandatory in some countries (a subset of (1)). 
                                                          
78
 The summary of model accounts for RP disclosure by Big 4 Accounting Firms is provided in Appendix 1. The 
model accounts were constructed according to the disclosure requirements of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure, 
provided by Australian Big 4 accounting firms.  
79
 One rater was an auditor in a Big 4 accounting firm and another rater was a researcher; both are experienced in 
analysing annual reports and financial statements. Both of the scorers have accounting qualifications. 
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Table 5.4 Related-Party IAS 24 Disclosure Checklist 
Panel A. Items Mandatory in All Six Countries                                                                                                                                              
(Unweighted: "0" = not disclosed; "1"= disclosed.)                                                                                                                    
Reference 
Information about Parent Company   
M1. Relationships between parent and subsidiaries. IAS 24 para 12.1 
Information about Key Management Personnel Compensation   
M2. KMP compensation in total. IAS 24 para 16.1 
Information about the Nature of Transactions   
M3. Information about the transaction. IAS 24 para 17.1 
M4. Quantitative amount of the transaction. IAS 24 para 17.2 
Information about the Outstanding Balances   
M5. Aggregate quantitative amount for the outstanding balances.  IAS 24 para 17.3 
M6. Information on whether the balances are secured. IAS 24 para 17.4 
M7. Information on the nature of consideration to be provided in the settlement of the balance 
e.g., to be settled by cash. 
IAS 24 para 17.5 
M8. Details of any guarantees given or received. IAS 24 para 17.6 
M9. Information about provision for doubtful debts. IAS 24 para 17.7 
M10. Expense recognised for bad or doubtful debts due from related parties. IAS 24 para 17.8 
Information about the Nature of Relationship    
M11. Nature of relationships.  IAS 24 para 18.1 
 M12. Quantitative amount for the nature of relationships. IAS 24 para 18.2 
Panel B. Items Discretionary in All Countries ("3" = high; "2" = medium, "1" = low, and 
"0" = no information)*  Extension of: 
D1.     Nature of transaction details.  IAS 24 para 17.1 
D2.      Terms and conditions of transaction details. IAS 24 para 17.2 
D3.      Related party details for the amount of balances. IAS 24 para 17.3 
D4.      Nature of relationship details. IAS 24 para 18.1 
Panel C. Items Mandatory in Some Countries:                                                                                                                                                                       
(Unweighted: "0" = not disclosed; "1"= 
disclosed.) 
Aus Ind Mal Phil Sing Tha Reference 
MD1. The name of the parent. M D M M M D IAS 24 para 12.2 
MD2. The name of the ultimate controlling 
party/next most senior parent. 
M D M M M D IAS 24 para 12.3 
MD3. Short-term benefit. M D M M M D 
 IAS 24 para 16 
(a) 
MD4. Post-employment benefit. M D M M M D 
IAS 24 para 16 
(b) 
MD5. Other long-term benefit. M D M M M D 
IAS 24 para 16 
(c) 
MD6. Termination benefit. M D M M M D 
IAS 24 para 16 
(d) 
MD7. Share-based payment. M D M M M D 
IAS 24 para 16 
(e) 
MD8. Where the parent is incorporated/constituted. 
(AASB Aus12.1(a)) 
M D D D D D 
AASB Aus12.1 
(a) 
MD9. The name of the ultimate controlling entity 
incorporated within Australia. 
M D D D D D 
AASB Aus12.1 
(b) 
MD10. Pricing Policy (Indonesia: PSAK 7; 
Thailand: TAS47) 
D M D D D M 
PSAK 7 para 19 
(c); TAS 47  
Note: M = RP disclosure item which is mandatorily required in the particular country; D = RP disclosure item 
which is not mandatorily required (i.e., subject to discretion) in the particular country.  
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(1) Items Mandatory in All Countries  
Table 5.4 (Panel A) includes items M1 – M12 which are mandatory in all 
countries
80
. Each item was scored “one” when disclosed in an annual report of a 
sample company, and “zero” otherwise. The full annual report was read 
thoroughly to verify the disclosure of RP transactions81. Items that were not 
disclosed and were not relevant in the particular company or in a particular 
country are coded as “NA” (not applicable) and excluded from the score total. If 
a particular item was not disclosed and there was not sufficient information in 
the annual report to conclude whether the item is relevant/irrelevant to the 
company, code “UD” was assigned and the item was excluded from the score 
total. 
 
(2) Items Discretionary in All Countries  
Table 5.4 (Panel B) presents the items which are discretionary in all countries. 
The checklist was used to capture the extent of RP disclosure on certain items of 
information requiring managers’ discretion. These items consist of the details of 
information on the nature of transaction, the terms and condition of the 
transactions, the related party information for each amount of balances, and the 
nature of relationships with the related parties. Each of these four items was 
scored “0” for no disclosure, “1” for low, “2” for medium, and “3” for high level 
of details. Table 5.5 presents the detailed coding system for these four RP 
discretionary items.  
The checklist was constructed after pre-testing five randomly selected annual 
reports of sample firms from each country. The checklist was accompanied by a 
guidance scoring sheet to assist in assigning the weight for each item. This 
guidance incorporated the different sub-items or wording that might be disclosed 
on an information item. This approach is consistent with previous studies in 
                                                          
80
 Of the 12 common mandatory items, 9 (75%) were mandatory to all six countries and 3 items (25%) were 
explicitly mandatory to four of them. The 3 items (i.e., items M6, M7, and M8) were not explicitly required by 
RP disclosure standards in Indonesia and Thailand, however, the items were part of the information regarding RP 
balances. The approach is consistent with Craig and Diga (1998). 
81
 RP disclosures include information about parent company, subsidiaries, the ultimate controlling entity, where 
the parent is incorporated or constituted, key management personnel compensation in total and the breakdowns, 
nature of related-party transactions (including the amount and terms and conditions), outstanding balances of 
related-party transactions (including the amount, terms and conditions, and doubtful debts) and the nature of 
relationships of related-party transactions (including the amount in each type of relationship). 
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other disclosure contexts (e.g., Holder-Webb, 2007; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 
1994). 
Table 5.5 Discretionary Disclosure Coding System  
Score Description 
Item 1: Detailed disclosure of the nature of transaction (0-3)  
This item measures to what extent the company discloses the nature of transactions, as there are only examples of RP 
transactions provided and no specific guidance by RP disclosure standards, hence managers have to exercise their 
discretionary judgment relating to these items. Accordingly, additional points are assigned based on these following 
conditions: 
0 No information. 
1 = low The company discloses general lists of transactions with no amount. 
2 = medium The company discloses general lists of transactions (i.e., dividend, interests, reimbursement). 
3 = high The company discloses more sensitive transactions (i.e., sales, purchases, loans, rentals). 
Item 2: Detailed disclosure of the terms and condition of transaction (0-3) 
Assign additional points for discretionary information, if the company discloses the terms and conditions of the 
transaction, based on these following conditions: 
0 No information. 
1 = low The company mentions normal commercial terms and conditions (or/with statement that they are 
arm's length/in the ordinary course of business/not more favourable than...). 
2 = medium The company mentions normal commercial terms and conditions and market value, or/with 
statement that they are under arm’s length/in the ordinary course of business. 
3 = high The company mentions specific information about the price/interest rate/particular negotiation.  
Item 3: Detailed disclosure of related party for each balances (0-3) 
This item captures to what extent the company discloses the balances of RP transactions. Accordingly, additional 
points are assigned based on the following conditions:  
0 No information. 
1 = low The disclosure and amounts are aggregated for all related parties. 
2 = medium The company discloses balances for only one specific related party. 
3 = high The company discloses balances for more than one related party, including a statement that there 
are no outstanding balances with the particular related party or parties. 
Item 4: Detailed disclosure of the nature relationship (0-3) 
This item measures to what extent the company discloses the nature of related party relationships. Accordingly, 
additional points are assigned based on the following conditions: 
0 No information. 
1 = low The company discloses the relationship for only “subsidiary” and/or “related parties” (or only the 
names of the related parties) without any further information/details about the nature of 
relationships of the related parties. 
2 = medium The company discloses “subsidiary” and other specific parties (i.e., the nature of relationship, for 
example: associates/JV/holding company/ultimate holding company/director/KMP/etc.), including 
disclosures that there are no RP transactions with any of those specific parties.  
3 = high The company discloses subsidiary, any other specific parties (i.e., the nature of relationship, for 
example: associates/JV/holding company/ultimate holding company/director/KMP/etc.), and the 
names or additional information/narratives about related party relationship. 
Note: the above coding and scoring system is used as the basis for developing the variables MSCORE, DSCORE and 
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(3) Overall Score 
As previously discussed, the overall RP disclosure score also includes items 
which are mandatory in some countries (hence, discretionary in the other 
countries). Each of these items was categorised as mandatory (M) or 
discretionary (D) according to its applicability in each country as shown in Panel 
C of Table 5.4 (items MD1 to MD10). Consistent with the scoring of MSCORE, 
each item was coded “one” when disclosed in an annual report of a sample 
company, and “zero” otherwise.  The total RP disclosure score is therefore a 
comprehensive measure that includes all mandatory and discretionary RP 
disclosure items.  
 
For statistical analysis purposes it is common for disclosure scores to be 
standardised. Accordingly, the raw scores obtained from the three scoring 
procedures described above are standardised for each sample company using the 
following formula (Cooke, 1996): 
         
∑    
  




RP_DISCj RP Disclosure Score  
nj The maximum possible RP disclosure scores for company j 
Xij The RP disclosure scores for company j based on the applicability 
of item i 
 
The formula produces standardised scores ranging from 0 to 1. The standardised 
measures are used in the regression modelling describe below as dependent variables 
to capture RP disclosure (RP_DISC). 
 
5.2.3 RQ3: Regression Model for Testing the Determinants of RP Disclosures  
In addressing RQ3, the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 are tested using multiple 
regression analysis to examine the internal and external governance characteristics 
which potentially explain the nature and extent of RP disclosures by companies in 
Chapter 5: Research Design 
~ 117 ~ 
 
the Asia-Pacific region. The alternative RP disclosure scores are the dependent 
variable in the regression model. A number of proxies are used to measure the 
internal and external corporate governance characteristics and other firm-specific 
(control) variables entering the linear regression models to jointly test the expected 
explanatory factors for the RP disclosures: 




β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 
ACEXPjk + β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + 
β12LEGLjk + β13 ENFjk + β14 INVPjk + β15 CORUPjk + β16 SIZEjk + β17 PROFITjk 
+ β18 PERFORMjk + β19 RPTNjk + β+20 INDUSjk + εjk                                                                (1) 
Where: 
RP_DISC  is represented by the three alternative measures of the RP disclosure score: 
OSCORE = A measure of a company’s overall RP disclosure index for firm j in 
country k. It is a ratio of a company’s compliance and discretionary RP 
disclosure score to the maximum possible score of mandated and 
discretionary disclosure. The index ranges from 0 to 1.      
MSCORE = A measure of a company’s compliance index of RP disclosure firm j in 
country k. It is a ratio of a company’s actual RP disclosure score to the 
maximum possible RP disclosure score based on the applicable mandated 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure. The index ranges from 0 to 1.  
DSCORE = A measure of a company’s discretionary index of RP disclosure firm j in 
country k. It is a ratio of a company’s discretionary RP  disclosure score 
to the maximum discretionary RP disclosure score. There are four 
weighted discretionary items of RP disclosure, with the total maximum 
score = 12 points. The index ranges from 0 to 1.    
BIND = The ratio of independent directors to board size for fiscal year ending in 
2009.  
BSIZE = The size of the company’s board of directors, measured as the number of 
a company’s board members for fiscal year ending in 2009. 
BEXP = The ratio of board member(s) with financial expertise to board size for 
fiscal year ending in 2009.  
ACIND = The size of the company’s audit committee, measured as the number of a 
company’s audit committee members for fiscal year ending in 2009. 
ACSIZE = The total number of audit committee members for fiscal year ending in 
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2009. 
ACEXP = The AC financial expertise, measured as a binary variable with a value of 
one if a firm has at least one member with financial and accounting 
expertise on its audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
CONC = The ownership concentration, which is a ratio of ordinary shares owned 
by the largest shareholders to total shares issued at year end.  
FAM = A binary variable coded 1 if a firm is classified as family-controlled and 0 
otherwise. Firm is classified as family-controlled if an individual/family 
owned >10% or more of outstanding shares and at least one family 
member was on the corporate board.  
LEV = Leverage at the end of 2009, which is total debt/total assets.  
EXT = The size of external auditor, measured as a binary variable coded 1 if firm 
i is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year 2009 and 0 otherwise.  
CROSS = The firm’s cross listing status, measured as a binary variable coded as “1” 
if a firm is listed in foreign stock exchange and “0” otherwise.  
LEGL = The country legal origin, which is a binary variable coded as “1” if a 
country has common-law legal origin and “0” otherwise.  
ENF = The enforcement index in Preiato et al. (2012). (Includes the existence, 
activity, involvement, and responsibility of a country’s enforcement body 
or bodies in relation to the quality of financial reporting and standard 
setting outcomes. A higher index indicates stronger enforcement.)  
INVP = The investor protection index in La Porta et al. (2006). (The index is a 
principal component of the indices of disclosure requirements, liability 
standards, and anti-director rights. A higher index indicates stronger 
investor protection.) 
CORUP = The control for corruption index, measured by corruption perception 
index 2009 by Transparency International. (A higher index indicates 
stronger control for corruption (less corruption). 
SIZE = Log of total assets at the end of 2009. 
PROFIT = Firm profitability at the end of 2009, represented by return on assets 
which is earnings before tax / average total assets.  
PERFORM = Firm performance at the end of 2009, represented by Tobin’s Q and 
measured as the sum of total assets plus the market value of equity less 
book value of equity, over total assets.  
NRPT = RP transaction activity measured by natural logarithm of total number of 
RP transactions reported in the annual report of fiscal year 2009.  
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INDUSTRY = Eight dummy variables representing the nine GICS sectors. 
5.2.4 Explanation and Justification of Independent Variables  
Internal Governance Characteristics 
BIND: Board Independence (H1) 
H1 predicts a positive association between the proportion of independent directors on 
a firm’s board and the level of RP disclosure. Board independence was measured by 
a ratio of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. This 
measure was used in prior studies which investigated the relationship between board 
independence and RP transactions or RP disclosures (e.g., Aharony, Wang, & Yuan, 
2010; Arshad et al., 2009; Cheung, Jing, et al., 2009; Cheung, Qi, et al., 2009; 
Gallery, Gallery, et al., 2008; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010; Ryngaert & Thomas, 
2012; Wahab et al., 2011). 
BSIZE: Board Size (H2) 
H2 predicts a negative association between the size of a firm’s board of directors and 
the level of RP disclosures. Consistent with prior studies (Cheung et al., 2006; 
Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004a; Munir & Gul, 2010; Wahab et al., 2011), board size 
was represented by total number of directors on the board. This measure is consistent 
with previous disclosure studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006). 
BEXP: Board Expertise (H3) 
H3 expects a positive association between the accounting or financial expertise of 
board members and the level of RP disclosure. Board expertise is measured as the 
proportion of board members with accounting and financial expertise to total number 
of board members. This measure has been used by previous research on the board 
efficacy (e.g., Arshad et al., 2009). 
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ACIND: AC Independence (H4) 
H4 predicts a positive association between the independence of audit committee and 
the level of RP disclosure. AC independence is measured as the number of 
independent members on the audit committee82.  
ACSIZE: AC Size (H5) 
H5 predicts an association between the size of audit committee and the level of RP 
disclosure. AC size is represented by the number of audit committee members. This 
measure is consistent with previous studies on the efficacy of audit committee 
(Anderson et al., 2004; Felo et al., 2003).  
ACEXP: AC Expertise (H6) 
H6 predicts a positive association between the accounting and financial expertise of 
audit committee members and the level of RP disclosure. AC expertise is measured 
using dummy variable coded 1 if a firm has at least one member with an accounting 
or financial expert on its audit committee and zero otherwise
83
. This measure has 
been used by Lo et al. (2010). 
CONC: Ownership Concentration (H7) 
H7 predicts a positive association between the concentration of ownership and the 
level of RP disclosures. The concentration of ownership was measured by a 
percentage ownership of the largest shareholder at year end. This measure is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Berkman et al., 2009; Cheung, Jing, et al., 2009; 
Cheung, Qi, et al., 2009; Jiang, Habib, & Hu, 2011; Lo et al., 2010).  
FAM: Family-Controlled (H8) 
H8 predicts that family-controlled firms have a higher level of RP disclosures. A 
family firm is represented by a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm is controlled by a 
                                                          
82
 This study uses the absolute number of independent members on the audit committee to represent AC 
independence due to the institutional differences of AC independence characteristics in the sample countries 
(refer to Table 6.7). For example, Indonesian companies tend to have a smaller size of audit committee, which in 
most cases, consists of 100% independent members. In contrast, companies in other countries (e.g., Australia and 
Singapore) tend to have a larger size of audit committee which, in many cases, have less than 100% independent 
members. In this case, the proportion of independent audit committee members may not be fully representing the 
degree of audit committee independence.  
83
 The use of a dummy variable to measure ACEXP is mainly due to the unique data in this study. In this study, two companies 
do not have an audit committee whereas 213 companies have no financial expert on the committee. 
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family and 0 otherwise (Cheung, Qi et al., 2009). Consistent with Ali et al. (2007, p. 
246), a firm was categorised as a family firm if “the founder and/or their descendants 
hold positions in the top management or on the board or are among the companies’ 
largest shareholders.” This definition is also consistent with previous studies on 
family firms (Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b, 2004).  
Family ownership data were collected from the section of Analysis of Shareholdings 
of the companies’ annual reports. In addition, information from the directors’ 
shareholding and profile of board of directors was also examined to ascertain the 
identity of the largest shareholders. A binary variable was used to represent family 
firms where it was coded as “one” if family shareholding in the firm is equal to or 
more than 10% and coded “zero” otherwise. Such an approach is consistent with 
Munir and Gul (2010)84.  
Firm-Level External Governance Characteristics  
LEV: Leverage (H9) 
H9 predicts an association between the leverage and the level of RP disclosures. 
Leverage was measured by the ratio of total debt to total asset at the end of fiscal 
year 2009. This measure is consistent with prior related party transaction studies 
(Berkman et al., 2009; Aharony et al., 2010; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010; Wahab et 
al., 2011; Munir & Gul, 2010; Ryngaert & Thomas, 2012) and disclosure studies 
(Eng & Mak, 2003 and Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008) use a similar ratio (total 
liabilities to total assets) to measure leverage.  
EXT: Type of External Auditor (H10) 
H10 predicts that companies which are audited by a Big 4 auditor have higher levels 
of RP disclosures. Type of external auditor was represented by dummy variable 
coded 1 if a firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor in year 2009 and 0 otherwise. This 
approach is consistent with prior studies which examine relationships between types 
of external audit and RP transactions  (Cheung et al., 2006; Gallery, Gallery et al., 
2008; Munir & Gul, 2010; Wahab et al., 2011) or the extent of disclosure (Chau & 
Gray, 2010; Barako et al., 2006). 
                                                          
84
 An exception: Karoon Gas (Australia: KAR) is categorised as family-controlled firm, because Mr Robert 
Hosing (KAR’s executive chairman) has 6.84% direct ownership (KAR’s annual report, 2009). 
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CROSS: Cross-listing Status (H11) 
H11 predicts a positive association between the cross-listing status and the level of 
RP disclosures. The cross-listing status was measured by a binary variable coded 1 if 
a firm is cross-listed in a foreign stock exchange and 0 otherwise. This measure is 
consistent with that of Morris and Gray (2009).  
Country-level Governance Characteristics 
To test the influence of the country-level governance characteristics on the level of 
firms’ RP disclosures, four measures of the country level variables are employed. 
Those variables are a country’s legal origin, enforcement, investor protection index, 
and corruption index.  
LEGL: Legal Origin (H12) 
H12 predicts that firms which reside in countries with common-law legal origins 
have higher levels of RP disclosures. The legal origin (LEGL) represents a country’s 
predominant legal origin which distinguishes between common-law and code-law 
countries. A company is coded “1” if it resides in a country with common-law legal 
origin and “0” otherwise. Prior studies in international finance/accounting use the 
legal origin as a country-level explanatory factor or an instrument (e.g., La Porta et 
al., 2006). Legal origin is argued as “the most primitive” factor, relative to the other 
country legal factors in the extant international finance/accounting studies. That is, 
legal origin is considered to have the highest degree of exogeneity, particularly 
because it has been rooted for ages (Ball et al., 2000; Hope, 2003; Morris et al., 
2012). The legal origin, however, is unlikely to be a sole explanatory factor of firms’ 
disclosure (Morris et al., 2012). 
ENF: Enforcement (H13) 
H13 predicts that firms in countries with stronger enforcement have higher levels of 
RP disclosures. Prior study (Durnev & Kim, 2005) suggests that a country’s strength 
of legal environment is represented by both de jure (i.e., investor protection) and de 
facto (i.e., enforcement) aspects of regulations, because a country cannot rely only on 
one aspect. A country may have a high investor protection index, but does not have a 
strong enforcement, hence the regulation will not be effective. Accordingly, this 
thesis includes both aspects of regulation, that is, the enforcement and the investor 
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protection index. A country’s level of enforcement is measured by the enforcement 
index of Preiato et al. (2012) which measures a country’s strength of enforcement, 
which emphasises on accounting enforcement (hereafter ENF) 85. The index captures 
the existence, activity, involvement, and responsibility of a country’s enforcement 
body or bodies in relation to the quality of financial reporting and standard setting 
outcomes. The index measures seven enforcement items in a country, which are: 
whether a country has security market regulator or other body monitors financial 
reporting; whether the body regulates audit firms, has power to set accounting and 
auditing standards, reviews financial statements, provides a report about its review of 
financial statements, has taken enforcement action regarding financial statements, 
and what is the level of resourcing by the securities market regulator. The value of 
the index ranges between 0-12 with higher values for stronger enforcement. 
INVP: Investor Protection (H14) 
H14 predicts that firms in countries with stronger investor protection have higher 
levels of RP disclosures. With respect to the investor protection, La Porta et al.’s 
(2006) investor protection index (hereafter INVP) was used to measure the strength 
of the investor protection in a country. The value of the index for each country is 
constructed from the principal component analysis of three indices: disclosure 
requirements, liability standards, and anti-director rights (La Porta et al., 2006, p. 
10). A higher INVP score indicates a stronger investor protection in terms of 
disclosure requirements, liability standards and anti-director rights. 
CORUP: Control for Corruption (H15) 
H15 predicts that firms in countries with stronger control for corruption have higher 
levels of RP disclosures. Lastly and importantly, the control for corruption has been 
argued as an important component of a country’s institutional framework to mitigate 
opportunistic behaviours by managers or controlling owners (e.g., Aldrighi, 2009; 
Jain, 2001; Transparency International, 2009b) and encourage firms’ transparency 
(Morris & Gray, 2009). A country’s control for corruption is measured by the 
Corruption Perception Index 2009 (hereafter CORUP), published by Transparency 
                                                          
85
 Preiato et al. (2012, p. 22) compile the index based on the publicly available data including FEE, 2001; CESR, 
2006, 2007, 2009; IFAC, 2011; and annual reports of the countries’ enforcement bodies. 
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International. The higher CORUP index variable denotes stronger control for 
corruption (i.e., less corruption). 
Table 5.6 shows all the country-level variables. It indicates that among the six 
countries, Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore’s legal system originate from  British 
common law. Those three countries have relatively higher corruption scores (less 
corrupt), compared to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand whose legal system 
originated from the code (civil) law.  
Table 5.6 Country-Level Governance Factors 
PANEL A LEGL  ENF INVP CORUP 
Australia Common Law 11.00 0.78 8.70 
Indonesia Code Law 4.00 0.51 2.80 
Malaysia Common Law 9.00 0.73 4.50 
Philippines Code Law 8.00 0.81 2.40 
Singapore Common Law 6.00 0.77 9.20 
Thailand Code Law 7.00 0.37 3.40 
Note: LEGL is a country’s predominant legal origin; ENF is a country’s enforcement index (Preiato et al., 2012); 
INVP is a country’s investor protection index (La Porta et al., 2006); CORUP is a country’s control for 
corruption index (CPI 2009 of Transparency International). For each proxy of ENF, INVP and CORUP, a higher 
score represents a stronger enforcement. 
 
5.2.5 Control Variables 
Based on the hypothesis development, in addition to corporate governance, there are 
a number of other firm-level factors which may influence corporate related party 
transaction disclosures. These factors include company size, leverage, profitability, 
performance, listing status, and industry type (Aharony et al., 2010; Ryngaert & 
Thomas, 2012).   
SIZE: Company Size 
The company’s size was measured by the reported total assets at the end of fiscal 
year 2009. This measure is commonly used in prior RP transaction studies (e.g., 
Chen, Chen, & Chen, 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Aharony et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 
2006; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010; and Gallery, Gallery et al., 2008) and disclosure 
studies (e.g., Gallery, Cooper et al., 2008; Al-Shammari et al., 2008).  
PERFORM: Performance 
A firm’s performance was measured by using Tobin’s Q ratio, which is a ratio of 
market capitalisation minus the book value of equity plus total assets, all divided by 
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total assets. This measure is consistent with prior studies (Brown & Caylor, 2004; 
Durnev & Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004; Ryngaert & Thomas, 2012).  
PROFIT: Profitability 
The company’s profitability is measured using the return on assets at the end of 
2009, which is the ratio of net income before tax to average total assets.  
NRPT: RP Transaction Activity 
A firm’s RP transaction activity is represented by the natural logarithm of number of 
RP transactions reported in the annual reports in the fiscal year 2009 (Nekhili & 
Cherif, 2011).  
INDUS: Industry Type 
The disclosure of RP transactions is mandated for all types of industry. However, to 
control for the possibility of industry effect on firms’ RP disclosure, the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is used to control for the presence of such 
effect in the nine major sectors86.  
 
5.2.6 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables (RQ3) 
Table 5.7 presents the summary of the variables, measures and the related references. 
                                                          
86
 Global Industry Classification Standard consists of ten sectors (Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities). As 
previously discussed in this chapter, companies in the Financials sector were excluded from the sample. Therefore, the eight 
dummy variables are used to cover each of the nine major sectors (The Health Care sector is the excluded sector). 
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Table 5.7 Summary of the Variables, Measures and References 
 
Dependent Variable Measure Reference 
Expected 
Sign 
OSCORE: Overall RP 
Disclosure Score  
Overall RP disclosure score (i.e., the maximum possible items of 
RP disclosure). 
  
MSCORE: Mandatory RP 
Disclosure Score 
Mandatory RP disclosure score (i.e., disclosure items in IAS 24 
(2003) commonly mandatory in all six countries). 
  
DSCORE: Discretionary RP 
Disclosure Score 
Discretionary RP-disclosure score (i.e., disclosure items in IAS 24 
(2003) commonly discretionary in all six countries). 
  
Independent Variables: Internal Governance Characteristics 
BIND: Board Independence (H1) Board independence was measured by a ratio of independent 
directors to total number of directors on the board.  
Aharony et al. (2010); Arshad et al. (2009); Cheung, Jing et al. 
(2009); Cheung, Qi et al. (2009); Cheung et al. (2006); 
Gallery, Gallery et al. (2008); Kohlbeck & Mayhew (2010); 
Ryngaert & Thomas (2011); Wahab et al. (2011) 
+ 
BSIZE: Board Size (H2) The total number of directors on the board.  Barako et al. (2006); Gallery, Gallery et al. (2008); Gordon et 
al. (2004a) 
- 
BEXP: Board Expertise (H3) The proportion of board members with financial expertise to total 
number of board members.  
Arshad et al. (2009) + 
ACIND: Audit Committee 
Independence (H4) 
The number of independent AC members in the audit committee.  + 
ACSIZE: Audit Committee Size 
(H5) 
The size of audit committee was represented by the number of 
audit committee members.  
Anderson et al. (2004); Felo et al. (2003) ? 
ACEXP: Audit Committee 
Expertise (H6) 
A dummy variable coded 1 if a firm has financial expert on its 
audit committee and 0 otherwise.  
Lo et al. (2010) + 
CONC: Ownership 
Concentration (H7) 
The percentage ownership of the largest shareholder at year end. Berkman et al. (2009); Cheung et al. (2006); Cheung, Qi et al. 
(2009); Jiang et al. (2011); Lo et al. (2010) 
+ 
FAM: Family-Controlled (H8) A dummy variable coded 1 if a firm is controlled by a family and 
0 otherwise. 
Ali et al. (2007); Cheung, Qi et al. (2009)  + 
Independent Variables: External Governance Characteristics 
LEV: Leverage (H9) The ratio of total debt to total asset at the end of fiscal year 2009.  Aharony et al. (2010); Berkman et al. (2009); Eng & Mak 
(2003); ; Gallery, Cooper et al. (2008); Kohlbeck & Mayhew 
(2010); Munir & Gul (2010); Ryngaert & Thomas (2012) 
? 
EXT: Type of External Auditor 
(H10) 
A dummy variable coded 1 if a firm was audited by a Big 4 
auditor in year 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
Barako et al. (2006); Chau & Gray (2010); Cheung et al. 
(2006); Gallery, Gallery et al. (2008); Munir & Gul (2010); 
Wahab et al. (2011) 
+ 
CROSS: Cross-listing Status 
(H11) 
A binary variable coded 1 if a firm is cross-listed in a foreign 
stock exchange and 0 otherwise.  
Morris & Gray (2009) + 
Independent Variables: Country-Level Governance Characteristics 
LEGL: Legal Origin (H12) A binary variable coded as “1” if a country has British common- La Porta et al. (1998); Nenova et al. (2000) + 
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law legal origin and “0” otherwise.  
ENF: Enforcement (H13)  An enforcement index of Preiato et al. (2012) which measures the 
strength of a country’s enforcement body.  
Preiato et al. (2012) + 
INVP: Investor Protection (H14) An investor protection index of La Porta et al.’s (2006). The index 
represents principal component of the indices of disclosure 
requirements, liability standards, and anti-director rights (La Porta 
et al., 2006, p. 10).  
La Porta et al. (2006); Chen, Chen, & Wei (2009); Mclean, 
Zhang, & Zhao (2012) 
+ 
CORUP: Control for Corruption 
(H15) 
The Corruption Perception Index 2009 of Transparency 
International. A higher CORUP score indicates a stronger control 
for corruption (less corrupt). 
Transparency International (2009a); Malagueño et al. (2010) + 
Control Variables 
SIZE: Company Size The log of company’s total assets at the end of fiscal year 2009.  Aharony et al. (2010); Al-Shammari et al. (2008); Chen, Chen, 
& Chen, 2010); Cheung et al. (2006); Gallery, Cooper et al. 
(2008); Gallery, Gallery et al. (2008); Lo et al. (2010); 
Kohlbeck & Mayhew (2010) 
+ 
PERFORM:  Performance A ratio of market capitalisation minus the book value of equity 
plus total assets, all divided by total assets (Tobin’s Q ratio). 
Brown & Caylor, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005: Klapper & 
Love, 2004; Ryngaert & Thomas, 2012 
+ 
PROFIT: Profitability The return on assets at the end of 2009, which is the ratio of net 
income before tax to average total assets.  
 + 
RPTN: RP Transactions The log of RP transaction numbers reported in the annual reports 
in the fiscal year 2009.  





The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)   ? 
Dependent and Independent Variables -- Additional Tests 
MSCORE2 – Dependent 
Variable 
An alternative Mandatory RP disclosure score (i.e., all mandatory 
disclosure items in IAS 24 (2003)).  
  
ADRI – Independent Variable 
as an alternative of INVP  
Antidirector-right Index, an alternative of Investor Protection 
Index (INVP).  
 + 
ASDI –  Independent Variable 
as an alternative of INVP 
An anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) by Djankov et al. (2008) is used 
to replace INVP in the models. The anti-self-dealing index 
measures a more specific legal protection of minority 
shareholders, that is, the control of self-dealing. The index 
represents an average indices of ex-ante and ex-post private 
control of self-dealing (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 437). 
Djankov et al. (2008); Lel & Miller (2008); Mclean et al. 
(2012) 
+ 
SECRECY – Additional 
Independent Variable 
Gray’s (1988) cultural dimension derived from Hofstede, 
calculated by Braun and Rodrigues (2008). 
Braun & Rodriguez (2008); Morris et al. (2012) - 
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5.2.7 Diagnostic and Sensitivity Tests  
Normality and Other Regression Issues  
All variables were examined for deviations from normality. Of the governance 
variables, ownership concentration (CONC) was normally distributed, whereas other 
variables including board independence (BIND), board expertise (BEXP), board size 
(BSIZE), audit committee independence (ACIND) and audit committee size 
(ACSIZE) required winsorising of a small number of outliers (less than 5% of the 
sample observations) to achieve normal distribution.  
With regard to the firm-specific non-governance variable, large variance leads to the 
skewness distribution of company size (SIZE) and number of RP transactions 
(RPTN). Accordingly, following Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), natural logarithmic 
transformations were performed in which the resulting data was then winsorised to 
remove outliers. Also, profitability (PROFIT) and performance (PERFORM) were 
winsorised to correct the small number of outliers (i.e., less than 5% of the sample 
observation).  
As multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity may also be threats to the validity and 
reliability of regression results, these are examined as part of the estimating 
procedures and are discussed in the results chapter.  
Sensitivity Analysis (RQ3) 
To enhance the credibility of the findings in this study, a number of sensitivity 
analyses will be conducted. First, an alternative RP disclosure index will be used as 
an alternative of MSCORE, to include all items required by IAS 24 (2003) which is 
applicable in 2009. Second, given the potential risk of multicollinearity between 
country-level variables, a highly correlated country-level variable (i.e., legal origin) 
will be removed from the regression model. Third, two alternative measures of 
investor protection (INVP) will be examined. The first alternative measure is a 
revised anti-director right (ADRI), which measures (La Porta et al., 2006). The 
second alternative measure is an anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) (Djankov et al., 
2008).  
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the revised anti-director-right index measures 
shareholder rights according to the laws and regulations applicable to publicly traded 
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firms in May 2003. The index is a summative of six items: vote by mail, shares not 
deposited, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, pre-emptive rights, and capital to 
call a meeting (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 455). The anti-self-dealing index measures a 
more specific legal protection of minority shareholders, that is, the control against 
self-dealing by controlling owners. The index represents an average score of ex-ante 
and ex-post private control of self-dealing (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 437). Djankov et 
al. (2008) find that a higher anti-self-dealing-index score is associated with higher 
valued stock markets and lower benefits of control. The anti-self-dealing index has 
also been used in recent studies to measure investor protection (for example, Lel & 
Miller, 2008; Mclean et al., 2012). Also see a review by Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2012).  
Lastly, as discussed in Chapter 3, previous studies have examined the influence of 
culture on the corporate disclosures and find some mixed evidence on the influence 
of each cultural dimensions (e.g., Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Hope, 2003b; 
Jaggi & Low, 2000). Consistent with the argument present in Morris et al. (2012), 
the influence of the cultural dimension is examined by using SECRECY.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the time period, sample selection, data sources and research 
model specifications to address the three research questions and test the hypotheses. 
Guided by previous studies on financial disclosure and RP transactions and based on 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure, self-constructed disclosure indices are developed 
to measure the level of corporate RP transaction disclosure. These indices and 
analytical procedures are designed to address research questions one and two. To test 
the research hypotheses (research question 3) a multiple regression model is 
developed which includes, as the dependent variable in the model, the standardised 
indices as (alternative) RP disclosure proxies. Based on the prior disclosure 
literature, variables to capture the hypothesised relationship are included in the 
model as the independent variables. They include firm governance and non-
governance characteristics and country level investor protection variables. 
Furthermore, control variables are incorporated into the model to capture the 
expected influence of firm-specific factors (firm size, profitability, leverage, 
performance, listing status and industry category) on the levels of RP disclosure. 
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Alternative testing procedures are also outlined in the chapter. This rigorous research 
design should ensure that this study can appropriately address the research 
hypotheses and achieve reliable conclusions. The results of implementing this 
research design are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS  
 
This chapter presents the findings relating to the three research questions and the 
associated hypotheses. First, relating to RQ1, descriptive statistics are presented on 
the nature and extent of related party (RP) transactions and RP disclosures. Second, 
relating to RQ2, descriptive statistics are analysed on the extent of RP disclosure 
conformance to the IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure. Third, relating to RQ3, 
descriptive statistics for factors influencing the nature and extent of RP disclosures 
are examined, followed by a discussion of the bivariate tests of governance, country, 
and firm-specific factors influencing the nature and extent of RP disclosures. Fourth, 
the results of multivariate tests relating to the hypotheses (and RQ3) are analysed, 
followed by robustness tests and sensitivity analysis. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of findings. 
6.1 The Nature and Extent of RP Transaction and RP Disclosures (RQ1) 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the nature and extent of RP transaction 
and RP disclosures in the companies’ annual reports in the six Asia-Pacific countries. 
The table shows that there are 8,727 RP transactions reported by the sample firms in 
the six countries. On average, firms disclose 14 transactions, with a range between 
zero and 12087, suggesting that RP transactions are common in all six countries. The 
finding is relatively higher, compared to Gordon et al. (2004a)88 who find the 
frequency of RP transactions in the U.S. are an average of 3.9. Furthermore, the RP 
transactions in this study have a mean (median) value of US$911.87 million 
(US$71.35 million), ranging from minimum zero to the maximum US$58,437 
million. It should be noted, however, that the actual total RP transactions and the 
actual total values of those transactions are likely to be larger because some 
companies do not disclose transaction values in a number of cases. In addition, there 
are also possibilities that companies may not fully disclose all RP transactions, due to 
                                                          
87
 Three listed companies report zero RP transactions: David Jones (RP transactions are disclosed briefly and no 
amounts are provided), JB Hifi (discloses all required disclosure items: the name of parent entity, key 
management compensation, and terms and conditions of RP transactions, however, no RP transactions and 
amounts are mentioned), and Boart Long Year (discloses key management personnel compensation; no RP 
transactions and amounts are disclosed). Indosat, a government-linked company in Indonesia, reports 120 
transactions. The company discloses detail RP transactions, including the related party involved for each type of 
transaction (with no aggregation). 
88
 Gordon et al. (2004a) examine RP transactions of 112 U.S. listed companies from fiscal years 2000 and 2001 
proxy statements and 10-Ks.  
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materiality reasons, eliminated transactions with subsidiaries, and poor disclosure 
practices.  
Untabulated findings suggest that the higher frequency of RP transactions in some 
instances is due to corporate reporting policies. In the 2009 annual reports, most of 
the listed companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand disclose 
RP transactions by using “the detailed approach”. The listed companies in these 
countries disclose RP transactions by listing the name of each related party, the 
transactions undertaken with the respective related party, and the amount involved in 
the transactions. Listed companies in Singapore and Australia tend to report their RP 
transactions by using “the aggregated approach”. They disclose RP transactions 
according to the aggregated type or nature of RP relationships, the categorised type 
of transactions, and the summative amount involved in the aggregated transactions.  
Table 6.1 also presents the descriptive statistics of the RP transactions relative to the 
occurrence and magnitude of the transactions as reported by sample firms in the 2009 
annual reports. The results show a number of similarities and differences on the 
extent and magnitude of RP transactions across countries. First, loans provided to 
related parties are the most common type of transaction, accounting for 21.15% of 
the total number of RP transactions. Loans also have a relatively higher magnitude 
with a mean (median) US$95 million (US$ 921,000). Compared to loans received, 
loans provided to related parties are consistently more frequent in Australia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. This finding suggests that RP loans are an 
important source of finance in the sampled companies. Among all six countries, 
Thailand and Indonesia report relatively higher numbers of both loans provided to 
and loans received from related parties. These RP loans raise issues because of the 
potential conflict of interest in determining the term of loans (i.e., interest rate, 
repayment date, and allowance provided/expenses for doubtful accounts). In a 
number of cases, the terms of loans are unsecured, interest-free, and repayable on 
demand. Furthermore, it is also possible for companies to provide a relatively high 
amount of allowance for doubtful loans; hence, the loans could have close to a zero 
balance.  
Second, the purchases of goods and services are also of a high magnitude and 
frequent in all countries. Untabulated results show that purchases of goods and 
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inventory are the main driver in this category. Similarly, sales of goods and services 
transactions are mainly driven by sales of goods and inventory. The results are 
consistent in all six countries. Assuming the transactions are on commercial terms, 
these transactions may indicate “efficient transactions” to enhance overall 
competitiveness since they are part of operating activities (Chen, Chen, & Chen, 
2009). 
 Third, purchases of property and other assets are also common in all six countries. 
These purchases may involve conflicts of interest, for example, in determining the 
price of the purchased property and assets. While this type of transaction only 
constitutes 2.1% of the total number of RP transactions, they are relatively higher 
amounts with the mean (median) value of US$171 million (US$432,000). Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia have relatively higher numbers of such transactions 
compared to the other countries. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of RP Transactions by Nature Across Countries 
 Pooled Australia Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Thailand 
 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 














% (‘000 U S$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) 
Purchases of goods and  
services 
1,028 81,339 85 103,782 180 25,106 342 54,896 87 15,576 115 84,267 219 184,731 
(11.78) (1,951) (7.21) (2,742) (11.61) (2,562) (22.25) (1,331) (11.27) (2,647) (14.16) (1,963) (7.61) (2,401) 
Purchases of property  
and other assets 
187 171,284 8 228,668 34 4,686 58 3,839 5 11,777 23 25,440 59 494,489 
(2.14) (432) (0.68) (13,619) (2.19) (463) (3.77) (109) (0.65) (104) (2.83) (3,661) (2.05) (673) 
Sales of goods and  
services 
1,022 90,782 68 92,174 163 21,044 299 32,119 61 21,192 149 66,194 282 220,999 
(11.72) (2,125) (5.77) (9,523) (10.52) (1,703) (19.45) (1,854) (7.90) (1,143) (18.35) (2,141) (9.80) (3,691) 
Other Sales 67 12,287 4 1,327 13 34,497 6 17,016 1 200 16 10,251 27 3,820 
 
(0.77) (570) (0.34) (939) (0.84) (440) (0.39) (981) (0.13) (200) (1.97) (2,374) (0.94) (570) 
Other Income 1,314 18,991 240 59,079 86 15,091 286 15,511 85 3,065 179 5,290 438 8,753 
 
(15.06) (554) (20.36) (7,633) (5.55) (500) (18.61) (417) (11.01) (257) (22.04) (450) (15.22) (358) 
Other Expenses 1,361 15,833 151 20,494 183 34,979 329 4,398 126 1,461 158 51,025 415 5,845 
 
(15.60) (489) (12.81) (2,753) (11.81) (571) (21.41) (310) (16.32) (219) (19.46) (314) (14.42) (660) 
Employment 13 236 2 437 1 2 2 17 1 459 0 0 7 243 
 
(0.15) (45) (0.17) (437) (0.06) (2) (0.13) (17) (0.13) (459) (0.00) (0) (0.24) (93) 
Loans From 1,337 689 175 321,822 337 5,188 55 35,566 114 6,997 60 31,865 597 15,319 
 
(15.33) (251) (14.84) (25,153) (21.74) (398) (3.58) (1,275) (14.77) (372) (7.39) (2,083) (20.75) (636) 
Loans To 1,845 94,927 331 444,974 406 4,571 112 22,741 215 6,224 88 26,039 695 28,617 
 
(21.15) (921) (28.07) (12,658) (26.19) (448) (7.29) (1,029) (27.85) (216) (10.84) (877) (24.16) (870) 
Transfer of assets 15 53,697 3 4,517 0 0 7 2,348 0 0 4 1,614 1 330 
 
(0.17) (743) (0.25) (4,382) (0.00) (0) (0.46) (1,349) (0.00) (0) (0.49) (753) (0.03) (330) 
Donations 5 2,451 0 0 0 (0) 1 1,301 4 150 0 0 0 0 
 
(0.06) (1,349) (0.00) (0) (0.00) 0 (0.07) (1,301) (0.52) (175) (0.00) 0 (0.00) (0) 
Others 529 53,800 112 201,042 147 14,919 40 51,133 73 5,641 20 4,256 137 8,817 
 
(6.06) (1,382) (9.50) (7,686) (9.48) (984) (2.6) (788) (9.46) (881) (2.46) (1,671) (4.76) (590) 
Total  
8,727 60,897 1,179  220,809 1,550  14,228 1,537  26,774 772  7,375 812  41,425 2,877 58,589  
(100) (880) (100)  (8,114) (100)  (651) (100)  (672) (100)  (388) (100)  (853) (100)  (738) 
% of a country’s 




13.51  17.76  17.61  8.85  9.30  32.97  
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Further statistical analysis was performed on the RP relationships behind the 
transactions (Table 6.2). As expected, transactions with corporate combinations (i.e., 
subsidiaries, associates, and joint venture) are common in all countries. Overall, RP 
transactions with corporate combination account for 46% of total reported RP 
transactions. RP transactions with director-related entities (accounts for 6.27% of the 
total RP transactions) are less frequently disclosed and of lower magnitude in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore, compared to other countries. A relatively 
higher number of transactions with director-related entities is reported by Thai 
companies, whereas a relatively higher magnitude of transactions is reported by 
Australian companies with mean (median) value of US$24.7 million (US$ 404,000).  
Transactions with director-related entities are of a much higher magnitude and 
prevalence than with key management personnel individually, with a mean (median) 
value of US$2.4 million (US$229,000), which may indicate that companies prefer to 
enter into transactions with entities familiar to the directors. However, it might also 
indicate that directors as individuals feel reluctant to be involved in the RP 
transactions89. 
Further, RP transactions with major shareholders are commonly reported in all 
countries (mean/median: US$151 million/US$1.5 million), with relatively higher 
values reported in Australia and Thailand (i.e., US$371 million and US$ 278 million, 
respectively). However, in terms of the prevalence, companies in Thailand and 
Malaysia report higher numbers of transactions with major shareholders than those in 
other countries. Furthermore, transactions with the parent or entity that has joint 
control or significant influence are also less frequent. Compared to other countries, 
Thailand has the highest frequency and magnitude90 of transactions with a parent or 
entity that has joint control or significant influence (n=88, mean = US$64.9 million; 
median = US$676,000).  
Transactions with entities under common control91, however, are only reported by 
listed companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The 
                                                          
89 Similar findings are reported in Supranowicz (2007, pp. 63–64). 
90 While Singapore has the highest magnitude (mean = median = US$484 million), only two transactions are reported within 
this category. 
91 The entities under common control include entity under common control, entity under common ultimate holding company, 
other entity within the group, entity under common key management, entity under common major shareholder, subsidiary of 
immediate holding, entity subject to common significant influence, wholly-owned subsidiaries of the company’s immediate and 
ultimate holding company, subsidiaries of holding company. 
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prevalence and magnitude of transactions with this type of related party are mainly 
apparent in Indonesia and the Philippines. This result could be influenced by the 
existence of groups and the crossholdings structure of companies within the group in 
those countries. As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.4), East-Asian corporations 
including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are largely dominated 
by family-controlling owners in which the separation of management from 
ownership control is uncommon. Those family-controlling owners may have 
incentives to enter into RP transactions between closely affiliated companies or 
between family members; given the lower transaction costs and reduced information 
asymmetry (Claessens et al., 2000). 
Overall, the findings suggest that there are differences on the nature and extent of RP 
transactions across countries in the Asia-Pacific region. First, RP loans are more 
frequently reported by companies in Thailand and Indonesia. Second, RP purchases 
of property and other assets are more frequently reported by companies in Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Third, RP transactions with corporate combinations are 
common in all six countries and account for almost half of the total number of 
reported RP transactions. Fourth, RP transactions with director-related entities are 
more frequently reported by companies in Australia and Thailand. Lastly, RP 
transactions with entities under common control are frequently reported by 
companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.  
In addition to those differences in the nature and extent of RP transactions, there are 
also differences in the nature and extent of RP disclosures. For example, companies 
in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand tend to disclose their RP 
transactions by detailed reporting information, whereas companies in Singapore and 
Australia tend to disclose RP transactions by reporting aggregated/summative 
information. It is important to note that as with previous studies on RP transactions, 
this study can only identify RP transactions which are disclosed in the companies’ 
annual reports.   
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of RP Transactions by Nature of Related-Party Relationships Across Countries 
Nature of RP Relationships 






















% (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) % (‘000 US$) 
Parent, or an entity that has joint 
control or significant influence 
262 39,683 26 37,836 70 29,251 26 12,523 50 7,160 2 484,051 88 64,931 
3.00% (938) 2.21% 2,870 4.52% 751 1.69% 783 6.48% 1,139 0.25% 484,051 3.06% 676 
Subsidiary 2,129 132,270 548 417,646 66 9,044 356 25,076 99 14,134 134 58,019 926 36,755 
24.40% (2,568) 46.48% 29,312 4.26% 929 23.16% 1,029 12.82% 522 16.50% 2,158 32.19% 1,300 
Joint-venture in which  
the entity is a venturer 
400 28,098 117 54,795 11 1,532 41 25,007 23 3,309 60 28,611 148 13,468 
4.58% (894) 9.92% 8,601 0.71% 555 2.67% 2,981 2.98% 216 7.39% 501 5.14% 286 
Associate 
1,479 58,257 157 24,801 319 19,819 228 47,016 175 14,091 179 54,737 421 125,801 
16.95% (900) 13.32% 3,732 20.58% 840 14.83% 1,647 22.67% 548 22.04% 1,295 14.63% 540 
Entities under common  
control (fellow subsidiary) 
432 8,783 0 0 236 10,512 64 10,808 27 2,359 0 0 78 3,515 
4.95% (561) 0.00% 0 16.97% 832 4.16% 850 3.50% 406 0.00% 0 2.71% 88 
Major shareholder 
419 151,102 11 317,334 64 18,894 89 52,478 24 2,928 39 8,975 192 278,755 
4.80% (1,513) 0.93% 7,000 4.13% 584 5.79% 850 3.11% 161 4.80% 1,313 6.67% 3,203 
Holding company 
177 12,941 0 0 0 0 134 13,709 2 73,943 41 7,455 0 0 
2.03% (253) 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 8.72% 201 0.26% 73,943 5.05% 530 0.00% 0 
Key-management personnel 
206 2,431 45 5,645 42 1,641 63 1,880 15 537 18 1,663 23 929 
2.36% (229) 3.82% 161 2.71% 332 4.10% 212 1.94% 149 2.22% 239 0.80% 356 
Director-related entity 
547 19,533 81 24,684 59 2,578 149 3,824 27 919 45 163,656 186 3,087 
6.27% (243) 6.87% 404 3.81% 281 9.69% 328 3.50% 97 5.54% 199 6.47% 197 
Other related-party 
2,676 22,969 194 74,388 656 13,529 387 31,697 330 3,292 294 18,165 815 23,883 
30.66% (698) 16.45% 4,179 42.32% 546 25.18% 841 42.75% 269 36.21% 619 28.33% 777 
 Total 8,727 60,897 1,179  220,809 1,550  14,228 1,537  26,774 772  7,375 812  41,425 2,877 58,589  
  100% (880) 100%  (8,114) 100%  (651) 100%  (672) 100%  (388) 100%  (853) 100%  (738) 
% of each country’s 
transactions to total transactions 
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6.2 The Extent of RP Disclosure Conformance to IAS 24 (RQ2) 
International Financial Reporting Standard (i.e., IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures, 
2003) is used as a benchmark in assessing the level of RP disclosure across the six 
countries. As previously mentioned, in the fiscal year ending in 2009, three countries 
in this study applied the newer version of IAS 24, one country applied the newer 
version plus additional paragraphs, and two countries conform to the older version. 
Table 6.3 shows proportions of companies in each country that conform with each 
item of mandatory disclosure under IAS 24 (2003). The items are clustered into five 
groups, which are (1) relationship and the name of parent, (2) key management 
personnel compensation (KMP), (3) nature and amount of transactions, (4) related-
party balances, and (5) nature of relationships. Evident in the table are a number of 
variations in the level of compliance among the groups of disclosed items.  
The first three groups, which are “relationship and the name of the parent”, “KMP 
compensation”, and “nature and amount of transactions” have high compliance levels 
at 98, 99, and 99%, respectively. The fourth group “related-party balances” has the 
lowest compliance (47.82%). While companies are inclined to disclose the “amount 
of the outstanding balances” and “whether the balances are secured”, they are less 
likely to disclose other details about the balances. The lowest level of compliance 
within this category is for “bad or doubtful debts expenses” (14.49%). Surprisingly, 
Thailand shows the lowest compliance on disclosing “bad or doubtful debts 
expenses” (6.06%), despite its highest number of RP loans compared to the other five 
countries (as previously discussed).  
The compliance level for the “provision for doubtful debt” is also very low (33.93%). 
The low compliance on these items for Thailand and the other countries may be due 
to the aggregation of such expense and provision in the notes to the accounts for 
overall receivables/loans. Thus users of financial statements may not be able to trace 
the particular information unless provided by way of cross-referencing. 
Alternatively, companies may not disclose such information because they do not 
have RP loans or do not recognise any expense/provision regarding the doubtful 
accounts. However, given the mandatory requirements of such disclosure, companies 
still need to disclose if such expense/provision was not made in the period.  
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Lastly, companies appear to be transparent in disclosing the “nature of relationship” 
and the “amount of transactions for each of the nature of relationships”. However, 
unlike the other countries which have more than 85% compliance in this category, 
the Philippines has a very low compliance level of less than 40%. Companies in this 
country generally do not disclose the nature of related-party relationships and tend to 
only disclose the name of related parties, which in many cases means the nature of 
relationships cannot be identified in the annual reports. Given this disclosure policy, 
users of financial statements may not be able to fully assess the risks and benefits of 
the disclosed RP transactions.  
Table 6.3 Corporate Conformance with the Mandatory RP Disclosure Items  
 
Mandatory Items 
Average Conformance of Mandatory Items 
 Pooled Aust Ind Mal Phil Sing Thai 
 (N=582) (N=99) (N=99) (N=100) (N=91) (N=93) (N=100) 
Relationship and the name of parent: 
1. Parent and subsidiaries 
relationship 
0.9811 0.9798 1.0000 0.9600 1.0000 1.0000 0.9500 
Total “Relationship and the 
Name of Parent” 
0.9811 0.9798 1.0000 0.9600 1.0000 1.0000 0.9500 
KMP Compensation:        
2. KMP compensation in total 0.9897 1.0000 0.9798 0.9900 0.9890 1.0000 0.9800 
Total “KMP Compensation in 
Total” 
0.9897 1.0000 0.9798 0.9900 0.9890 1.0000 0.9800 
Nature and Amount of 
Transactions: 
       
3. Nature of transactions 0.9880 0.9596 0.9899 0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
4. Amount of transactions 0.9863 0.9293 0.9899 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Total “Nature and Amount of 
Transactions” 
0.9871 0.9444 0.9899 0.9900 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Related-Party Balances:        
5. Amount of the outstanding 
balances 
0.9053 0.8990 0.9798 0.9798 0.7692 0.8065 0.9800 
6. Whether the balances are 
secured 
0.7787 0.6263 0.5253 0.9200 0.9451 1.0000 0.6800 
7. Nature of consideration in 
the settlement 
0.1873 0.2424 0.0606 0.2700 0.1868 0.3656 0.0100 
8. Details of guarantees 
given/received 
0.5318 0.5612 0.4646 0.1500 0.8022 0.6452 0.6000 
9. Provision for doubtful debts 0.3393 0.4362 0.3750 0.2800 0.3000 0.2903 0.3571 
10. Bad or doubtful debts 
expenses 
0.1449 0.3053 0.1236 0.0900 0.1778 0.1183 0.0606 
Total “Related-Party Balances” 0.4782 0.5051 0.4125 0.4468 0.5293 0.5376 0.4467 
Nature of Relationships:        
11. Nature of relationship 0.8797 0.9798 0.9697 0.9800 0.3407 0.9892 0.9800 
12. Amount of transactions for 





0.9293 0.9697 0.9800 0.3846 0.9892 0.9700 
Total “Nature of Relationships” 0.8780 0.9545 0.9697 0.9800 0.3626 0.9893 0.9750 
Total Mandatory Items 0.7183 0.7415 0.7112 0.7148 0.6586 0.7670 0.7148 
Note: In coding disclosure items, companies are not penalised for non-disclosure, that is, the non-applicable items and the 
unable to determine items are excluded. In the year 2009, the following RP disclosure standards were based on IAS 24 (2003): 
AASB 124 (Australia), FRS 24 (Singapore), FRS 124 (Malaysia), PAS 24 (the Philippines); whereas the following RP 
disclosure standards were based on earlier version of IAS 24: PSAK 7 (Indonesia) was based on IAS 24 (1984) and TAS 47 
(Thailand) was based on IAS 24 (1994). 
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Based on the version of IAS 24 adopted, each country has additional mandatory 
items with which companies must comply. Table 6.4 presents country averages of 
conformance with additional mandatory and discretionary items in each country. 
Panel A shows averages of conformance with additional-mandatory items and Panel 
B shows averages of conformance with additional-discretionary items. As shown in 
Table 6.4, the average conformance for the additional-mandatory disclosure items is 
55%. Of all six countries, Australia shows the highest conformance in disclosing key 
management personnel compensation (items 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and identity of the 
parent company (items 1 and 2). The highest conformance could be influenced by the 
additional disclosures requirements for Australian companies. AASB 124 requires 
more information/disclosures of key management personnel compensation (i.e., para 
Aus 25.1 to Aus 25.9.3) and parent entities and/or ultimate controlling parties’ 
identity (i.e., para Aus 12.1) than other countries. 
Further, companies in the other five countries (i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), appear to be more willing to disclose “short-
term benefit of KMP” and “post-employment benefit of KMP”. Companies in these 
countries, however, have lower conformance to the other disclosure requirements for 
KMP compensation (i.e., “other long-term benefit of KMP”, “termination benefit of 
KMP”, and “share-based payment of KMP”)92. The lower conformance could be due 
to the sensitive nature of compensation disclosure. Given the sensitive nature of 
KMP compensation, managers may want to withhold or obscure the information to 
avoid drawing undue attention and criticism.  
Interestingly, the findings in Table 6.4 also indicate companies’ lower conformance 
with item 1 (i.e., “the name of the parent”) and item 2 (i.e., “the name of the ultimate 
controlling party/next most senior parent”), despite the relatively insensitive nature 
of such information. A small number of companies, however, disclose that they do 
not have any “parent” or “ultimate controlling party”, or that they are the “ultimate 
controlling party” in the group. Disclosing the name of the parent/ultimate 
controlling party/next most senior parent is needed to obtain a more complete picture 
                                                          
92
 It should be noted that in coding disclosure items companies are not penalised for non-disclosure, that is, the 
non-applicable items and the unable to determine items are excluded. In the case that companies disclose that 
they do not have the particular type of KMP benefits, the items are coded as “1” (“disclosed”).  
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of the nature of related party relationships, including all affiliated parties entering 
into RP transactions with the company.    
Table 6.4 Corporate Conformance with Additional Mandatory/Discretionary 
Disclosure Items  
Panel A. Additional Mandatory Items 
 
Average Percentage of Additional Mandatory Items 
Pooled* Aust Ind Mal Phil Sing Thai 
1. The name of the parent 0.5326 0.6970 
 
0.6200 0.3516 0.4409 
 
2. The name of the ultimate 
controlling party/next most senior 
parent 
0.4058 0.4694 0.4800 0.2418 0.4194 
3. Short-term benefit of KMP 0.9765 1.0000 0.9900 0.9560 0.9570 
4. Post-employment benefit of KMP 0.8538 0.9899 0.8200 0.8242 0.7742 
5. Other long-term benefit of KMP 0.2658 0.7396 0.1400 0.1099 0.0645 
6. Termination benefit of KMP 0.2992 0.7526 0.1600 0.1868 0.0860 
7. Share-based payment of KMP 0.5733 0.9596 0.4000 0.2667 0.6452 
8. Where the parent is 
incorporated/constituted 
0.3737 0.3737 
   
9. The name of the ultimate 
controlling entity incorporated 
within the country 
0.3816 0.3816 
10. Pricing Policy 0.5930  0.2525 0.9300 
Total Additional Mandatory Items 0.5564 0.7173 0.2525 0.5157 0.4202 0.4839 0.9300 
*Total pooled-N and each country-N are based on the n-applicable of each item. Items shaded are discretionary and therefore 
are excluded.  
Panel B. Additional Discretionary 
Items 
Average Percentage of Additional Discretionary Items 
Pooled* Aust Ind Mal Phil Sing Thai 
1. The name of the parent 0.2211 
 
0.2424 
   
0.2000 
2. The name of the ultimate 
controlling party/next most senior 
parent 
0.1608 0.2525 0.0700 
3. Short-term benefit 0.2362 0.1111 0.3600 
4. Post-employment benefit 0.2613 0.0808 0.4400 
5. Other long-term benefit 0.0603 0.0808 0.0400 
6. Termination benefit 0.0151 0.0000 0.0300 
7. Share-based payment 0.0854 0.0707 0.1000 
8. Where the parent is 
incorporated/constituted 
0.2521 0.0909 0.3800 0.3077 0.3511 0.1400 
9. The name of the ultimate 
controlling entity incorporated 
within the country 
0.1302 0.0000 0.3700 0.0000 0.2553 0.0200 
10. Pricing Policy  0.1589 0.2424  0.1000 0.1978 0.0957  
Total Additional Discretionary 
Items 
0.2209 0.2424 0.1313 0.2833 0.1685 0.2366 0.2589 
*Total pooled-N and each country-N are based on the n-applicable of each item. Items shaded are mandatory and therefore are 
excluded.  In coding disclosure items, companies are not penalised for non-disclosure, that is,  the non-applicable items and the 
unable to determine items are excluded. In the case that companies disclose that they do not have the particular type of KMP 
benefits, the items are coded as “1” or “disclosed”. 
 
Table 6.4 Panel A also shows that short-term and post-employment benefits are more 
frequently disclosed than other long-term benefits, termination benefits, and share-
based payments. Regarding pricing policy disclosures, which are only mandated in 
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Indonesia and Thailand, the results show that Thai companies provide higher levels 
of disclosure (i.e., 93%). This difference could be due to the additional guidance 
provided by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), as mentioned in Chapter 2.  
Panel B of Table 6.4 shows conformance with additional-discretionary items. The 
additional-discretionary items consist of three parts. First, items 1-7 are mandatory 
items in the IAS 24 (2003) which is applicable at 2009, but not mandatory in the 
earlier version of IAS 24, therefore, these items are considered discretionary for 
companies in Indonesia and Thailand. Second, items 8-9 are mandatory for 
companies in Australia, following the additional paragraph in AASB 124, therefore 
they are discretionary for companies in other countries. Third, item 10 is mandatory 
in the earlier version of IAS 24 but not mandatory in the IAS 24 (2003) which is 
applicable at 2009, therefore, it is considered as discretionary for Australia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Panel B of Table 6.4 highlights some 
interesting findings regarding these items. The overall conformance scores for the 
additional-discretionary items are all below 30%, which is relatively low compared 
to the conformance with the additional-mandatory disclosure items.  
Furthermore, the information about parent entity (i.e., item 1 and 2) are rarely 
disclosed in Indonesia and Thailand, with an average of 24% and 20%, respectively. 
Financial statement users have to seek this information from sources other than 
annual reports, despite the importance of this information in determining 
“relatedness”. This might cause difficulty in making use of information about RP 
transactions. With respect to the disclosure of KMP compensation (items 3 – 7), 
while the items are not required by the current GAAP, companies in Thailand show 
higher levels of disclosure than those in Indonesia. For item 10, “pricing policy”, the 
overall conformance is very low (15.89%). Among the four countries in which the 
“pricing policy” is not mandatory, companies in Australia are more likely to disclose 
the information. 
Table 6.5 presents the country averages for conformance with common extended-
discretionary disclosure. The relatively higher scores of item 1 (i.e., nature of 
transaction details) and item 2 (i.e., terms and conditions of transactions details) by 
Thai listed companies could be influenced by the technical guidance provided by 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), as discussed previously. The Philippines has the 
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lowest disclosure score for item 4 (i.e., nature of relationship), as most of its listed 
companies disclose considerably less information regarding the nature of relationship 
(29.30%). 
  
Table 6.5 Companies Disclosure of Items that are Discretionary in All Countries 
Discretionary Items 
Average of Common-Discretionary for Each Item 
Pooled Aust Ind Mal Phil Sing Thai 
(N=582) (N=99) (N=99) (N=100) (N=91) (N=93) (N=100) 
1.      Nature of transaction details  0.9771 0.9422 0.9765 0.9900 1.0000 0.9785 1.0000 
2.      Terms and conditions of 
transaction details 
0.7325 0.7104 0.6263 0.4633 0.8681 0.9462 0.8067 
3.      Related party details for the 
amount of balances 
0.8474 0.8182 0.9495 0.9293 0.6850 0.7025 0.9767 
4.      Nature of relationship details  0.7474  0.8754  0.8316  0.8367  0.2930  0.6767  0.9367 
Total Discretionary Items 0.8257 0.8367 0.8460 0.8025 0.7051 0.8235 0.9300 
The common-discretionary of related party disclosure measures the degree of details provided in the related party disclosure 
using four items. Each item is coded 1 for low, 2 for medium, and 3 for high level of details. A more detail explanation of 
coding system is provided in Table 5.5 (Chapter 5).  
Overall, as expected, the results in Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 indicate that the 
mandatory scores are consistently higher than the discretionary scores. Companies 
appear to focus on the compliance with the mandated disclosure requirements, and 
are less likely to provide additional/discretionary RP information. Common-law 
countries (i.e., Australia, Malaysia and Singapore) tend to exhibit greater disclosures 
for both mandatory and discretionary information. In addition, technical guidelines 
provided by regulators seem to increase the level of RP disclosures, as in the case of 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand’s Listed Companies Handbook. However, the 
enforcement level also appears to play a role in ensuring companies’ disclosure of 
mandatory information. The results indicate that there are country-level and firm-
level factors which are likely to influence RP disclosures across six countries. Those 
factors are discussed in the next section. 
6.3 Factors Influencing the Nature and Extent of RP Disclosures (RQ3) – 
Descriptive  
This section addresses the third research question: what are the governance, country, 
and other factors which explain the nature and extent of RP disclosures in the Asia-
Pacific region. Prior to estimating the multivariate regression model, the data were 
examined to ensure that all the statistical assumptions including the ratio of cases to 
independent variables, absence of outliers, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity 
are satisfied (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010).  
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6.3.1 RP Disclosure Indices  
As previously discussed in Chapter 5, a self-constructed RP disclosure index is used 
to measure companies’ RP transaction disclosure. The index is derived from RP 
disclosures in the company’s financial statements for fiscal year ending in 2009. The 
index provides a ratio of a firm’s disclosure score, which is its maximum possible 
score if the firm fully discloses its RP transactions according to the applicable RP 
disclosure requirements based on IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure (2003). Further, 
two subsets of the overall RP disclosure are also examined (i.e., the mandatory items 
and discretionary items of RP disclosures). Those overall, mandatory and 
discretionary RP disclosure indices are labelled as OSCORE, MSCORE, and 
DSCORE, respectively. Each of the indices ranges from 0 to 1. All RP disclosure 
indices were examined for deviations from normality. Table 6.6 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the mandatory, discretionary, and total score of RP 
disclosure indices (i.e., MSCORE, DSCORE, and OSCORE).  
Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics for the RP Disclosure Indices  











































































































Note: MSCORE is the mandatory RP disclosure score excluding NA and UD items. DSCORE is the discretionary RP 
disclosure. OSCORE is the overall RP disclosure score (combined mandatory and discretionary items excluding not-applicable 
(NA) and unable-to-determine (UD) items). All three indices range from 0 to 1. In coding disclosure items, companies are not 
penalized for non-disclosure, i.e. the non-applicable items and the unable to determine items are excluded. In the case that 
companies disclose that they do not have the particular type of KMP benefits, the items are coded as “1” or “disclosed”. 
 
Mandatory Index (MSCORE) 
Table 6.6 reveals that there is a large variation in MSCORE. The scores range from a 
minimum of 0.3333 to the maximum of 1, with the mean of 0.7183. Companies in 
Singapore have the highest mean score (0.7670), whereas those in the Philippines 
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have the lowest (0.6586). As shown in Table 6.6, the mean MSCORE for companies 
in Australia, Malaysia and Singapore are above the overall average (i.e., 0.7183), 
whereas the mean for companies in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are 
below the average. A possible explanation for this result is that the stronger 
institutional framework in Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore provides greater 
incentives for companies to comply with disclosure requirements. Unlike Indonesia 
and Thailand, whose accounting standards are based on an earlier version of IAS 24, 
the Philippines has applied the newer IAS 24 (2003) version, however, it has the 
lowest compliance with RP disclosure requirements. This low compliance may also 
be influenced by the weak institutional framework in the Philippines, which possibly 
enables companies to maintain their opacity.  
Discretionary Index (DSCORE) 
Table 6.6 shows the mean of the discretionary RP disclosure (DSCORE) of all 
companies in this study is 0.8257, which ranges from the minimum of 0.2500 to the 
maximum of 1. The highest mean score is found in Thailand (0.9300), whereas the 
lowest score is reported in the Philippines (0.7051). Thailand and Indonesia have 
relatively higher DSCORE compared to other countries. The higher scores could be 
driven by the number of RP transactions, the numerous types/nature of RP 
transactions, and the RP relationships. As shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, 
Thailand and Indonesia have a relatively higher number of RP transactions compared 
to the other countries (i.e., 32.97% and 17.76% respectively). Another possible 
explanation is that companies in Thailand and Indonesia may want to distinguish 
themselves from the other companies in their country by providing greater 
information above the mandatory requirements, particularly given their weak 
institutional frameworks and lower transparency in the region. 
Overall Index (OSCORE) 
The overall index of RP transaction disclosure (OSCORE) ranges from 0 to 1. Table 
6.6 above shows that the OSCORE for all countries ranges from the minimum of 
0.2941 to the maximum of 0.9412, with a mean OSCORE of 0.6527. The highest 
mean OSCORE is for Australia (0.7537), whereas the lowest mean is for Indonesia 
(0.5790). Except for Australia, the average OSCORE in each of the countries is less 
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than 0.7000 and there is no company in all countries with the maximum score 
(OSCORE = 1.00).  
Furthermore, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore the 
statistical significance on the difference among the means of RP disclosure indices 
across countries. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007 p. 37), “Analysis of 
variance is used to compare two or more means to see if there are any statistically 
significant differences among them”. In addition, “While the independent sample t-
test is limited to comparing the means of two groups, the one way ANOVA 
(Analysis of Variance) can compare more than two groups” (Park, 2009, p. 5). 
Therefore, a one-way ANOVA is used to examine the mean differences of MSCORE, 
DSCORE, and OSCORE across the six A-P countries. The results (untabulated) show 
that there are statistically significant differences across countries on the average of 
MSCORE (p < 0.001), DSCORE (p < 0.001), and OSCORE (p < 0.001). In addition, 
Table 6.7 shows the post-hoc comparisons of mean differences across countries 
using the Tukey HSD tests (Pallant, 2011). The table shows the significant 
differences of MSCORE, DSCORE, and OSCORE across countries (p < 0.05). 
Table 6.7 Multiple Comparisons of Mean Differences for the RP Disclosure Indices  
 Mean-Differences 
 
Australia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Panel A: MSCORE 
Australia 
 
0.0302 0.0266 0.0829*** -0.0256 0.0267 
Indonesia -0.0302 
 
-0.0036 0.0526** -0.0558** -0.0036 
Malaysia -0.0266 0.0036 
 
0.0562** -0.0522** 0.0000 
Philippines -0.0829*** -0.0526** -0.0562** 
 
-0.1084*** -0.0562** 
Singapore 0.0256 0.0558** 0.0522** 0.1084*** 
 
0.0522** 
Thailand -0.0267 0.0036 0.0000 0.0562** -0.0522** 
 
Panel B: DSCORE 
Australia 
 
-0.0093 0.0342 0.1316*** 0.0132 -0.0933*** 
Indonesia 0.0093 
 
0.0435 0.1408*** 0.0225 -0.0840*** 
Malaysia -0.0342 -0.0435 
 
0.0974*** -0.0210 -0.1275*** 
Philippines -0.1316*** -0.1408*** -0.0974*** 
 
-0.1184*** -0.2249*** 
Singapore -0.0132 -0.0225 0.0210 0.1184*** 
 
-0.1065*** 
Thailand 0.0933*** 0.0840*** 0.1275*** 0.2249*** 0.1065*** 
 
OSCORE 
      
Australia 
 
0.1746*** 0.0870*** 0.1716*** 0.0718*** 0.1051*** 
Indonesia -0.1746*** 
 
-0.0877*** -0.0031 -0.1028*** -0.0695*** 
Malaysia -0.0870*** 0.0877*** 
 
0.0846*** -0.0151 0.0182 
Philippines -0.1316*** -0.1408 -0.0974*** 
 
-0.1184*** -0.2249*** 
Singapore -0.0718*** 0.1028*** 0.0151 0.0998*** 
 
0.0333 
Thailand -0.1051*** 0.0695*** -0.0182 0.0664*** -0.0333 
  
***, ** indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels. The value denotes mean differences based on Tukey 
HSD tests with MSCORE, DSCORE, and OSCORE as the dependent variables.  
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Overall, Figure 6.1 below summarises the rank of means of the RP disclosure indices 
across countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Of the six countries, Australia has the 
highest mean total RP disclosure score (OSCORE). Singapore has the highest mean 
of mandatory disclosure score (MSCORE) and Thailand exhibits the highest mean 
discretionary RP disclosure score (DSCORE).  
To identify the potential explanation on the differences of firms’ RP disclosure 
practices, the next three sections explore the factors that potentially explain 




Figure 6.1 Mean of RP Disclosure Indices (Mandatory, Discretionary and 
Overall Index)  
 
6.3.2 Independent Variables: Firm-Level Internal Governance Characteristics 
Table 6.8 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm-level internal governance 
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Board Independence (BIND) 
Over the full sample, the mean independent director ratio, (i.e., the proportion of 
independent directors on the board), is 44%. Australia has the highest mean (65%), 
whereas the Philippines has the lowest (26%). The range of variation of independent 
director is consistent with previous studies in the region. For example, Eng and 
Mak’s (2003) Singapore study and Connelly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan’s 
Thailand study (2012) report similar mean ratios.
 
 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
The board size for the full sample ranged from 2 to 21, with a mean (median) 8 
members. The mean of the board size for Thai listed companies is the highest93 (12) 
and that of Indonesia is the lowest (5). The lower board size in Indonesia could be 
attributed to the two-tier system mandatory requirement. In Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Company Law94 (1995, revised in 2007) requires a two-tier corporate governance 
structure for Indonesian listed companies, that is, the board of commissioners and the 
board of directors. According to the Company Law, the board of commissioners, 
which is equivalent to the independent non-executive directors in a one-tier 
governance structure, should consist of at least two independent members95.  
Board Expertise (BEXP) 
Board expertise represents the ratio of board members with accounting and financial 
expertise to the total number of board members. The overall sample mean (median) 
is 0.20 (0.18) which ranges from 0.00 to 0.67. Malaysia has the highest mean (0.25), 
while the Philippines has the lowest (0.14). The findings show that while Thailand 
and the Philippines have substantially larger number of board members (with the 
median value of 12 and 9 for Thailand and the Philippines, respectively), very few of 
the members have financial expertise. The larger board size may be due to the 
domination of controlling families in the large companies in these countries.  
 
                                                          
93
 Connelly et al. (2012) investigate the corporate governance practices of Thai listed companies in 2005 and 
report a mean board size of 11.2. 
94
 Article 94 (2) of the Company Law (1995), revised in Article 108 (5) of the Company Law (2007). 
95
 For comparative purposes, following previous studies (e.g., Morris et al., 2004; Siregar & Utama, 2008) the term “board” or 
“directors” is used in reference to the Indonesian board of commissioner (in a two-tier structure) or board of directors (in a one-
tier structure), unless stated otherwise.   
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Table 6.8 Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Level Governance Characteristics as 
Independent Continuous Variables 
Country Variables Mean (Median) Min. (Max.) Std. Dev. 
Pooled (N=582) BIND 0.44 (0.40) 0.08 (1.00) 0.18 
 BSIZE 8.40 (8.00) 2.00 (21.00) 3.02 
 BEXP 0.20 (0.18) 0.00 (0.67) 0.14 
 ACIND 2.79 (3.00) 0.00 (7.00)* 0.86 
 ACSIZE 3.34 (3.00) 0.00 (7.00)* 0.75 
 CONC 39.12 (40.41) 0.02 (100) 21.75 
 LEV 0.41 (0.34) 0.00 (5.11) 0.41 
Australia (N=99) BIND 0.65 (0.67) 0.17 (1.00) 0.2 
 BSIZE 7.67 (7.00) 3.00 (14.00) 2.08 
 BEXP 0.24 (0.23) 0.00 (0.50) 0.14 
 ACIND 3.10 (3.00) 0.00 (6.00) * 0.91 
 ACSIZE 3.41 (3.00) 0.00 (7.00)* 0.88 
 CONC 18.42 (23.2) 5.85 (87.86) 14.64 
 LEV 0.44 (0.37) 0.00 (2.57) 0.39 
Indonesia (N=99) BIND 0.42 (0.40) 0.20 (1.00) 0.13 
 BSIZE 5.02 (5.00) 2.00 (11.00) 1.82 
 BEXP 0.16 (0.14) 0.00 (0.67) 0.17 
 ACIND 3.03 (3.00) 0.00 (7.00)* 0.68 
 ACSIZE 3.26 (3.00) 0.00 (7.00)* 0.79 
 CONC 55.00 (53.28) 10..09 (98.55) 22.47 
 LEV 0.47 (0.43) 0.00 (1.72) 0.37 
Malaysia (N=100) BIND 0.45 (0.43) 0.15 (0.88) 0.13 
 BSIZE 8.72 (8.00) 4.00 (15.00) 2.23 
 BEXP 0.25 (0.25) 0.00 (0.67) 0.12 
 ACIND 2.91 (3.00) 2.00 (5.00) 0.70 
 ACSIZE 3.41 (3.00) 2.00 (6.00) 0.70 
 CONC 32.31 (34.49) 0.02 (100.00) 21.36 
 LEV 0.39 (0.39) 0.00 (1.32) 0.33 
Philippines (N=91) BIND 0.26 (0.22) 0.11 (0.60) 0.09 
 BSIZE 9.36 (9.00) 5.00 (15.00) 1.92 
 BEXP 0.14 (0.13) 0.00 (0.57) 0.13 
 ACIND 1.63 (2.00) 1.00 (4.00) 0.61 
 ACSIZE 3.47 (3.00) 2.00 (6.00) 0.89 
 CONC 47.84 (49.32) 15.19 (99.85) 18.32 
 LEV 0.37 (0.21) 0.00 (5.11) 0.64 
Singapore (N=93) BIND 0.50 (0.46) 0.17 (0.89) 0.16 
 BSIZE 7.85 (8.00) 4.00 (16.00) 2.16 
 BEXP 0.23 (0.20) 0.00 (0.60) 0.14 
 ACIND 2.92 (3.00) 1.00 (5.00) 0.75 
 ACSIZE 3.37 (3.00) 2.00 (6.00) 0.70 
 CONC 42.61 (37.98) 7.10 (88.98) 21.13 
 LEV 0.33 (0.28) 0.00 (1.18) 0.27 
Thailand (N=100) BIND 0.38 (0.35) 0.08 (0.80) 0.13 
 BSIZE 11.77 (12.00) 5.00 (21.00) 2.97 
 BEXP 0.16 (0.14) 0.00 (0.46) 0.12 
 ACIND 3.07 (3.00) 1.00 (5.00) 0.52 
 ACSIZE 3.14 (3.00) 2.00 (5.00) 0.49 
 CONC 39.75 (40.62) 8.25 (89.93) 17.77 
 LEV 0.42 (0.35) 0.00 (1.44) 0.36 
Note: * Two companies of the sample do not have audit committees for the period ending in 2009 (i.e., Andean Resources 
in Australia and Nusantara Infrastructure in Indonesia). The variables are defined as follows: BIND is ratio of the number 
of independent director(s) to board size; BSIZE is total number of directors on the board; BEXP is the ratio of board 
member(s) with financial expertise to board size; ACSIZE is total number of audit committee members; ACIND is the 
total number of independent members on the audit committee; CONC is the percentage a company’s largest shareholding; 
LEV is the ratio of total debt to total asset at the end of fiscal year 2009. 
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Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) and Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) 
On the average, the mean of AC independence (i.e., measured as the total number of 
independent members on the audit committee), is 2.79, with the lowest mean of 1.63 
in the Philippines and the highest mean of 3.10 in Australia. In terms of audit 
committee size (ACSIZE), which is measured by the number of audit committee 
members, the overall mean is 3.34 with the maximum of 7.00 members. The findings 
reveal that while the Philippines has a substantially larger audit committee size (with 
the mean 3.47), very few of the members are independent.     
Ownership Concentration (CONC) 
Ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of shareholdings held by the 
largest shareholder. Consistent with the prior discussion in Chapter 2, the ownership 
concentration is relatively higher in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand than the 
other countries. On average, the largest owners of companies in those three countries 
account for almost 40% of shares in companies. In contrast, Australia has the lowest 
mean for ownership concentration (18.42%). 
Leverage (LEV) 
Financial leverage is measured as a ratio of total debt to total assets. Table 6.8 shows 
that for the full sample, leverage ranges from zero to 5.110 with a mean of 0.405. 
The zero leverage implies that some companies have no debt, whereas the ratio of 
5.110 indicates that the company has a very low book value of assets related to debt 
levels96. Of all six countries, Indonesia has the highest mean leverage (0.473), which 
may indicate that companies in Indonesia rely more on debt financing, rather than 
equity financing, consistent with the country’s relatively low stock market 
capitalisation. In contrast, Singapore has the lowest mean leverage (0.333), 
suggesting that companies have a low reliance on debt financing in that country. 
 
6.3.3 Control Variables 
The descriptive statistics on the raw data of the control variables are presented in 
Table 6.9. The table reveals that total assets (SIZE) of the sample companies vary 
greatly across the six countries, ranging from US$0.23 million to US$78,770 million  
                                                          
96
 One company in the Philippines has leverage of 5.11. 
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with an average of US$1,946.52 million. On average, companies in Australia have 
the largest assets in the sample (US$4,589 million), while those in the Philippines 
have the lowest (US$640 million)97.  
Table 6.9 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Control Variables 
Country Variables Mean (Median) Min. (Max.) Std. Dev. 
Pooled (N=582) SIZE (US$ million) 1,946.52 (594.21) 0.23 (78,770.00) 4,805.61 
 PROFIT 0.09 (0.08) -0.92 (1.26) 0.16 
 PERFORM 1.76 (1.23) 0.41 (44.83) 2.33 
 RPTN 8.99 (7.00) 0.00 (44.00) 0.78 
Australia (N=99) SIZE (US$ million) 4,589.30 (2,387.70) 59.68 (78,770.00) 9,253.53 
 PROFIT 0.10 (0.07) -0.40 (1.26) 0.21 
 PERFORM 2.09 (1.40) 0.72 (11.58) 1.79 
 RPTN 8.33 (7.00) 0.00 (23.00) 4.90 
Indonesia (N=99) SIZE (US$ million) 923.21 (390.56) 46.17 (10,405.75) 1,538.73 
 PROFIT 0.13 (0.10) -0.32 (0.70) 0.15 
 PERFORM 1.73 (1.28) 0.57 (11.77) 1.38 
 RPTN 7.20 (6.00) 1.00 (23.00) 4.39 
Malaysia (N=100) SIZE (US$ million) 2,171.10 (715.90) 55.70 (20,265.00) 3,491.84 
 PROFIT 0.10 (0.09) -0.23 (90.69) 0.11 
 PERFORM 1.63 (1.25) 0.63 (9.17) 1.24 
 RPTN 9.64 (9.00) 1.00 (30.00) 5.59 
Philippines (N=91) SIZE (US$ million) 640.12 (90.53) 0.23 (7,370.01) 1,366.00 
 PROFIT 0.05 (0.07) -0.92 (0.93) 0.23 
 PERFORM 2.32 (1.17) 0.41 (44.83) 5.10 
 RPTN 5.62 (4.00) 1.00 (16.00) 3.78 
Singapore (N=93) SIZE (US$ million) 1,772.48 (629.90) 72.43 (23,448.79) 3,481.48 
 PROFIT 0.08 (0.08) -0.23 (0.31) 0.08 
 PERFORM 1.44 (1.24) 0.54 (3.05) 0.60 
 RPTN 6.48 (6.00) 1.00 (16.00) 3.85 
Thailand (N=100) SIZE (U.S.$ million) 1,486.90 (436.00) 30.74 (33,121.00) 3,657.64 
 PROFIT 0.10 (0.10) -0.18 (0.33) 0.09 
 PERFORM 1.34 (1.15) 0.49 (4.06) 0.66 
 RPTN 16.49 (16.00) 1.00 (44.00) 8.21 
The variables are defined as follows: SIZE is the fiscal year-end total assets; PROFIT is the return on assets 
(ROA) at the end of fiscal year 2009, which is earnings before tax/average assets  PERFORM is Tobin’s Q 
(fiscal year-end market value of assets divided by fiscal year-end book value of assets, in which market value of 
assets = market value of equity + book value of assets – book value of equity); RPTN is the number of RP 
transactions reported in the annual report of fiscal year 2009. 
Over the full sample, profitability (PROFIT) as measured by return on assets ranges 
from -0.92 to 1.26, with a mean of 0.09
98
. Indonesian companies show the highest 
mean (0.13), followed by Australia (0.10), Malaysia (0.10), Thailand (0.10), 
Singapore (0.08), and the Philippines (0.05). With regard to performance 
                                                          
97
 Island Information & Technology Inc., a Philippines’ company, had been experiencing cumulative losses 
which eroded its assets (investing.businessweek.com, 2009). This number is far below the asset average of assets 
Filipino companies. 
98 Further inspection of the minimum value of -0.92 reveals that the company (it was in the Philippines) has been 
experiencing operating losses due to the industry downturn; nonetheless, the auditor report on the company’s 
financial statement ending in 2009 provides a going-concern opinion. 
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(PERFORM), which is measured by Tobin’s Q, the value ranges from 0.41 to 44.83 
with the mean (median) of 1.76 (1.23)
99
. 
Lastly, RP transaction activity (RPTN) is measured by the number of transactions 
reported in the annual report of fiscal year 2009. For the pooled data, the mean RPTN 
ranges from 0 to 44, with a mean of 8.99 transactions. Thai companies have the 
highest mean (16.49), followed by Malaysia (9.64), Australia (8.33), Indonesia 
(7.20), Singapore (6.48), and the Philippines (5.62)
100
. 
The nature of across countries’ variations for firm size, financial leverage, and 
ownership concentration are consistent with Astami and Tower (2006) who 
examined 442 companies across five nations (Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore). The variations for leverage and total assets are also 
consistent with those of Morris and Gray (2009) who investigated 12 countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region101.  
Table 6.10 shows that 486 (83.5%) of the firms are audited by Big 4 auditors. In 
terms of the presence of a financial expert serving on the board of directors 
(ACEXP), 424 (72.90%) of the firms have financial experts on the board. Malaysia 
has the largest number of firms with financial experts on the board (90), whereas the 
Philippines has the smallest (40). Regarding family-controlled firms, there are 211 
(36.30%) firms which are controlled by family. The Philippines has the largest 
number of family-controlled firms (47), whereas Australia has the smallest number 
of firms (9).  
Regarding the number of firms audited by Big 4, the variation across countries is 
consistent with Morris and Gray (2009). With respect to the cross-listing status, very 
few companies in Thailand and Malaysia are cross-listed in foreign stock exchanges 
(7% and 8%, respectively) whereas a large number of companies in Australia have 
foreign cross-listing status (94.9%). The pattern is consistent with previous studies 
                                                          
99 The highest value (44.83) implies that the company has a very low book value (refer to note 91). 
100 The RP transaction activity (RPTN) is calculated using the aggregated approach, due to the differences in RP 
disclosure among the six sample countries. In the previous discussion (Section 6.1), listed companies in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand tend to disclose RP transactions by using “the detailed 
approach”, whereas listed companies in Singapore and Australia tend to report their RP transactions by using “the 
aggregated approach”.  
101
 Morris and Gray (2009) investigated Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. In their study, the ratio of liabilities to total assets was used as a 
proxy for leverage; therefore the means are slightly higher.  
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which include cross-listing status across countries. For example, Morris and Gray 
(2009) find that Australia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have a higher number 
of cross-listed firms than Malaysia and the Philippines. Whereas a Malaysian study 
by Morris et al. (2011, p. 228) finds that only three companies in their sample 
(n=188) are cross-listed in foreign stock exchanges.   


















Variables 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 
ACEXP 424 72.90 81 81.80 82 82.80 90 90.00 40 44.00 69 74.20 62 62.00 
FAM 211 36.30 9 9.10 21 21.20 46 46.00 47 51.60 46 48.40 43 43.00 
EXT 486 83.50 94 94.90 62 62.60 86 86.00 75 82.40 83 89.20 86 86.00 
CROSS 241 41.40 94 94.90 62 62.60 8 8.00 9 9.90 61 65.60 7 7.00 
ACEXP is a binary variable coded “1” if a firm has one/more financial expert(s) on its audit committee and “0” otherwise; 
FAM is a binary variable coded “1” if a firm is family-controlled and “0” otherwise ; EXT is a binary variable coded “1” if a 
firm is audited by Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise; CROSS  is a binary variable coded “1” if a firm is cross-listed in a foreign 
stock exchange and “0” otherwise. 
 
6.4 Univariate Analysis  
Table 6.11 presents the list of dependent and independent test and control variables 
used in the research model, whereas Table 6.12 shows the correlations between RP 
disclosure indices and independent (continuous) variables. Panel A of Table 6.12 
presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the dependent variables 
(i.e., RP disclosure indices) whereas Panel B of Table 6.12 shows the correlations 
among all independent variables included in the multivariate regressions. The 
internal governance variables that have positive and significant associations with 
MSCORE and DSCORE include board independence (BIND), board expertise 
(BEXP), AC independence (ACIND), and AC expertise (ACEXP). As for DSCORE, 
only AC independence (ACIND) shows a positive and significant correlation. For the 
firm-level external governance factors, all variables: leverage (LEV), type of external 
auditor (EXT), and crosslisting status (CROSS) are positively correlated with 
MSCORE. In addition, type of external auditor (EXT) and crosslisting status 
(CROSS) are positively correlated with OSCORE. The results on country-level 
variables indicate that all variables: legal origins (LEGL), enforcement (ENF), 
investor protection (INVP) and control for corruption (CORUP) show positive and 
                                                          
102
 In Munir and Gul’s study which investigated 462 listed companies in Malaysia at the fiscal year end 2005 and 
2004, there are 343 companies (74.2%) audited by a Big 4 auditor. 
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significant associations with OSCORE. Whereas for MSCORE, legal origin (LEGL) 
and control for corruption (CORUP) are positively correlated. Contrary to the 
expectation, investor protection (INVP) shows negative and significant correlation 
with DSCORE. Of the control variables, firm size (SIZE) and RP transaction activity 
(RPTN) show positive and significant correlations with MSCORE, DSCORE, and 
OSCORE. The findings indicate initial supports of the expected associations between 
governance-specific, country-specific, and other firm-specific factors and corporate 
RP disclosures. However, the correlation results should be interpreted cautiously as 
they do not consider the joint effect of other variables. 
Table 6.11 List of Variables Used in the Model of RP Disclosures 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
OSCORE Overall RP-disclosure index score 
MSCORE Mandatory RP-disclosure index score  
DSCORE Discretionary RP-disclosure index score  
Independent Variables 
BIND The ratio of the number of independent director(s) to board size 
BSIZE The total number of directors on the board 
BEXP The ratio of board member(s) with financial expertise to board size 
ACIND The total number of independent members on the audit committee 
ACSIZE The total number of audit committee members  
ACEXP 
A binary variable coded “1” if a firm has one/more financial expert(s) on its audit 
committee and “0” otherwise 
CONC The percentage of shareholding of a company’s largest shareholder  
FAM A binary variable coded “1” if a firm is family-controlled and “0” otherwise  
LEV The ratio of total debt to total asset at the end of fiscal year 2009 
EXT A binary variable coded “1” if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise  
CROSS 
A binary variable coded “1” if a firm is cross-listed in a foreign stock exchange and 
“0” otherwise  
LEGL 
A country’s predominant legal origin, coded “1” for common law legal origin and “0” 
otherwise 
ENF 
A country’s enforcement index (Preiato et al., 2012). A higher value represents 
stronger enforcement 
INVP 
A country’s investor protection index (La Porta et al., 2006). A higher score implies 
stronger investor protection 
CORUP 
A country’s control for corruption index (CPI 2009 of Transparency International). A 
higher value denotes stronger control for corruption 
Control Variables  
SIZE A natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2009  
PROFIT 
The return on assets (ROA) at the end of fiscal year 2009, which is earnings before 
tax/average assets 
PERFORM 
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book value of assets) at the end of fiscal year 2009, which is  
market value of equity plus book value assets minus book value of equity divided by  
book value of assets  
RPTN 
A natural logarithm of total number of RP transactions reported in the annual report of 
fiscal year 2009  
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Table 6.12 Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables  
PANEL A: DVs and IVs 
Pearson’s Correlation Spearman's Rank Correlation 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
RPT Disclosure Indices    
MSCORE (1) 1 0.450** 0.681** 1.00** 0.388** 0.646** 
DSCORE (2)  1 0.689**  1.00** 0.635** 
OSCORE (3)   1.00**   1.00** 
Governance Variables    
BIND  0.084* 0.015 0.238** 0.107** -0.001 0.211** 
BSIZE  -0.075 0.064 0.053 -0.101* 0.058 0.071 
BEXPR  0.103* 0.032 0.157** 0.105* 0.034 0.149** 
ACIND  0.102* 0.213** 0.165** 0.067 0.173** 0.104* 
ACSIZE  -0.050 -0.032 0.056 -0.059 -0.027 0.048 
ACEXP  0.111** 0.058 0.116** 0.095* 0.042 0.102* 
CONC  -0.047 0.025 -0.081 -0.059 0.014 -0.082* 
FAM  0.069 0.024 -0.017 0.079 0.007 -0.012 
LEV  0.103* 0.072 0.064 0.102* 0.067 0.062 
EXT  0.120** 0.075 0.221** 0.108** 0.079 0.206** 
CROSS  0.127** 0.064 0.220** 0.113** 0.063 0.186** 
Country-Level Variables    
LEGL  0.175** -0.028 0.417** 0.178** -0.078 0.412** 
ENF  0.004 -0.079 0.366** -0.017 -0.079 0.334** 
INVP  0.011 -0.310** 0.170** -0.045 -0.296** 0.127** 
CORUP  0.217** 0.046 0.437** 0.245** 0.068 0.426** 
Firm-Specific Variables    
SIZE  0.155** 0.172** 0.343** 0.120** 0.127** 0.303** 
PROFIT  -0.056 0.036 -0.035 -0.055 0.046 -0.045 
PERFORM  -0.031 -0.033 0.046 -0.019 0.002 0.051 
RPTN  0.174** 0.426** 0.288** 0.150** 0.412** 0.263** 
Notes: * and ** significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level (2-tailed). The variables are defined in Table 6.11.  
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Table 6.12  Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables*  
PANEL B 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
BIND (4) 1 -0.219 0.152 0.472 0.085 0.155 -0.254 -0.189 0.063 0.089 0.419 0.488 0.285 0.158 0.540 0.412 -0.093 0.058 0.017 
BSIZE (5) -0.257 1 -0.172 0.040 0.136 -0.143 -0.063 0.017 0.045 0.171 -0.256 -0.101 0.238 -0.149 -0.110 0.187 -0.019 -0.099 0.274 
BEXP (6) 0.178 -0.168 1 0.103 0.022 0.504 -0.063 -0.022 0.030 0.011 0.086 0.262 0.096 0.110 0.197 0.123 -0.015 -0.041 0.029 
ACIND (7) 0.474 0.023 0.089 1 0.398 0.197 -0.150 -0.100 0.123 0.080 0.269 0.232 -0.032 -0.279 0.261 0.415 0.080 -0.012 0.227 
ACSIZE (8) 0.065 0.170 0.015 0.401 1 0.120 -0.013 -0.053 0.066 0.101 0.148 0.092 0.094 0.163 0.062 0.213 0.059 0.024 0.000 
ACEXP (9) 0.161 -0.133 0.521 0.185 0.114 1 -0.096 0.007 0.050 -0.054 0.107 0.207 0.024 -0.001 0.127 0.218 0.025 -0.065 0.039 
CONC (10) -0.239 -0.048 -0.077 -0.164 -0.025 -0.096 1 -0.082 -0.057 -0.038 -0.113 -0.332 -0.396 -0.148 -0.293 -0.205 0.070 0.031 0.022 
FAM (11) -0.172 0.021 -0.030 -0.117 -0.063 0.007 -0.065 1 -0.011 -0.087 -0.193 -0.040 -0.066 0.024 -0.090 -0.245 -0.109 -0.140 -0.010 
LEV (12) 0.125 0.027 0.063 0.164 0.092 0.088 -0.052 0.013 1 -0.062 0.099 -0.033 -0.030 -0.104 -0.028 0.356 -0.209 -0.154 0.081 
EXT (13) 0.077 0.184 0.023 0.073 0.092 -0.054 -0.054 -0.087 -0.059 1 0.053 0.178 0.219 0.126 0.182 0.175 0.106 0.039 0.109 
CROSS (14) 0.404 -0.267 0.098 0.266 0.147 0.107 -0.126 -0.193 0.128 0.053 1 0.292 0.049 0.190 0.495 0.429 0.036 0.194 -0.076 
LEGL (15) 0.496 -0.087 0.266 0.207 0.100 0.207 -0.347 -0.040 -0.004 0.178 0.292 1 0.542 0.620 0.830 0.406 -0.058 0.086 -0.040 
ENF (16) 0.190 0.248 0.102 -0.048 0.108 0.033 -0.391 -0.063 -0.034 0.199 0.002 0.507 1 0.523 0.375 0.242 -0.103 0.065 0.055 
INVP (17) -0.007 -0.035 0.014 -0.381 0.162 -0.107 -0.108 0.002 -0.111 0.111 0.187 0.327 0.492 1 0.490 0.048 -0.111 0.076 -0.359 
CORUP (18) 0.539 -0.046 0.223 0.343 0.039 0.181 -0.309 -0.046 0.021 0.178 0.363 0.878 0.231 0.070 1 0.383 -0.064 0.094 -0.054 
SIZE (19) 0.402 0.188 0.118 0.362 0.221 0.202 -0.197 -0.230 0.406 0.180 0.432 0.399 0.248 -0.014 0.405 1 0.000 -0.115 0.259 
PROFIT (20) -0.068 -0.010 -0.013 0.075 0.028 0.006 0.063 -0.122 -0.207 0.096 0.035 -0.053 -0.102 -0.130 -0.024 -0.048 1 0.408 -0.024 
PERFORM (21) 0.062 -0.067 -0.022 0.060 0.038 -0.051 0.006 -0.166 -0.137 0.061 0.187 0.109 0.066 0.044 0.091 -0.057 0.426 1 -0.093 
RPTN (22) 0.035 0.283 0.017 0.229 -0.005 0.039 0.020 -0.017 0.101 0.099 -0.085 -0.050 0.055 -0.393 0.061 0.237 -0.014 -0.063 1 
*This table presents bivariate correlations among all independent variables entered into multivariate regression tests. Bold text denotes significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). Below the 
diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. For variables’ definitions, refer to Table 6.11. 
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6.5 Multivariate Test: Results of Hypothesis Testing (RQ3) 
The third research question aims to examine the influence of internal and external 
governance characteristics on the level of RP disclosures. The following sections 
report the regression results based on the model developed in Chapter 5 to test the 
predictions for RP disclosure scores. Table 6.13 reports the results of estimating the 
models using all variables to explain the level of RP disclosures. The RP disclosures 
are measured by the mandatory score (MSCORE) in Model 1, the discretionary score 
(DSCORE) in Model 2, and the overall score (OSCORE) in Model 3. The regressions 
for all of these three dependent variables (MSCORE, DSCORE and OSCORE) have 
also been estimated separately on a country-by-country basis, and the results are 
presented in Appendix 3A, Appendix 3B, and Appendix 3C103.  
Table 6.13 indicates that the independent and control variables are significant in 
explaining the level of overall RP disclosure (F=13.860, p < 0.001). The adjusted R
2
 
indicates that the variables examined in the models explain 37.4% of the variations in 
the level of overall RP disclosure. A review of the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
shows that the highest VIF are below 10 in all models, hence, there is no serious risk 
of multicollinearity in the regression models. Lastly, Breusch-Pagan test of 
heteroscedasticity indicates that MSCORE and OSCORE Models reject the 
heteroscedasticity assumption; however, DSCORE Model confirmed the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Accordingly, White’s robust standard errors are 






                                                          
103
 The results of the country-by-country regressions are weaker than the main results presented in Table 6.13 and 
are likely due to the lower sample size for each country (Maximum N=100) and lower within-country variation in 
the dependent variables. The correlations among independent and dependent variables for each country is 
presented in Appendix 2 (i.e., Appendix 2A – Appendix 2F)  
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Table 6.13 Results of Regression Analysis on the Association between RP Disclosures 
and Governance Characteristics (N=582) 
RP_DISC =  
 
β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 ACEXPjk 
+ β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + β12LEGLjk + β13 
ENFjk + β14 INVPjk + β15 CORUPjk + β16 SIZEjk + β17 PROFITjk + β18 PERFORMjk + 




Model 1 - 
MSCORE 
Model 2 - 
DSCORE 











(Constant)  0.691 9.580*** 0.833 10.250*** 0.356 6.810*** 
BIND + -0.070 -1.620 -0.102 -2.090** -0.050 -1.690* 
BSIZE - -0.005 -2.410** -0.006 -2.020** -0.004 -2.490** 
BEXP + 0.002 0.050 0.010 0.190 0.033 0.970 
ACIND + 0.004 0.400 0.007 0.530 -0.003 -0.370 
ACSIZE ? -0.013 -1.480 -0.004 -0.300 0.002 0.220 
ACEXP + 0.019 1.320* 0.003 0.190 0.006 0.540 
CONC + <0.001 0.160 0.000 1.000 0.001 4.420*** 
FAM + 0.028 2.530*** 0.029 2.170** 0.024 2.950*** 
LEV ? 0.020 1.240 -0.014 -0.680 -0.001 -0.100 
EXT + 0.040 3.200*** 0.024 1.340* 0.027 2.580*** 
CROSS + 0.004 0.270 0.017 0.970 0.007 0.650 
LEGL + -0.001 0.030 -0.007 -0.230 0.002 0.110 
ENF + -0.003 -0.880 0.003 0.570 0.016 6.160*** 
INVP + -0.020 -0.310 -0.333 -4.360*** -0.096 -1.890** 
CORUP + 0.011 3.390*** 0.014 3.320*** 0.016 5.820*** 
SIZE + 0.003 0.650 0.004 0.610 0.008 2.040** 
PROFIT + -0.067 -1.060 0.011 0.130 -0.026 -0.510 
PERFORM + 0.004 0.390 0.002 0.130 0.009 1.260 
RPTN + 0.030 4.080*** 0.069 6.740*** 0.035 5.780*** 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES   Included  Included  Included 
Max. VIF   6.854  5.525  6.854 
F-Statistic   3.937  8.330  13.860 
p-value   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
Adjusted R
2
   0.120  0.254  0.374 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient is predicted, two-
tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted or not in the predicted direction), respectively. Models are estimated 
using linear regression and White robust standard errors are used to calculate t-statistics. RP_DISC is the 
measure of RP disclosure scores, which is Mandatory Score (MSCORE) in Model 1, Discretionary Score 
(DSCORE) in Model 2, and Overall Score (OSCORE) in Model 3. For brevity, the results for industry dummy 
variables are not shown in the table, but are reported in the text. MSCORE is the mandatory RP-disclosure index 
score; DSCORE is the discretionary RP-disclosure index score; OSCORE is the overall RP-disclosure index 
score; BIND is ratio of the number of independent director(s) to board size; BSIZE is total number of directors 
on the board; BEXP is the ratio of board member(s) with financial expertise to board size; ACINDP is the total 
number of independent members on the audit committee; ACSIZE is total number of audit committee members; 
ACEXP is a binary variable coded “1” if a firm has one/more financial expert(s) on its audit committee and “0” 
otherwise; CONC is the percentage a company’s largest shareholding; FAM is a binary variable coded “1” if a 
firm is family-controlled and “0” otherwise; LEV is the ratio of total debt to total asset at the end of fiscal year 
2009; EXT is a binary variable coded “1” if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise; CROSS is a 
binary variable coded “1” if a firm is cross-listed in a foreign stock exchange and “0” otherwise; LEGL is a 
country’s predominant legal origin, coded “1” for common law legal origin and “0” otherwise; ENF is a 
country’s enforcement index (Preiato et al., 2012); INVP is a country’s investor protection index (La Porta et al., 
2006); CORUP is a country’s control for corruption index (CPI 2009 of Transparency International); SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2009; PROFIT is the return on assets (ROA) at the end 
of fiscal year 2009, which is earnings before tax/average assets; and PERFORM is Tobin’s Q (market-to-book 
value of assets) at the end of fiscal year 2009, which is market value of equity plus book value assets minus book 
value of equity divided by book value of assets; RPTN is the natural logarithm of total number of RP transactions 
reported in the annual report of fiscal year 2009. 
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6.5.1 Board Characteristics (H1-H3) 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that a company’s board independence is positively associated 
with the level of RP disclosures. Contrary to the hypothesised prediction, Table 6.13 
shows that the BIND coefficient is significant but negative in Model 2 (DSCORE) 
and Model 3 (OSCORE). The finding may indicate that independent directors on a 
board serve as a substitutive role, rather than a complementary role, of internal 
monitoring system, which is also consistent with the findings of Eng and Mak (2003) 
and Nelson et al. (2010). Alternatively, the result could be driven by the presence of 
“grey” directors in the board independence variable (Barako et al., 2006).   
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative association between the size of a company’s board 
of directors and the level of RP disclosures. Table 6.13 shows that the BSIZE 
variable coefficient is negative and significant in all models. The significant and 
negative sign for the board size may indicate that too many board members could 
lead to redundancy and ineffective communication. As shown in the descriptive 
statistics in Table 6.8, the overall mean (median) of board size of companies in the 
Asia-Pacific region is 8.40 (8.00) and ranges from 2.00 to 21.00. A board size of 
more than eight members is claimed to be less effective and can be easily captured 
by the CEO (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). The finding may also infer that a 
smaller board encourages greater internal monitoring system, which is consistent 
with Gordon et al. (2004a).  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the financial expertise of the members of a firm’s board of 
directors has a positive association with the level of RP disclosures. As shown in 
Table 6.13, the BEXP variable coefficient is positive and not significant. The 
insignificant result on the BEXP may be due to the narrow definition of board 
expertise, that is, formal accounting and financial expertise. In addition to the formal 
financial and accounting expertise of board members, their financial experience may 
also influence their monitoring capacity.  
6.5.2 Audit Committee Characteristics (H4-H6) 
Hypotheses 4 and 6 predict that the level of RP disclosure is positively associated 
with AC independence and AC expertise; whereas H5 posits that the level of RP 
disclosure is associated with AC size. Table 6.13 shows that, contrary to the 
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prediction, the ACIND coefficients are positive and not significant in Model 1 and 
Model 2, and negative and not significant in Model 3. Table 6.13 also reveals that the 
coefficients of variables ACSIZE are negative and not significant in Model 1 and 
Model 2, and positive and not significant in Model 3. With respect to the AC 
expertise, the ACEXP coefficient is positive and not significant in Model 2 and 
Model 3, but positive and marginally significant in Model 1 (p < 0.1).  
The non-significance for ACIND could be that the independent members of audit 
committee are simply representing the independent members of the board (in many 
cases, the independent members of the board of directors also serve as independent 
members of audit committee)104. With respect to the non-significance of ACSIZE, a 
possible explanation could be that the size of audit committee has no influence on the 
efficacy of the committee in encouraging more transparent RP disclosures. The 
positive and significant association between board expertise (ACEXP) and MSCORE 
indicates that board members with financial and accounting expertise appear to put 
more emphasis in encouraging firms’ compliance with RP disclosure requirements, 
however, they may not have the same concern regarding broader disclosure of RP 
information. Alternatively, the non-significance of ACEXP may be due to the narrow 
definition of audit committee expertise, that is, formal accounting and financial 
expertise. The financial and accounting experience, in addition to the formal 
expertise of audit committee members, may also influence the efficacy of the audit 
committee as an internal monitoring mechanism. Another possible explanation is that 
a board of directors plays a more significant role in companies’ internal monitoring 
systems, than the audit committee. Morris and Gray (2009) also find no significant 
association between the presence of audit committee and the level of firms’ overall 
disclosures after controlling for country-level factors.  
6.5.3 Ownership (H7-H8) 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that the ownership concentration of a company is positively 
associated with the level of RP disclosures. Consistent with the predicted hypothesis, 
Table 6.13 shows that the CONC coefficient is significantly associated (p < 0.001) 
with the overall RP disclosure in only Model 3, indicating that controlling owners 
                                                          
104
 A regression test (untabulated) using an alternative measure of AC independence (i.e., the proportion of independent AC 
members) has also been conducted and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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encourage the disclosure of RP information. Thus the concentration of ownership is 
relevant for monitoring overall RP disclosure, but not as relevant for monitoring the 
more specific items of RP disclosure.  
Hypothesis 8 predicts that family-controlled firms are likely to have a higher level of 
RP disclosures. Consistent with the prediction, Table 6.13 reveals that the FAM 
coefficient is significantly associated with mandatory RP disclosure (p < 0.01), 
discretionary RP disclosure (p < 0.05), and overall RP disclosure (p < 0.01). The 
finding indicates that family owners are more inclined to provide greater disclosure 
of RP information, given the longer-run investment horizon and higher concerns over 
reputation, which is consistent with Ali et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2008), Wan-Hussin 
(2009), and Chau and Gray (2010). This finding is also consistent with the notion 
that family firms are less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviour because they 
want to preserve a family’s reputation, wealth and long-term under-diversified 
investment (Wang, 2006). 
6.5.4 Firm-Level External Governance Characteristics (H9 - H11) 
Hypothesis 9 predicts that the leverage of a company is associated with the level of 
RP disclosures. Table 6.13 shows that the LEV coefficient is positive but not 
significant in Model 1 and negative and not significant in both Model 2 and Model 3. 
Hypothesis 10 predicts that companies which are audited by a Big 4 auditor have 
higher levels of RP disclosures. As predicted, the EXT coefficient is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01 in Model 1 and Model 3, and p < 0.1 in Model 2), thus 
companies audited by Big 4 auditor are associated with higher levels of RP 
disclosures. These findings support the notion that Big 4 auditors have reputation 
concerns, which motivates them to encourage greater transparency in RP disclosures.  
Hypothesis 11 predicts that companies which are in foreign stock exchange(s) have 
higher levels of RP disclosures. As shown in Table 6.13, the crosslisting (CROSS) 
coefficient is positive but not significant, which is inconsistent with bonding 
hypothesis. This insignificant finding may be due to the specific type of disclosure 
examined in this study, that is, the RP transaction disclosure. Foreign stock 
exchanges may not specifically require a more comprehensive disclosure of RP 
information, compared to the existing requirement in the home-based stock 
exchanges.  
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6.5.5 Country-Level External Governance Characteristics (H12 - H15)105 
Hypothesis 12 predicts that firms in countries with common-law legal origins have 
higher levels of RP disclosures. Contrary to the prediction, Table 6.13 shows that 
LEGL coefficient is negative and not significant in Models 1 and 2, and positive and 
not significant in Model 3106. 
Hypothesis 13 predicts that firms in countries with stronger enforcement have higher 
levels of RP disclosures. Consistent with the hypothesis, ENF is positively associated 
with the overall RP disclosure (p < 0.01, Table 6.13, Model 3), suggesting that 
stronger enforcement encourages greater disclosure of overall RP information. 
However, the ENF coefficient is negative and not significant in Model 1 and positive 
and not significant in Model 2. These findings indicate that the enforcement variable 
ENF is relevant for the overall transparency of RP disclosure, but not as relevant for 
encouraging the more specific items of RP disclosure (i.e., both mandatory and 
discretionary components).  
Hypothesis 14 predicts that firms in countries with stronger investor protections have 
higher levels of RP disclosures. Contrary to the prediction, Table 6.13 shows INVP is 
negatively associated with the overall disclosure (p < 0.05, Model 3) and 
discretionary disclosure (p < 0.01, Model 2) of RP information. A possible 
explanation for this result is that the investor protections may not act as an effective 
external monitoring mechanism to ensure greater transparency of RP information 
disclosure. Alternatively, a country’s investor protection mechanism may represent a 
substitute for disclosure transparency, particularly since the investor protection index 
is a summative of a country’s anti-director right index, disclosure index, and liability 
standard index (La Porta et al., 2006)107.  
Hypothesis 15 predicts that firms in countries with stronger control for corruption 
have higher levels of RP disclosures. As predicted, results in Table 6.13 show that 
CORUP is positively associated with RP disclosure in all models (p < 0.01), 
indicating that firms which reside in a country with stronger control for corruption 
                                                          
105 A regression test has been performed by replacing all country level factors (i.e., LEGL, ENF, INVP, and CORUP) with 
dummy variables for the countries (i.e., 5 dummy variables). The results are qualitatively similar with the main model (refer to 
Appendix 4).  
106 Further examination and discussion on the influence of legal origin is provided in Section 6.6.2. 
107 A further examination on the alternative measures for investor protection is conducted in the robustness tests in Section 
6.6.3. 
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tend to disclose greater disclosure of RP information. The findings also confirm that, 
after controlling for firm-level and country-level governance characteristics, stronger 
controls for corruption are consistently associated with greater disclosure of RP 
information, possibly because the underlying transactions are less likely to be 
opportunistic in such settings. 
6.5.6 Control Variables 
With respect to the control variables, Table 6.13 reveals that the RP transaction 
activity (RPTN) coefficient is positive and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, not 
surprisingly, companies having more RP transaction activity tend to have a more 
detail disclosures of RP information. The SIZE coefficient is significant in Model 3 
but not in the other models, suggesting that larger companies are more likely to 
disclose higher levels of overall RP information as found in many other disclosure 
studies. Untabulated results reveal that industry dummies for the Utility and 
Industrial sectors have negative and significant coefficients (p < 0.05), suggesting 
that companies in these sectors tend to have lower compliance with mandatory RP 
disclosure requirements. The other control variables (PROFIT and PERFORM) show 
insignificant coefficients, suggesting that these variables do not provide any 
influence on the level of RP disclosure compliance after controlling for other 
variables included in the models.  
6.6 Robustness Tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
6.6.1 Alternative RP Disclosure Indices (MSCORE2) 
As previously discussed in the main discussion, the mandatory RP disclosure score 
(MSCORE) only includes the disclosure requirements which are commonly 
mandated in all six countries in the year 2009. As an alternative, a new disclosure 
index is created to include all disclosure requirements in IAS 24 applicable in 2009. 
The index (MSCORE2) consists of 22 dichotomous items; hence equal weight is 
assigned for each item. Companies are not penalised for non-disclosure, as the non-
applicable and unable-to-determine items are excluded from calculating the 
MSCORE2. The MSCORE2 is then used in new estimates of the model and the 
results are presented in Table 6.14.  
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Table 6.14 reveals that results are stronger than those reported for MSCORE and are 
more consistent with the previous results for OSCORE. Ownership concentration 
(CONC) now shows a positive and significant coefficient. For the external 
governance characteristics, the legal origin (LEGL) and investor protection (INVP) 
coefficients are now negative and significant, whereas the coefficient of enforcement 
(ENF) is now positive and significant (p < 0.01). Lastly, for the control variables, 
firm size (SIZE) coefficient is positive and significant. The model’s explanatory 
power has also improved considerably (adjusted R
2
 = 24.6%). 





β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 
ACEXPjk + β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + 
β12LEGLjk + β13 ENFjk + β14 INVPjk + β15 CORUPjk + β16 SIZEjk + β17 PROFITjk + 
β18 PERFORMjk + β19 RPTNjk + β+20 INDUSjk + εjk                                                                
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-Statistics 
(Constant) ? 0.598 10.030*** 
BIND + -0.039 -1.160 
BSIZE - -0.005 -2.590*** 
BEXP + 0.009 0.220 
ACIND + 0.002 0.210 
ACSIZE ? -0.006 -0.810 
ACEXP + 0.015 1.220 
CONC + 0.018 1.920** 
FAM + 0.001 2.270** 
LEV ? 0.013 0.890 
EXT + 0.030 2.460*** 
CROSS + 0.008 0.600 
LEGL + -0.047 -2.130** 
ENF + 0.013 4.420*** 
INVP + -0.310 -5.410*** 
CORUP + 0.017 5.610*** 
SIZE + 0.012 2.680*** 
PROFIT + -0.045 -0.800 
PERFORM + 0.011 1.330 
RPTN + 0.017 2.600*** 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES 
   
Included 
F-Statistic 
   
8.030 
p-value 





   
0.246 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient is predicted, two-
tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted or not in the predicted direction), respectively. RP_DISC is the 
measure of RP disclosure scores, which is the alternative Mandatory Score (MSCORE2); all other variables are 
as described in Table 6.13. 
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6.6.2 The Influence of Legal Protection (LEGL) 
The findings reported in the main regression (Table 6.13) indicate that the LEGL 
coefficient is not significant in any of the models. Table 6.15 reports the re-
examination on the regressions by removing the LEGL variable from the equation.  
Table 6.15 Additional Regression Analysis – Excluding Legal Origin (LEGL) (N=582) 
RP_DISC  =  
 
β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 
ACEXPjk + β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + β12ENFjk 
+ β13 INVPjk + β14 CORUPjk + β15 SIZEjk + β16 PROFITjk + β17 PERFORMjk + β18 




Model 1 - MSCORE 
Model 2 - 
DSCORE 










(Constant) ? 0.692 11.850*** 0.843 12.710*** 0.353 12.580*** 
BIND + -0.070 -1.620 -0.101 -2.090** -0.050 -1.690* 
BSIZE - -0.005 -2.440*** -0.005 -2.000** -0.004 -2.530*** 
BEXP + 0.002 0.050 0.010 0.180 0.033 0.980 
ACIND + 0.004 0.420 0.006 0.480 -0.003 -0.360 
ACSIZE ? -0.013 -1.500 -0.003 -0.260 0.001 0.210 
ACEXP + 0.019 1.330* 0.003 0.160 0.006 0.550 
CONC + <0.001 0.160 0.000 1.010 0.001 4.4200*** 
FAM + 0.028 2.540*** 0.029 2.140** 0.024 2.970*** 
LEV ? 0.020 1.240 -0.014 -0.670 -0.001 -0.110 
EXT + 0.040 3.200*** 0.024 1.350* 0.027 2.580*** 
CROSS + 0.004 0.300 0.019 1.140 0.007 0.640 
LEGL 
 
Excluded Excluded Excluded 
ENF + -0.003 -0.940 0.002 0.540 0.016 6.450*** 
INVP + -0.021 -0.380 -0.341 -5.350*** -0.093 -2.240** 
CORUP + 0.011 4.080*** 0.013 3.820*** 0.016 7.170*** 
SIZE + 0.003 0.680 0.004 0.590 0.009 2.220** 
PROFIT + -0.067 -1.060 0.011 0.130 -0.026 -0.510 
PERFORM + 0.004 0.390 0.001 0.100 0.010 1.280 
RPTN + 0.030 4.100*** 0.069 6.720*** 0.035 5.780*** 































***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient is predicted, two-
tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted or not in the predicted direction), respectively. RP_DISC is the 
measure of RP disclosure scores, which is Mandatory Score (MSCORE) in Model 1, Discretionary Score 
(DSCORE) in Model 2, and Overall Score (OSCORE) in Model 3. For brevity, the results for industry dummy 
variables are not shown in the table. All variables are as described in Table 6.13.  
 
The table shows that all findings are consistent with those in the main regressions 
results (Table 6.13). These findings suggest that the more specific country-level 
proxies, including the enforcement, control for corruption, and investor protection 
index dominate over legal origin. A re-estimation of the Model 1, 2 and 3 
Chapter 6: Results  
~ 166 ~ 
 
(untabulated), which retains LEGL and removes all other country-level factors (i.e., 
ENF, INVP, and CORUP) shows that the LEGL coefficient is positive and 
significant, suggesting that legal origin appears to capture a more general 
institutional framework instead of a more specific measure of the framework (i.e., 
ENF, INVP, and CORUP). Similarly, more recent literature criticises the legal origin 
hypothesis for not capturing the most significant aspect of the law (Brown et al., 
2011, p. 117 citing Lele & Siems, 2007; Siems, 2007). In addition, a longitudinal 
study by Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems (2009, p. 627) finds evidence that civil 
law countries appear to have been improving their legal framework over the time, 
suggesting that the effect of legal origin may have dissipated over time (Brown et al., 
2011). 
6.6.3 Alternative Measures for Investor Protection (ADRI and ASDI) 
Contrary to the expectation, the previous regression results show negative and 
significant INVP coefficients. To check whether the negative results are driven by 
measurement error, the existing investor protection score is replaced by alternative 
measures which only focus on the minority shareholder protection. Accordingly, a 
revised anti-director right index (ADRI) by La Porta et al. (2006) is used to replace 
INVP in the models. However, the results (untabulated) are substantially the same as 
those reported for INVP.  
As an alternative, an anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) by Djankov et al. (2008) is used 
to replace INVP in the models. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the anti-self-
dealing index measures a more specific legal protection of minority shareholders, 
that is, the control against self-dealing by controlling owners. The index represents 
an average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing (Djankov et al., 
2008, p. 437). Djankov et al. (2008) find that a higher anti-self-dealing score is 
associated with a higher valued stock market and lower benefits of control. The anti-
self-dealing index has also been used in recent studies in finance to measure investor 
protection (for example, Lel & Miller, 2008; Mclean et al., 2012) and also reviewed 
in Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012).  
The results of re-estimating the regression model by replacing the INVP with the 
ASDI are presented in Table 6.16. The results in Table 6.16 show that ASDI 
coefficient is positive and significant in Model 2 (p < 0.01) and 3 (p < 0.05), but not 
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significant in Model 1. The positive and significant coefficients indicate that the 
more specific investor protection measure appears to be associated with higher 
transparency of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region, consistent 
with H14. 
Table 6.16 Additional Regression Analysis – Replacing INVP with ASDI (N=582) 
RP_DISC  =  
 
β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 
ACEXPjk + β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + 
β12LEGLjk + β13 ENFjk + β14 ASDIjk + β15 CORUPjk + β16 SIZEjk + β17 PROFITjk + 





















BIND + -0.102 -1.768* -0.108 -2.022** -0.077 -1.564 
BSIZE ? -0.137 -2.573*** -0.125 -2.563** -0.106 -2.345** 
BEXP + 0.005 0.098 0.002 0.039 0.029 0.722 
ACIND + 0.033 0.527 0.052 0.897 -0.013 -0.236 
ACSIZE ? -0.071 -1.439 -0.026 -0.569 0.000 0.002 
ACEXP + 0.059 1.243 0.017 0.389 0.031 0.773 
CONC + 0.014 0.316 0.043 1.034 0.142 3.671*** 
FAM + 0.102 2.411*** 0.073 1.856** 0.099 2.729*** 
LEV ? 0.051 1.098 -0.026 -0.598 0.011 0.287 
EXT + 0.116 2.790*** 0.050 1.301* 0.084 2.361*** 
CROSS + 0.011 0.187 0.064 1.191 0.048 0.963 
LEGL + -0.026 -0.217 -0.530 -4.735*** -0.218 -2.099** 
ENF + -0.043 -0.575 0.138 1.986** 0.352 5.462*** 
ASDI + 0.033 0.350 0.363 4.233*** 0.138 1.732** 
CORUP + 0.217 2.552*** 0.222 2.839*** 0.408 5.607*** 
SIZE + 0.064 0.996 0.052 0.869 0.096 1.750** 
PROFIT + -0.059 -1.254 0.004 0.085 -0.013 -0.319 
PERFORM + 0.024 0.504 0.015 0.351 0.049 1.222 
RPTN + 0.185 3.933*** 0.331 7.618*** 0.245 6.074*** 
























***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient is predicted, two-
tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted or not in the predicted direction), respectively. RP_DISC is the 
measure of RP disclosure scores, which is Mandatory Score (MSCORE) in Model 1, Discretionary Score 
(DSCORE) in Model 2, and Overall Score (OSCORE) in Model 3. For brevity, the results for industry dummy 
variables are not shown in the table. ASDI is a country’s investor protection as measured by the anti-self-dealing 
index (La Porta et al., 2006); all other variables are as described in Table 6.13. 
6.6.4 The Influence of Culture (SECRECY) 
Past studies examining corporate disclosures indicate that culture affects disclosure 
practices (e.g., Hope, 2003b; Morris et al., 2012). Hope (2003b) argues and provides 
evidence that, internationally, the level of firms’ overall disclosures are associated 
with country legal origins and cultural dimensions. In measuring culture, extant 
international studies rely on Hofstede’s (1980) and Gray’s (1988) cultural 
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dimensions. While the findings of the influence of cultural dimensions on the level of 
disclosures have been mixed (e.g., Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Jaggi & Low, 
2000), Hope (2003b) argues and provides evidence that culture has an important 
influence on the level of disclosures, particularly in a rich information environment. 
Following the work of Morris et al. (2012), the Gray’s (1988) cultural dimension of 
“secrecy” is added to the models, to test the influence of a key cultural value on RP 
disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. The cultural dimension is 
represented by the secrecy index in the Braun and Rodriguez (2008) study, which 
measures the index based on Gray’s (1988) cultural dimensions derived from 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural values. A higher index of secrecy is thus expected to be 
associated with less transparent RP disclosure. The results of tests for the influence 
of secrecy to the RP disclosures (MSCORE, DSCORE and OSCORE) are reported in 
Table 6.17.  
The results show that the SECRECY coefficients are negative and not significant in 
all models. The insignificant findings may indicate that SECRECY has no influence 
after controlling for other country-level factors, particularly the control for corruption 
(CORUP). Further examination (untabulated) reveals that, when CORUP is removed 
from the model, the SECRECY coefficients are negative and significant in all models 
(p < 0.01 in Model 1 and Model 3; p < 0.05 in Model 2), suggesting the influence of 
secrecy on the level RP mandatory, discretionary, and overall RP disclosures. 
However, as shown in Table 6.17, the influence of secrecy does not hold after 
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Table 6.17 Additional Regression Analysis – Inclusive of SECRECY (N=582) 
RP_DISC  =  
 
β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 
ACEXPjk + β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + 
β12LEGLjk + β13 ENFjk + β14 INVPjk + β15 CORUPjk + β16 SIZEjk + β17 PROFITjk + 


















5.102***  3.897*** 
BIND + -0.103 -1.773* -0.105 -1.978** -0.075 -1.525 
BSIZE ? -0.145 -2.318** -0.079 -1.377 -0.070 -1.319 
BEXP + 0.004 0.081 0.006 0.145 0.033 0.809 
ACIND + 0.039 0.578 0.021 0.345 -0.037 -0.647 
ACSIZE ? -0.074 -1.457 -0.011 -0.242 0.012 0.268 
ACEXP + 0.061 1.264 0.007 0.156 0.024 0.572 
CONC + 0.014 0.302 0.046 1.116 0.144 3.736*** 
FAM + 0.099 2.233** 0.091 2.229** 0.113 2.992*** 
LEV ? 0.052 1.114 -0.031 -0.731 0.007 0.174 
EXT + 0.116 2.753*** 0.056 1.439* 0.089 2.473*** 
CROSS + 0.016 0.256 0.035 0.628 0.026 0.491 
LEGL  -0.017 -0.114 0.045 0.332 0.064 0.515 
ENF + -0.034 -0.372 -0.008 -0.100 0.262 3.379*** 
INVP + -0.011 -0.128 -0.348 -4.299*** -0.163 -2.166** 
CORUP + 0.254 1.741** 0.153 1.140 0.315 2.528*** 
SIZE + 0.067 1.021 0.037 0.615 0.085 1.524* 
PROFIT + -0.060 -1.258 0.005 0.120 -0.012 -0.291 
PERFORM + 0.025 0.528 0.008 0.178 0.043 1.071 
RPTN + 0.186 3.936*** 0.328 7.557*** 0.243 6.019*** 






















0.257  0.359 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient is predicted, two-
tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted or not in the predicted direction), respectively. RP_DISC is the 
measure of RP disclosure scores, which is Mandatory Score (MSCORE) in Model 1, Discretionary Score 
(DSCORE) in Model 2, and Overall Score (OSCORE) in Model 3. For brevity, the results for industry dummy 
variables are not shown in the table. SECRECY is Gray’s (1988) cultural dimension derived from Hofstede, 
calculated by Braun and Rodriguez (2008); all other variables are as described in Table 6.13.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the results of tests designed to address the research 
questions and test the research hypotheses. In relation to the research question 1, the 
findings indicate that RP transactions are very common across the sample countries. 
Of the six countries, companies in Thailand report the highest number of RP 
transactions, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. Furthermore, among all types of RP transactions, RP loans are the most 
common type of transaction. Thailand and Indonesia report relatively higher numbers 
of RP loans, which in many cases are unsecured, interest-free, and repayable on 
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demand. As expected, RP transactions with corporate combinations (i.e., 
subsidiaries, associates and joint venture) are common in all six countries and 
account for 46% of all reported RP transactions. RP transactions with entities under 
common control are only reported by companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, indicating the dominance of family-controlled firms in 
these countries. RP transactions with director-related entities are more frequently 
reported in Thailand and Australia.  
With respect to research question 2, the findings show some variations on the extent 
of RP disclosures conformance to IAS 24 by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Of the six countries, Singapore shows the highest conformance to the mandatory 
requirements, followed by Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Whereas for the common-discretionary part of the IAS 24 disclosure 
requirements, Thailand shows the highest average, followed by Indonesia, Australia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. As for overall disclosures, Australia has the 
highest average, followed by Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Of the required RP disclosure items, companies tend to have lower 
compliance levels in disclosing information on related-party balances. This finding is 
concerning given the high number of related-party loans reported by companies in 
the Asia-Pacific region and raises questions about what factors might be driving 
those transactions.  
To address the third research question, a series of regression tests were conducted to 
examine the association between corporate RP disclosures and hypothesised 
governance, country and firm-specific factors. Following the regression analysis, a 
number of findings can be inferred in accordance with the research hypotheses. First, 
the findings indicate that for internal governance characteristics, a smaller board of 
directors is associated with higher levels of RP disclosure, consistent with H2. 
However, contrary to the H1 prediction, a less independent board of directors is more 
likely to encourage greater RP disclosures. With regard to the ownership structure, a 
company with a higher ownership concentration is associated with greater RP 
disclosures, which supports H7. In addition, a family-controlled company is also 
more inclined to provide greater RP disclosure, consistent with H8 prediction. The 
findings on ownership may indicate that family firms appear to maintain their 
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reputation and longer-run investment perspective by providing greater assurance 
through more transparent disclosure of RP information. 
The findings also indicate that an external governance characteristic, as represented 
by the size of external auditor, is likely to encourage greater disclosure of RP 
information. Consistent with predicted hypothesis H10, a larger audit firm is 
associated with higher levels of RP disclosures. The larger external audit firms are 
considered to have greater concern over their reputation; hence appear to influence 
the extent of disclosure in this study. With respect to the country-level governance 
characteristics, the findings indicate that companies which reside in a country with 
stronger control for corruption are associated with more transparent disclosure of RP 
information, providing support for H15. Furthermore, companies in a country with 
stronger enforcement are also more likely to provide a higher level of overall RP 
disclosure, consistent with H13. However, the strength of a country’s investor 
protection has an inverse relationship with RP disclosure, which is contrary to the 
H14 prediction. A possible explanation is that the investor protection index only 
captures the de jure legal system in a country, thus it will not be effective without 
effective law enforcement. Therefore, it appears that the enforcement mechanisms 
work better, particularly in Asian countries, than the investor protection mechanisms.  
Robustness tests indicate that the main findings are supported when all the 
independent variables are regressed against an alternative MSCORE index 
(MSCORE2). The findings are also consistent when legal origin variable, LEGL, is 
excluded from the model and when a cultural variable, SECRECY, is added to the 
model. With respect to the investor protection, two alternative measures are 
examined, that  is, La Porta et al.’s (2006) anti-director-right index (ADRI) and 
Djankov et al.’s (2008) anti-self-dealing index (ASDI). The results show that the anti-
self-dealing index (ASDI) is positively associated with the level of RP disclosures, 
suggesting that companies in a country with a higher anti-self-dealing score tend to 
be more transparent in disclosing RP information. This finding may indicate that the 
more specific nature of this measure, that is, focusing on the examination of 
countries’ laws in protecting minority shareholders from the self-dealing practices by 
controlling owners, may better capture cross-country differences in the investor 
protection relating to the self-dealing practices. Thus, most of the hypothesised 
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relationships are supported and are robust to the use of alternative measures and 
testing procedures. 
The next chapter presents a summary and discussion of the key findings with respect 
to the research questions, together with the limitations, recommendations for future 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has examined the nature and extent of related party (RP) transactions, the 
extent of their disclosures and the association with firm-level and country-level 
governance characteristics of companies in the Asia-Pacific region (i.e., Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand). This thesis is 
motivated by the increasing significance of RP transactions, the considerable impacts 
of those transactions, and the lack of empirical evidence on the extent of corporate 
RP disclosures in the region. Based on the motivations and gaps in the literature, 
three key research questions have been proposed and addressed: (1) what is the 
nature and extent of RP transactions and RP disclosures across countries in the Asia-
Pacific region?, (2) to what extent do the RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-
Pacific region conform to the IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure within and across 
countries? and (3) what are the governance, country and other factors which explain 
the nature and extent of RP transaction disclosures in the Asia-Pacific region? This 
chapter presents a summary of the preceding chapters and discussion of key findings, 
contributions and implications of the thesis. This chapter concludes with the study’s 
limitations and recommendations for future research. 
7.1 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
Chapter 2 discussed the institutional factors that potentially influence RP disclosures 
and the extent of IAS 24 adoption in the selected Asia-Pacific countries. Countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region provide an important setting to investigate RP disclosures for 
at least two reasons. First, companies in some Asian countries are commonly 
characterised by dominant shareholders and family-controlled ownership. Second, 
Asia-Pacific countries differ in legal origin, capital market development, 
enforcement, control for corruption, and corporate governance structures. While 
those country factors provide an important setting to investigate the nature and extent 
of corporate RP disclosures, there is no known empirical evidence on the influence 
of these country factors on the extent of RP disclosures. Chapter 2 highlighted the 
potential influences of these country factors on the extent of RP disclosures. First, 
legal origin is likely to influence the financial reporting system. Specifically, 
common-law countries tend to have greater disclosures than civil law countries. 
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Second, there are differences in the strength of enforcement between the six 
countries. The effectiveness of the enforcement of accounting standards may 
influence the quality of financial information, in which stronger enforcement can 
ensure that disclosure requirements enhance access to financial information. Third, 
the countries also differ in the strength of protection of minority shareholders. 
Fourth, family-controlled firms are common in many Asian countries. Greater 
family-concentrated ownership may potentially lead to less opportunistic RP 
transactions; however, it may prove less effective in settings of weak enforcement 
and weak control for corruption. Fifth, despite differences on the extent of adoption 
in the year 2009, IAS 24 had been used as the basis for the development of national 
accounting standards of RP disclosures in all six sample countries. In the year 2009, 
Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore had fully adopted IAS 24 (2003), 
whereas Indonesia and Thailand were still conforming to an earlier version of the 
standard. Last, regulators in all of the six countries have recommended listed 
companies to comply with their domestic Codes of Corporate Governance which 
generally recommend a minimum number of board members, independent board 
members, and financial expertise of the board of directors and audit committee. 
Effective corporate governance mechanisms are likely to mitigate opportunistic RP 
transactions and lead to more transparent RP disclosures. 
 
Chapter 3 presented a review of the literature on corporate financial disclosures, in 
particular the disclosure of RP transactions, and the extant studies addressing the 
influence of corporate governance on the disclosure of information in annual reports. 
The literature on disclosure compliance indicates that, despite mandatory 
requirements, managers have incentives to withhold information, particularly 
unfavourable or sensitive information. Furthermore, the empirical findings of studies 
investigating RP transactions generally indicate a strong support for the opportunism 
or conflict of interest perspective than the efficient transaction perspective. That is, 
RP transactions are generally associated with value loss or wealth reduction. Given 
the conflict of interest in RP transactions, the information about RP transactions is 
likely to be sensitive, therefore, managers may have a strong incentive to distort or 
withhold information about these transactions.  
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The literature on the determinants of corporate financial disclosures reveals that the 
corporate financial disclosures in annual reports are influenced by internal and 
external governance characteristics. Studies on the role of the board of directors and 
audit committees in relation to the extent of corporate disclosures provides mixed 
findings, which may be explained by differences in the country-settings, time 
periods, measurement methods, and the nature of the disclosures examined. Research 
examining the influence of external governance characteristics on the extent of 
corporate disclosures demonstrates consistent findings with respect to the role of 
independent audit firms in encouraging greater disclosures. Furthermore, a stream of 
literature investigating the influence of country-level governance factors on financial 
reporting practices and disclosures suggests the importance of country legal origins, 
enforcement, minority shareholder protection and controls for corruption. However, 
in the more specific context of RP transactions, it was evident that there is a lack of 
studies which systematically address the influence of internal and external 
governance on the RP transactions and RP disclosures.  
Based on the prior literature and the identified gaps, Chapter 4 developed the 
theoretical framework encompassing the research questions and hypotheses to 
examine the association between the extent of RP disclosures and internal and 
external corporate governance characteristics. Agency theory was used as a 
framework to explain the association between disclosure and corporate governance. 
RQ1 aimed to explore differences in the nature and extent of RP disclosures about 
those transactions by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. RQ2 focused on 
variations in the extent of RP disclosure conformance in accordance to IAS 24 
Related Party Disclosure, by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. RQ3 sought to 
investigate the governance, country, and other firm-specific factors which explain the 
nature and extent of RP disclosures in the Asia-Pacific region. Hypotheses were 
proposed on the associations between internal and external corporate governance 
characteristics and the extent of RP disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region. First, effective internal governance characteristics were expected to enhance 
firms’ RP disclosures. In particular, it was hypothesised that the independence, size 
and expertise of board of directors (H1, H2, H3) and audit committee (H4, H5, H6) 
are associated with the extent of RP disclosures. Further, ownership concentration 
(H7) and family-controlled ownership (H8) were hypothesised to influence the extent 
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of RP disclosures. Second, external governance characteristics, encompassing the 
firm-level and country-level factors, were also predicted to influence the extent of RP 
disclosure. For the firm level, it was hypothesised that leverage (H9), external auditor 
size (H10) and cross-listing status (H11) are positively associated with the level of 
RP disclosures. As for the country-level factors, companies in a country with 
common law legal origin (H12), stronger enforcement (H13), investor protection 
(H14), and control for corruption (H15) were hypothesised to have greater RP 
disclosures.  
Chapter 5 outlined the research design to address the research questions and 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. Guided by previous studies on financial 
disclosure and RP transactions and based on IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure, a self-
constructed disclosure index was developed to measure the level of corporate RP 
transaction disclosure. The fiscal year 2009 was selected as the study year, which 
preceded the changes in the disclosure requirements in the six countries (i.e., 
following the amendment of IAS 24 in November 2009) and represented the most 
recent reports available at the data collection period. A one-year study period was 
selected due to the complexity of controlling for changes in institutional differences 
and their consequences over time across countries. The sample comprised 582 
companies selected from the Top 100 largest non-financial companies by market 
capitalisation as at 31 December 2009 from each of the six countries. The sample 
was limited to companies which have RP disclosure in the annual report to allow for 
comparisons of the extent of RP disclosures. Data for RP transactions, the disclosure 
of such transactions, and firm-level governance characteristics were hand-collected 
from the information disclosed by the sample companies. The descriptive analysis 
addressed RQ1 and RQ2, whereas multivariate procedures were developed to jointly 
test the hypotheses and address RQ3.  
7.1.1 Findings on the Nature and Extent of RP Transactions (RQ1) 
Chapter 6 presented the study’s findings including an examination of the nature and 
extent of RP transactions, the disclosure about those transactions, and the 
determinants of the disclosures by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. In relation 
to the RQ1, the findings indicate that RP transactions are common across sample 
countries. Of the six sample countries, companies in Thailand report the highest 
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number of RP transactions, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore 
and the Philippines. Among all types of RP transactions, RP loans are the most 
common type of transaction. RP loans are more frequently reported by companies in 
Thailand and Indonesia, which in many cases are unsecured, interest-free, and 
repayable on demand. With respect to the nature of RP relationships, RP transactions 
with corporate combinations (i.e., subsidiaries, associates and joint venture) are 
common in all six countries and account for 46% of all reported RP transactions. RP 
transactions with director-related entities are more frequently reported in Thailand 
and Australia, whereas transactions with entities under common control are only 
reported by companies in Indonesia, Malaysia the Philippines, and Thailand. These 
findings may indicate the dominance of family-controlled firms in these four 
countries.  
7.1.2 Findings on the Nature and Extent of RP Disclosures (RQ2) 
With respect to RQ2, the findings show variations in the extent of RP disclosure 
conformance to IAS 24 by companies in the Asia-Pacific region. Of the six countries, 
Singapore shows the highest conformance to the mandatory requirements, followed 
by Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. This finding is 
likely due to the influence of countries institutional factors on the extent of disclosure 
conformance. For the discretionary disclosures that are common to all countries, 
Thailand shows the highest average level of discretionary disclosures, followed by 
Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, suggesting that in the 
weaker institutional frameworks, managers may want to signal their superior 
safeguarding of investors’ assets. As for overall disclosure, Australian firms have the 
highest average scores, followed by Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Of the RP disclosure requirement items, companies have lower 
compliance level scores in disclosing the information regarding the outstanding items 
pertaining to related-parties (i.e., related-party balances), again suggesting the 
influence of institutional factors.  
7.1.3 Findings on the Determinants of RP Disclosures (RQ3) 
The multivariate regression analysis provides support for a number of the proposed 
hypotheses in addressing RQ3. The findings indicate that a number of the internal 
governance characteristics of a smaller board of directors is associated with a higher 
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level of RP disclosure, consistent with the H2 prediction. The finding holds for all 
subsets of RP disclosure: mandatory, discretionary, and overall RP disclosures. 
However, contrary to the H1 prediction, the results show that fewer independent 
directors are associated with higher levels of mandatory, discretionary and overall 
RP disclosures. With regard to the ownership structure, companies with higher 
ownership concentration tend to have higher levels of RP disclosures, which supports 
the H7 prediction. In addition, family-controlled companies are more likely to 
provide greater RP disclosure, consistent with the H8 prediction. The findings on 
ownership may indicate that family-controlled and firms with high ownership 
concentration seek to enhance their reputation and their longer-run investment 
prospects by providing greater assurance through more transparent disclosure of RP 
information. 
The findings also support the predicted influence of external governance 
characteristics on the extent of RP disclosures. Specifically, the findings show that 
firms with a Big 4 auditor tend to disclose higher levels of RP information, consistent 
with the H10 prediction. This finding holds for all types of mandatory, discretionary, 
and overall RP disclosures. Larger external audit firms may have a greater concern 
over their reputation and hence encourage client firms to be more transparent in their 
RP disclosures. With respect to the country-level governance characteristics, the 
findings indicate that companies which reside in a country with a stronger control for 
corruption are associated with a more transparent disclosure of RP information, 
providing support for the H15 prediction. Furthermore, companies in a country with 
stronger enforcement are also more likely to provide higher levels of overall RP 
disclosure, consistent with H13. However, the strength of a country’s investor 
protection has an inverse relationship with RP disclosure, which is contrary to the 
H14 prediction. A possible explanation is that the investor-protection index only 
captures the de jure legal system in a country, thus it will not be effective without 
effective law enforcement. Therefore, the enforcement mechanism works better, 
particularly in Asian countries, than the investor protection mechanism.  Table 7.1 
presents a complete summary of the hypotheses findings for this study. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
Research Questions and Hypotheses Findings 
What are the governance, country, and other firm-specific factors 
which explain the nature and extent of related-party disclosures by 
companies in the Asia-Pacific region? 
 
H1: The proportion of board independence is positively 
associated with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the 
Asia-Pacific (AP) region 
Not supported 
H2: The size of a firm’s board of directors is negatively 
associated with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the 
AP region 
Supported 
H3: The financial expertise of the members of a firm’s board of 
directors has a positive association with the level of RP 
disclosures by companies in the AP region 
Not supported 
H4: The number of independent members in a firm’s audit 
committee is positively associated with the level of RP 
disclosures by companies in the AP region 
Not supported 
H5: The size of a firm’s audit committee has an association 
with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the AP region 
Not supported 
H6: Audit committee with at least one director having financial 
expertise is positively associated with the level of RP 
disclosures by companies in the AP region 
Supported (MSCORE) 
H7: The ownership concentration of a company is positively 
associated with the level of RP disclosures by companies in the 
AP region 
Supported 
H8: Family-controlled firms in the AP region have higher 
levels of RP disclosures 
Supported 
H9: The leverage of a company is associated with the level of 
RP disclosures by companies in the AP region 
Not supported 
H10: Companies in the AP region which are audited by a Big 4 
auditor have higher levels of RP disclosures 
Supported 
H11: Companies in the AP region which are cross-listed in 
foreign exchange(s) have higher levels of RP disclosures  
Not supported 
H12: Firms in countries with common law legal origins have 
higher levels of RP disclosures than those in countries with 
code law legal origins 
Not supported 
H13:Firms in countries with stronger enforcement have higher 
levels of RP disclosures than those in countries with weaker 
enforcement 
Supported 
H14: Firms in countries with stronger investor protection have 
higher levels of RP disclosures than those in countries with 
weaker investor protection 
Not supported (Main Analysis) 
Supported (Additional 
Analysis) 
H15: Firms in countries with stronger control for corruption 
have higher levels of RP disclosures than those in countries 
with weaker control for corruption 
Supported 
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Lastly, robustness tests indicate that the findings are consistent when all the 
independent variables were examined using an alternative MSCORE index in the 
regression modelling. The findings were also consistent when the legal origin 
variable, LEGL, was excluded from the model or when a cultural variable, 
SECRECY, was added to the model. With respect to the investor protection, two 
alternative measures, that is, La Porta et al.’s (2006) anti-director-right index (ADRI) 
and Djankov et al.’s (2008) anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) were examined in separate 
regression procedures. The results showed that the anti-self-dealing index was 
positively associated with the level of RP disclosures, suggesting that companies in a 
country with a higher anti-self-dealing index tend to be more transparent in 
disclosing RP information. This finding may indicate that the more specific nature of 
this measure, that is, focusing on the examination of countries’ laws in protecting 
minority shareholders from the self-dealing practices by controlling owners, may 
better capture cross-country differences in investor protection relating to the self-
dealing practices.  
7.2 Contributions and Implications 
The findings presented in this thesis provide a number of significant contributions to 
research on RP disclosures that will be beneficial for both regulators and market 
participants.  
First, this thesis provides a detailed investigation on the nature and extent of RP 
transactions, the disclosure of such transactions, and the factors that influence the 
disclosures by large companies in the Asia-Pacific region. This thesis extends the 
current body of research in RP transactions which tend to focus more heavily on the 
“transactions”, either the amount or number of specific or general transactions, rather 
than on the “comprehensive disclosure transparency” of RP transactions. 
Accordingly, this thesis is among the first in pursuing the understanding on both of 
the nature and extent of RP transactions as well as the comprehensive disclosure 
transparency of such transactions. The disclosure of RP transactions, either in the 
form of mandatory or discretionary disclosures, is an essential component in 
strengthening the protection of minority shareholders, investors and other users 
relying on the financial statements as a legitimate source of information in their 
decision-making process (Lo & Wong, 2011).  
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Second, this thesis also extends current studies by investigating RP transactions and 
the disclosures of such transactions using cross-countries setting. There is no known 
prior research investigating RP transactions using a cross-country perspective. The 
cross-countries approach is beneficial in informing the influence of country-level 
factors. In this regard, this thesis finds evidence of the influence of enforcement, 
shareholders’ protection and control for corruption on the extent of RP disclosures. 
The findings provide empirical evidence that the strength of enforcement, the 
protection against self-dealing actions, and the control for corruption are associated 
with corporate transparency of the RP disclosures.   
Third, this thesis provides empirical evidence on the link between accounting and 
corruption in a cross-country setting. To date, there is a lack of research in this area, 
Malagueño et al. (2010, p. 375) contend that “[T]here is little cross country research 
that establishes a direct empirical link between accounting and corruption”. The 
evidence shows that less corrupt countries are associated with greater disclosure 
transparency of RP information. This finding supports previous studies in other areas 
which find that corrupt actions are more likely to be discovered when there is greater 
business transparency  (Halter et al., 2009). The findings also suggest that in the 
absence of efficient control for corruption, RP transactions are more prevalent as a 
means of acquiring self-interested benefits.  
Anecdotal evidence indicates that RP transactions may serve abusive purposes, for 
example, in the case of Satyam in India (OECD, 2009) in which RP transactions are 
used for fraudulent purposes. Empirically, previous studies on RP transactions also 
suggest that these transactions can be opportunistic when managers, directors, 
controlling owners or other related parties pursue self-interests through non-arm’s 
length RP transactions. Even in the normal business activities, RP transactions can be 
used opportunistically to transfer assets or liabilities between related parties. In a 
broader perspective, such opportunistic transactions can have implications for the 
economies (Lo & Wong, 2011). In this respect, the transparent RP disclosures enable 
users to better monitor transactions that may not be in accordance with shareholders’ 
best interests. As an implication, a more stringent RP accounting standard and RP 
disclosure requirements are warranted to enhance the disclosure of RP transactions, 
particularly as higher standards of RP disclosure are likely to strengthen the 
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mitigation of opportunistic RP transactions and increase disclosure transparency. 
Thus, the findings can help policy makers, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, in 
articulating better RP disclosure requirements for listed companies. 
Fourth, this thesis raises concerns about the efficacy of some internal governance 
mechanisms, as some of the mechanisms (found to be associated with disclosure in 
other studies) were not associated with the extent of RP disclosures by companies in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The findings may suggest that such governance 
characteristics are not effective in encouraging RP disclosure transparencies by 
companies in this institutional setting. This result confirms the reports by OECD 
(2009, pp. 40–41) and CFA (2009, p. 37) which raise the issue of the effectiveness of 
board independence for companies in Asian countries108. More effective supervision 
and regulation seem to be warranted to improve the efficacy of internal governance 
mechanisms as an internal monitoring system in a company, particularly given the 
costly investment expended by companies in establishing such mechanisms. For 
example, the number of boards on which an independent director may serve can be 
limited and the concept of independence can be reinforced, which is consistent with 
the recommendations by OECD (2009, pp. 40–41). In addition, a limitation should 
also be imposed on the duration of time that an independent can be appointed on the 
board as mentioned in the CFA report, “Because no limits exist on the number of 
times independent directors may serve on the board, their partiality is also prone to 
diminishing over time” (Loon & De Ramos, 2009, p. 37).   
Overall, the findings of this study have implications for standard setters and 
regulatory bodies in relation to RP disclosure standard. In particular, the study’s 
findings provide empirical evidence that country-level factors, including the strength 
of enforcement by accounting regulatory bodies, the protection of minority 
shareholders against self-dealing actions, and the control for corruption are important 
determinants for increased corporate transparency of the RP disclosures.  
 
 
                                                          
108
 For example, Hong Kong Exchange’s chief executive Paul Chow once mentioned that one challenge of 
corporate governance in Hong Kong is that non-executive independent directors may not be fully independent 
when major shareholders appoint the directors (Loon & De Ramos, 2009, p. 37). 
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7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis has several limitations, which may offer potential avenues for further 
studies. First, like other studies investigating RP transactions, this thesis only 
captures RP transactions which have been disclosed and therefore, not all RP 
transactions may be included in the analysis. There is a possibility that companies 
enter into RP transactions but do not disclose the transactions. In particular, for the 
purpose of comparison, the RP transactions investigated in this study are limited to 
the transactions reported in the secondary data, that is, the annual reports. Future 
studies may also include other disclosure medium of RP transactions. 
Second, this thesis has included internal and external governance characteristics in 
the regression tests. However, due to the unavailability of data and time constraints, 
other governance characteristics have not been examined in this study, for example 
the identification of “grey” directors, the diligence of the board of directors and audit 
committee (e.g., the number of board or audit committee meetings), the 
compensation of directors, the duality of the CEO, the shareholdings of managers, 
the political-connections of insiders, and the tenure of independent directors and 
audit committee members. Therefore, future studies could pursue these factors as an 
extension to this study.  
Third, this thesis relies on the disclosed information of family relationships and 
shareholdings in the companies’ annual reports and ultimate ownership data in the 
OSIRIS BVDEP database to identify ownership and family-controlled ownership. 
There is a risk that these sources may not correctly identify the ultimate family that 
controls a firm; however, the risk has been minimised by cross-checking between the 
two sources (i.e., the annual reports and the OSIRIS BVDEP database).  
Lastly, given the time constraints on data collection, the study’s sample is limited to 
the top 100 non-financial listed companies from each of the six countries, thus 
introducing a size bias. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, large companies are 
likely to be closely monitored by the investment community, regulators, and other 
interested parties, and hence are likely to provide more disclosure. Therefore, the size 
bias is unlikely to be a major threat to the validity of the study’s findings, but it does 
offer an area for further research (i.e., to what extent do small firms engage in 
opportunistic RP transactions?). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Model Accounts of RP Disclosures by Big 4 Accounting Firms 
AASB 124 disclosures presented in the Big 4 accounting firms’ example financial statements  
Para Disclosure Description DTT PwC EY KPMG 
Par 
12 
Relationships between parents and subsidiaries shall be 
disclosed irrespective of whether there have been 
transactions between those related parties.  An entity shall 
disclose the name of the entity’s parent and, if different, the 
ultimate controlling party.  If neither the entity’s parent nor 
the ultimate controlling party produces financial reports 
available for public use, the name of the next most senior 





















Aust.  parent 





When any of the parent entities and/or ultimate controlling 
parties named in accordance with paragraph 12 is 
incorporated or otherwise constituted outside Australia, an 
entity shall: 
(a) identify which of those entities is incorporated overseas 
and where; and  
(b) disclose the name of the ultimate controlling entity 










No (and no 
reference) 
Par16 An entity shall disclose key management personnel 
compensation in total and for each of the following 
categories:     
(a) short-term employee benefits;  
(b) post-employment benefits;  
(c) other long-term benefits;  
(d) termination benefits; and   
(e) share-based payment.   
Yes, refer to 
KMP note 
Yes, refer to 
KMP note 
Yes, refer to 
KMP note 
Yes 
Par17 If there have been transactions between related parties, an 
entity shall disclose the nature of the related party 
relationship as well as information about the transactions 
and outstanding balances necessary for an understanding of 
the potential effect of the relationship on the financial 
statements.  These disclosure requirements are in addition 
to the requirements in paragraph 16 to disclose key 
management personnel compensation.  At a minimum, 










Yes (the nature 
of relationship) 
(a)     the amount of the transactions; Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(b)     the amount of outstanding balances and:  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(i)  their terms and conditions, including whether they 
are secured, and the nature of the consideration 
to be provided in settlement; and  
























cash. T&C for 
RPTs; 
interest rate 
for oans blc. 
Guarantees: 
refer to 
other note.   
Yes: unsecured; 




& trivial in 
nature) 
(c)    provisions for doubtful debts related to the amount of 
outstanding balances; and   





No (and no 
reference) 
(d)    the expense recognised during the period in respect of 










The disclosures required by paragraph 17 shall be made 
separately for each of the following categories:  
(a)     the parent;  
(b)     entities with joint control or significant influence over 
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(c)     subsidiaries; 
(d)     associates;  
(e)      joint ventures in which the entity is a venturer;  
(f)      key management personnel of the entity or its parent;  







DTT = Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; EY = Ernst & Young; KPMG = KPMG; PwC = PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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Appendix 2A Correlation – Australia 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MSCORE (1) 1 0.562
** 0.768** -0.158 -0.324** 0.226* -0.067 -0.024 0.200* 0.039 0.122 0.136 0.087 0.035 -0.239* -0.002 0.093 0.146 
DSCORE (2) 0.500
** 1 0.856** -0.250* -0.254* 0.053 -0.113 -0.086 0.02 0.04 0.153 0.013 -0.017 0.004 -0.273** -0.049 0.044 0.301** 
OSCORE (3) 0.738
** 0.817** 1 -0.241* -0.210* 0.172 -0.082 -0.03 0.12 0.135 0.191 0.007 0.069 0.058 -0.227* 0.033 0.123 0.307** 
BIND (4) -0.179 -0.272
** -0.240* 1 0.129 -0.073 0.491** 0.202* 0.028 -0.345** -0.361** -0.028 0.098 0.178 0.258* -0.179 -0.064 -0.117 
BSIZE (5) -.351
** -0297** -0.268** 0.126 1 -0.104 0.263** 0.368** 0.051 0.01 -0.119 0.126 0.208* 0.119 0.656** -0.029 -0.281** 0.167 
BEXP (6) 0.276
** 0.103 0.223* -0.112 -0.126 1 0.096 0.087 0.592** -0.056 -0.093 0.107 0.042 0.152 0.066 -0.056 -0.201* -0.014 
ACIND (7) -0.076 -0.123 -0.083 0.499
** 0.257* 0.063 1 0.722** 0.194 -0.275** -0.309** 0.147 0.147 0.088 0.448** -0.036 -0.306** 0.097 
ACSIZE (8) -0.065 -0.089 -0.062 0.199
* 0.390** 0.06 0.699** 1 0.189 -0.127 -0.217* 0.300** 0.244* 0.066 0.450** 0.005 -0.254* 0.183 
ACEXP (9) 0.192 -0.017 0.083 0.04 0.037 0.564
** 0.138 0.132 1 -0.042 -0.124 0.149 0.13 0.011 0.217* -0.008 -0.265** 0.052 
CONC (10) 0.021 -0.039 0.034 -0.309
** -0.056 -0.084 -0.256* -0.154 -0.107 1 0.263** -0.024 -0.133 -0.257* -0.126 0.158 0.073 0.308** 
FAM (11) 0.149 0.157 0.19 -0.308
** -0.104 -0.07 -0.307** -0.259** -0.124 0.249* 1 -0.027 0.073 0.073 -0.246* 0.043 0.119 -0.012 
LEV (12) 0.096 -0.046 -0.025 0.047 0.217
* 0.07 0.201* 0.348** 0.152 -0.016 -0.087 1 0.129 0.035 0.340** -0.241* -0.243* 0.131 
EXT (13) 0.125 -0.017 0.084 0.099 0.239
* 0.054 0.048 0.138 0.13 -0.229* 0.073 0.136 1 -0.053 0.322** 0.119 -0.184 0.048 
CROSS (14) 0.042 0.027 0.081 0.125 0.139 0.16 0.114 0.081 0.011 -0.152 0.073 0.109 -0.053 1 0.111 -0.218
* -0.038 -0.042 
SIZE (15) -.263
** -0.314** -0.247* 0.278** 0.672** 0.034 0.358** 0.371** 0.189 -0.168 -0.259** 0.413** 0.250* 0.126 1 -0.05 -0.566** 0.273** 
PROFIT (16) 0.002 -0.056 0.044 -0.149 0.014 -0.014 -0.066 -0.037 0.012 0.077 0.041 -0.223
* 0.1 -0.202* -0.1 1 0.315** -0.014 
PERFORM (17) 0.086 0.031 0.102 -0.122 -0.213
* -0.145 -0.250* -0.196 -0.250* 0.113 0.111 -0.275** -0.142 -0.013 -0.471** 0.356** 1 -0.248* 
RPTN (18) 0.148 0.309
** 0.354** -0.092 0.172 -0.032 0.064 0.127 0.046 0.267** -0.044 0.132 0.047 -0.016 0.252* -0.002 -0.205* 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Below the diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents 
Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. 
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Appendix 2B Correlation – Indonesia 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MSCORE (1) 1 0.228
* 0.559** 0.151 0.066 -0.118 0.034 0.075 0.04 0.075 0.125 0.027 0.107 0.137 0.102 -0.089 -0.035 -0.065 
DSCORE (2) 0.145 1 0.812
** -0.029 0.183 0.055 0.07 0.143 -0.006 0.191 0.147 -0.054 0.202* 0.225* 0.199* 0.128 0.095 0.372** 
OSCORE (3) 0.521
** 0.778** 1 0.024 0.244* -0.007 0.064 0.207* 0.056 0.227* 0.16 -0.053 0.250* 0.288** 0.216* 0.071 0.065 0.192 
BIND (4) 0.156 -0.05 0.017 1 -0.107 0.083 -0.152 0.053 0.206
* -0.081 0.087 0.277** 0.022 0.142 0.202* -0.271** -0.211* -0.035 
BSIZE (5) 0.007 0.14 0.151 -0.041 1 0.059 -0.041 0.127 0.064 0.149 -0.115 0.049 0.181 0.181 0.475
** 0.087 0.129 0.242* 
BEXP (6) -0.082 0.045 0.016 0.107 0.057 1 0.107 0.044 0.312
** -0.136 0.141 0.058 -0.016 -0.037 -0.007 -0.065 -0.148 0.067 
ACIND (7) 0.052 0.007 0.011 -0.247
* -0.12 0.05 1 0.614** 0.008 -0.081 0.173 -0.138 0.169 0.092 0.015 0.211* 0.099 -0.032 
ACSIZE (8) 0.076 0.077 0.144 0.015 0.054 0.043 0.550
** 1 0.146 -0.084 0.073 0.024 0.191 0.248* 0.343** 0.099 -0.003 0.068 
ACEXP (9) -0.011 -0.004 0.017 0.210
* 0.047 0.324** 0.028 0.167 1 -0.011 0.105 0.002 -0.02 0.036 0.147 0.12 -0.008 -0.005 
CONC (10) 0.063 0.16 0.193 -0.106 0.14 -0.189 -0.087 -0.076 -0.047 1 -0.196 -0.248
* 0.217* 0.056 -0.033 0.210* 0.159 0.279** 
FAM (11) 0.099 0.156 0.153 0.051 -0.148 0.157 0.182 0.098 0.105 -0.201
* 1 0.073 -0.059 0.094 -0.1 -0.214* -0.185 -0.119 
LEV (12) -0.007 -0.037 -0.07 0.284
** 0.009 0.119 -0.019 0.185 0.042 -0.280** 0.108 1 -0.260** 0.05 0.308** -0.521** -0.348** -0.133 
EXT (13) 0.104 0.209
* 0.220* 0.009 0.198* -0.021 0.143 0.192 -0.02 0.220* -0.059 -0.247* 1 0.094 0.146 0.318** 0.307** 0.022 
CROSS (14) 0.098 0.224
* 0.249* 0.220* 0.205* -0.045 0.053 0.213* 0.036 0.069 0.094 0.046 0.094 1 0.526** 0.161 0.187 0.134 
SIZE (15) 0.092 0.214
* 0.222* 0.310** 0.458** -0.024 -0.031 0.286** 0.154 -0.024 -0.104 0.298** 0.156 0.538** 1 0.076 0.115 0.124 
PROFIT (16) -0.097 0.169 0.067 -0.294
** 0.108 -0.098 0.185 0.03 0.102 0.239* -0.262** -0.479** 0.325** 0.148 0.062 1 0.576** 0.210* 
PERFORM (17) -0.006 0.149 0.064 -0.286
** 0.166 -0.222* 0.143 0.032 -0.025 0.224* -0.166 -0.334** 0.280** 0.113 0.094 0.537** 1 0.256* 
RPTN (18) -0.106 0.306
** 0.109 -0.087 0.229* 0.087 -0.013 0.098 0.023 0.235* -0.084 -0.126 0.027 0.143 0.122 0.230* 0.267** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Below the diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents 
Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. 
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Appendix 2C Correlation – Malaysia 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MSCORE (1) 1 0.007 0.428
** 0.054 -0.143 0 -0.124 -0.189 0.182 -0.193 0.216* 0.141 -0.052 -0.231* -0.145 -0.107 -0.077 -0.028 
DSCORE (2) -0.008 1 0.653
** 0.089 0.133 -0.006 0.166 0.195 0.052 0.16 -0.081 0.004 -0.023 0.074 0.214* -0.107 -0.087 0.221* 
OSCORE (3) 0.397
** 0.635** 1 0.187 0.033 0.034 0.021 0.123 -0.004 0.230* -0.049 0.098 -0.069 -0.031 0.147 -0.024 0.072 0.126 
BIND (4) 0.036 0.14 0.221
* 1 -0.438** -0.005 0.290** 0.119 -0.143 0.298** -0.036 -0.105 0.129 0.081 0.052 -0.003 -0.038 0.123 
BSIZE (5) -0.135 0.128 0.025 -0.441
** 1 -0.133 0.16 0.193 0.003 -0.038 -0.128 0.167 -0.168 0.203* 0.318** -0.15 -0.066 0.021 
BEXP (6) 0.027 -0.006 0.032 -0.019 -0.077 1 -0.097 0.007 0.337
** 0.1 -0.065 -0.022 0.056 0.136 0.001 0.075 0.062 0.074 
ACIND (7) -0.173 0.178 0 0.296
** 0.153 -0.049 1 0.566** 0 0.263** 0.019 0.122 0.074 0.283** 0.239* -0.098 -0.046 -0.033 
ACSIZE (8) -0.183 0.179 0.09 0.089 0.208
* 0.036 0.545** 1 0.094 0.306** -0.176 -0.04 0.105 0.429** 0.229* 0.185 0.196 0.042 
ACEXP (9) 0.172 0.017 -0.061 -0.153 0.014 0.332
** -0.003 0.089 1 -0.113 0.174 0.022 -0.134 -0.025 0.011 -0.052 -0.194 -0.005 
CONC (10) -0.138 0.183 0.248
* 0.304** 0.005 0.105 0.257** 0.274** -0.14 1 -0.336** -0.067 -0.019 0.179 0.034 -0.009 0.184 0.134 
FAM (11) 0.179 -0.034 -0.041 -0.049 -0.125 -0.091 0.024 -0.171 0.174 -0.329
** 1 0.061 -0.09 -0.124 -0.236* -0.167 -0.182 0.025 
LEV (12) 0.149 0.024 0.138 -0.058 0.094 0.039 0.178 -0.04 0.047 0.009 0.138 1 0.034 0.035 0.445
** -0.276** -0.145 0.078 
EXT (13) -0.073 -0.023 -0.075 0.131 -0.176 0.069 0.071 0.097 -0.134 -0.017 -0.09 0.03 1 0.013 0.129 0.049 -0.084 0.091 
CROSS (14) -0.254
* 0.056 -0.038 0.102 0.166 0.149 0.277** 0.381** -0.025 0.194 -0.124 0.031 0.013 1 0.284** 0.074 0.135 0.098 
SIZE (15) -0.151 0.198
* 0.171 0.069 0.280** -0.036 0.238* 0.237* 0.01 0.052 -0.181 0.456** 0.139 0.227* 1 -0.332** -0.316** 0.16 
PROFIT (16) -0.045 -0.068 -0.059 0.074 -0.111 -0.021 -0.06 0.112 -0.054 -0.02 -0.202
* -0.382** -0.032 -0.003 0-.345** 1 0.729** -0.287** 
PERFORM (17) -0.061 -0.076 0.044 0.037 0.013 -0.015 0.056 0.093 -0.177 0.123 -0.252
* -0.136 -0.072 0.06 -0.233* 0.646** 1 -0.243* 
RPTN (18) -0.016 0.244
* 0.149 0.219* 0.047 0.106 -0.021 0.051 -0.01 0.158 0.056 0.131 -0.023 0.091 0.189 -0.234* -0.189 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Below the diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents 
Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. 
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Appendix 2D Correlation – Philippines 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MSCORE (1) 1 0.720
** 0.865** -0.061 0.175 0.089 0.118 -0.062 0.111 0.105 0.087 0.181 0.228* 0.185 0.430** -0.007 -0.162 0.458** 
DSCORE (2) 0.744
** 1 0.903** -0.009 0.12 -0.019 0.112 -0.005 -0.004 0.111 0.063 0.220* 0.141 0.201 0.430** 0.09 -0.15 0.547** 
OSCORE (3) 0.841
** 0.917** 1 -0.031 0.184 0.04 0.156 0.026 0.074 0.187 0.076 0.298** 0.223* 0.255* 0.571** 0.069 -0.157 0.565** 
BIND (4) -0.081 -0.048 -0.074 1 -0.387
** 0.226* 0.188 -0.310** -0.059 -0.147 0.105 0.042 -0.082 0.026 -0.122 -0.046 -0.064 0.167 
BSIZE (5) 0.137 0.121 0.181 -0.621
** 1 0.005 0.308** 0.279** 0.11 0.077 -0.024 0.068 0.209* 0.207* 0.249* 0.230* 0.062 -0.021 
BEXP (6) 0.09 -0.014 0.019 0.126 0.024 1 -0.032 -0.047 0.555
** -0.016 -0.168 0.083 0.083 -0.025 0.048 0.042 0.057 0.031 
ACIND (7) 0.069 0.104 0.14 0.096 0.242
* -0.017 1 0.314** 0.035 0.125 0.166 0.151 0.001 0.265* 0.236* 0.133 -0.131 0.001 
ACSIZE (8) -0.109 0.018 0.052 -0.334
** 0.322** -0.029 0.286** 1 0.186 0.091 0.075 0.142 -0.062 0.175 0.211* 0.05 -0.006 -0.018 
ACEXP (9) 0.102 0 0.053 -0.062 0.105 0.587
** 0.013 0.182 1 -0.122 -0.029 0.026 0.002 0.077 0.159 0.008 -0.012 -0.035 
CONC (10) 0.035 0.056 0.158 -0.163 0.07 -0.026 0.113 0.134 -0.093 1 -0.072 0.038 0.115 -0.128 -0.043 -0.1 0.031 0.022 
FAM (11) 0.102 0.049 0.073 0.075 -0.036 -0.146 0.188 0.055 -0.029 -0.078 1 0.111 -0.158 0.1 -0.008 -0.026 0.01 -0.03 
LEV (12) 0.167 0.232
* 0.319** 0.074 0.036 0.148 0.129 0.174 0.065 0.027 0.176 1 0.133 0.316** 0.504** 0.166 0.028 0.09 
EXT (13) 0.236
* 0.147 0.216* -0.158 0.250* 0.111 -0.001 -0.037 0.002 0.085 -0.158 0.056 1 0.056 0.213* 0.067 -0.112 0.175 
CROSS (14) 0.196 0.216
* 0.254* 0.033 0.168 -0.023 0.197 0.177 0.077 -0.154 0.1 0.299** 0.056 1 0.562** 0.118 0.124 0.289** 
SIZE (15) 0.433
** 0.465** 0.566** -0.147 0.251* 0.127 0.189 0.214* 0.164 -0.043 -0.065 0.403** 0.225* 0.477** 1 0.294** -0.11 0.379** 
PROFIT (16) 0.051 0.134 0.126 -0.147 0.300
** 0.119 0.136 0.036 0.017 -0.061 -0.044 0.191 0.109 0.189 0.351** 1 0.114 -0.054 
PERFORM (17) -0.095 -0.102 -0.089 -0.051 0.067 0.007 -0.078 -0.034 -0.004 -0.018 -0.014 0.06 -0.068 0.135 -0.082 0.127 1 -0.1 
RPTN (18) 0.472
** 0.562** 0.579** 0.155 0.027 0.015 0.007 -0.015 -0.037 -0.035 -0.047 0.134 0.193 0.302** 0.374** 0.015 -0.06 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Below the diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents 
Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. 
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Appendix 2E Correlation – Singapore 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MSCORE (1) 1 0.158 0.529
** -0.107 -0.051 0.034 -0.126 -0.078 -0.09 0.102 0.004 0.012 0.028 -0.112 -0.074 0.004 0.013 0.086 
DSCORE (2) 0.156 1 0.641
** -0.012 -0.06 0.05 -0.069 0.053 0.085 0.017 0.086 -0.13 -0.151 -0.213* -0.101 0.053 -0.036 -0.067 
OSCORE (3) 0.485
** 0.598** 1 -0.02 0.018 0.095 -0.105 0.049 0.063 0.353** -0.098 -0.069 -0.074 -0.216* -0.009 0.004 0.062 -0.025 
BIND (4) -0.111 -0.049 -0.082 1 -0.049 -0.037 0.453
** 0.176 -0.03 -0.044 -0.146 0.053 0.044 0.135 0.158 -0.074 0.249* -0.043 
BSIZE (5) -0.049 -0.009 0.008 -0.017 1 -0.254
* 0.384** 0.313** -0.113 0.007 -0.226* 0.104 0.273** 0.126 0.270** 0.08 0.199 0.102 
BEXP (6) 0.049 0.043 0.038 -0.084 -0.254
* 1 -0.123 -0.092 0.484** 0.1 0.154 0.173 -0.314** -0.176 0.022 -0.098 -0.242* -0.008 
ACIND (7) -0.139 -0.017 -0.134 0.460
** 0.406** -0.144 1 0.629** 0.012 -0.135 -0.066 0.052 0.15 0.115 0.149 -0.035 0.167 0.231* 
ACSIZE (8) -0.078 0.124 0.072 0.144 0.346
** -0.15 0.643** 1 0.11 -0.071 -0.212* -0.065 0.084 0.065 0.164 0.131 0.218* 0.057 
ACEXP (9) -0.107 0.107 0.055 -0.078 -0.07 0.494
** 0.015 0.108 1 0.032 0.108 0.055 -0.208* 0.011 0.128 0.028 -0.146 0.087 
CONC (10) 0.094 -0.047 0.328
** -0.054 0.019 0.094 -0.147 -0.093 0.02 1 -0.307** 0.007 0.1 -0.104 0.116 -0.012 -0.072 0.067 
FAM (11) 0.019 0.077 -0.112 -0.104 -0.275
** 0.15 -0.069 -0.228* 0.108 -0.284** 1 -0.083 -0.214* -0.083 -0.387** -0.2 -0.181 0.039 
LEV (12) -0.011 -0.143 -0.127 0.036 0.115 0.203 0.05 -0.071 0.087 -0.006 -0.051 1 0.05 0.083 0.213
* -0.003 -0.019 0.038 
EXT (13) 0.016 -0.131 -0.089 0.085 0.293
** -0.259* 0.155 0.077 -0.208* 0.1 -0.214* 0.02 1 0.035 0.183 0.179 0.133 0.087 
CROSS (14) -0.13 -0.184 -0.197 0.072 0.094 -0.134 0.119 0.077 0.011 -0.096 -0.083 0.104 0.035 1 0.425
** 0.052 0.192 -0.126 
SIZE (15) -0.102 -0.074 0.001 0.168 0.335
** 0.047 0.161 0.149 0.111 0.168 -0.357** 0.267** 0.207* 0.450** 1 0.038 -0.115 0.072 
PROFIT (16) -0.012 0.139 0.024 -0.038 0.09 -0.098 0.004 0.122 -0.016 -0.044 -0.155 -0.072 0.2 0.053 -0.031 1 0.410
** -0.07 
PERFORM (17) 0.009 -0.003 0.05 0.168 0.176 -0.179 0.169 0.268
** -0.132 -0.087 -0.218* -0.036 0.126 0.235* -0.033 0.492** 1 0.07 
RPTN (18) 0.047 -0.066 -0.033 0.026 0.149 -0.054 0.257
* 0.049 0.079 0.073 0.016 0.027 0.097 -0.112 0.055 -0.04 0.123 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Below the diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents 
Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. 
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Appendix 2F Correlation – Thailand 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MSCORE (1) 1 0.424
** 0.764** -0.146 0.022 -0.061 -0.027 -0.074 -0.1 -0.165 0.125 0.053 0.157 -0.037 0.021 -0.287** -0.216* 0.363** 
DSCORE (2) 0.416
** 1 0.713** -0.344** 0.054 0.023 -0.065 -0.15 -0.032 -0.175 0.115 0.033 0.304** -0.129 -0.163 -0.198* -0.08 0.521** 
OSCORE (3) 0.725
** 0.662** 1 -0.317** -0.082 0.043 -0.175 -0.156 -0.067 0.001 0.144 0.006 0.330** -0.084 -0.227* -0.311** -0.178 0.452** 
BIND (4) -0.044 -0.317
** -0.247* 1 -.202* -0.044 .322** 0.109 0.002 0.049 0.013 0.041 -0.182 0.091 .278** -0.006 -0.163 -.229* 
BSIZE (5) -0.036 0.089 -0.091 -0.184 1 -0.270
** 0.162 0.096 -0.169 -0.124 -0.237* 0.138 0.007 -0.026 0.447** -0.008 -0.077 0.241* 
BEXP (6) -0.027 -0.033 0.037 -0.033 -0.296
** 1 -0.06 0.031 0.470** 0.166 0.068 -0.245* 0.063 -0.018 -0.213* 0.031 0.079 0.053 
ACIND (7) -0.053 -0.055 -0.196 0.281
** 0.19 -0.014 1 0.705** -0.031 -0.210* 0.059 0.061 0.05 0.127 0.155 0.11 -0.04 0.029 
ACSIZE (8) -0.093 -0.154 -0.196 0.149 0.139 0.032 0.837
** 1 0.024 -0.113 0.078 0.088 -0.019 0.096 0.043 0.061 0.037 0.088 
ACEXP (9) -0.104 -0.034 -0.016 -0.053 -0.185 0.519
** -0.019 0.026 1 -0.003 0.139 -0.078 -0.078 -0.108 -0.075 -0.096 -0.081 -0.037 
CONC (10) -0.14 -0.185 0.043 0.1 -0.089 0.131 -0.139 -0.093 -0.004 1 -0.091 0.017 -0.021 0.08 -0.025 -0.035 0.082 -0.05 
FAM (11) 0.14 0.12 0.145 -0.018 -0.232
* 0.053 0.047 0.088 0.139 -0.095 1 -0.001 -0.115 -0.159 -0.241* -0.08 -0.122 0.063 
LEV (12) 0.089 0.089 0.05 0.083 0.105 -0.240
* 0.042 0.061 -0.059 0.082 0.002 1 -0.166 0.096 0.419** -0.443** -0.249* 0.098 
EXT (13) 0.091 0.191 0.192 -0.148 0.008 0.051 0.058 -0.018 -0.078 -0.011 -0.115 -0.172 1 0.111 -0.129 0.074 0.008 0.185 
CROSS (14) -0.06 -0.175 -0.129 0.136 -0.026 0.011 0.131 0.11 -0.108 0.098 -0.159 0.107 0.111 1 0.207
* 0.061 0.024 -0.037 
SIZE (15) -0.006 -0.114 -0.199
* 0.217* 0.427** -0.188 0.141 0.106 -0.051 0.02 -0.242* 0.454** -0.068 0.214* 1 -0.205* -0.254* 0.223* 
PROFIT (16) -0.272
** -0.226* -0.335** 0.009 0.004 0.022 0.137 0.071 -0.136 -0.048 -0.102 -0.434** 0.062 0.084 -0.219* 1 0.511** -0.223* 
PERFORM (17) -0.254
* -0.068 -0.232* -0.063 -0.12 0.083 0.093 0.071 -0.088 0.059 -0.096 -0.249* 0.065 0.047 -0.324** 0.526** 1 -0.194 
RPTN (18) 0.212
* 0.354** 0.252* -0.237* 0.291** 0.026 0.06 0.113 -0.007 -0.005 0.065 0.166 0.139 -0.116 0.255* -0.171 -0.158 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Below the diagonal presents Spearman’s correlation and above the diagonal presents 
Pearson’s correlation of the independent variables. 
Appendix 
~ 192 ~ 
 
Appendix 3A MSCORE Within-Country 
 
Australia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
  Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. 
(Constant)   3.852 0.000   5.656 0.000   6.469 0.000   2.974 0.004   7.476 0.000   7.740 0.000 
BIND -0.081 -0.641 0.524 0.119 0.976 0.332 0.184 1.394 0.167 -0.164 -1.312 0.194 -0.060 -0.403 0.688 -0.102 -0.817 0.416 
BSIZE -0.227 -1.716 0.090 0.076 0.591 0.556 -0.096 -0.724 0.471 0.096 0.854 0.396 -0.034 -0.242 0.810 -0.089 -0.712 0.478 
BEXP 0.088 0.719 0.474 -0.159 -1.377 0.172 -0.016 -0.145 0.885 0.075 0.622 0.536 0.075 0.532 0.596 -0.032 -0.273 0.785 
ACIND 0.063 0.382 0.704 0.064 0.435 0.665 -0.048 -0.347 0.730 0.110 0.943 0.349 -0.118 -0.627 0.533 0.097 0.639 0.524 
ACSIZE -0.006 -0.037 0.971 -0.011 -0.075 0.940 -0.028 -0.194 0.847 -0.241 -2.279 0.026 0.036 0.229 0.820 -0.142 -1.024 0.309 
ACEXP 0.174 1.453 0.150 0.064 0.536 0.593 0.161 1.347 0.182 0.076 0.653 0.516 -0.129 -0.976 0.332 -0.122 -1.109 0.270 
CONC -0.029 -0.259 0.797 0.092 0.780 0.438 -0.149 -1.195 0.236 0.082 0.849 0.399 0.077 0.635 0.527 -0.143 -1.433 0.156 
FAM 0.032 0.289 0.773 0.108 0.931 0.355 0.030 0.248 0.804 0.155 1.638 0.106 0.014 0.100 0.920 0.081 0.778 0.438 
LEV 0.176 1.620 0.109 -0.050 -0.358 0.721 0.194 1.623 0.108 0.022 0.205 0.838 0.027 0.230 0.819 -0.074 -0.626 0.533 
EXT 0.179 1.700 0.093 0.091 0.752 0.454 -0.039 -0.353 0.725 0.057 0.583 0.562 0.037 0.294 0.769 0.082 0.798 0.427 
CROSS 0.091 0.872 0.386 0.097 0.746 0.458 -0.108 -0.913 0.364 -0.098 -0.833 0.408 -0.056 -0.406 0.686 0.009 0.089 0.929 
SIZE -0.278 -1.621 0.109 0.020 0.120 0.905 -0.047 -0.332 0.741 0.308 2.145 0.035 -0.022 -0.140 0.889 -0.009 -0.062 0.951 
PROFIT -0.008 -0.072 0.943 -0.141 -0.925 0.358 -0.223 -1.347 0.182 -0.089 -0.894 0.374 -0.010 -0.077 0.939 -0.249 -2.024 0.046 
PERFORM 0.089 0.687 0.494 -0.011 -0.077 0.938 0.173 1.032 0.305 -0.074 -0.757 0.451 0.055 0.366 0.715 -0.055 -0.480 0.633 
RPTN 0.241 2.277 0.025 -0.070 -0.590 0.557 -0.024 -0.220 0.826 0.374 3.524 0.001 0.104 0.835 0.406 0.284 2.580 0.012 
                                      
R Square 0.292     0.107     0.164     0.407     0.061     0.264   
Adjusted R Square 0.164     -0.054     0.015     0.288     -0.120     0.132   
Durbin-Watson 1.387     1.972     1.652     1.630     2.195     2.057   
Maximum VIF 3.438     2.463     2.818     2.599     2.927     2.005   
F 2.283     0.663     1.099     3.427     0.337     0.024   
Signif (F) 0.009     0.813     0.370     0.000     0.989     2.629   
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Appendix 3B DSCORE Within-Country 
 
Australia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
 














BIND -0.198 -1.582 0.118 -0.075 -0.682 0.497 0.072 0.549 0.585 -0.085 -0.684 0.496 0.091 0.635 0.528 -0.142 -1.387 0.169 
BSIZE -0.080 -0.609 0.544 -0.004 -0.033 0.974 0.096 0.730 0.467 0.066 0.585 0.560 0.042 0.307 0.760 -0.001 -0.009 0.993 
BEXP -0.010 -0.083 0.934 0.036 0.346 0.730 -0.074 -0.655 0.514 -0.031 -0.263 0.793 -0.067 -0.492 0.624 -0.004 -0.045 0.964 
ACIND 0.117 0.714 0.478 -0.023 -0.173 0.863 0.060 0.433 0.666 0.060 0.518 0.606 -0.140 -0.770 0.444 0.227 1.820 0.072 
ACSIZE -0.070 -0.464 0.644 0.034 0.246 0.807 0.045 0.309 0.758 -0.129 -1.232 0.222 0.137 0.890 0.376 -0.340 -2.998 0.004 
ACEXP 0.062 0.526 0.600 -0.053 -0.490 0.626 0.100 0.843 0.402 0.025 0.211 0.834 0.068 0.530 0.597 -0.013 -0.148 0.883 
CONC -0.161 -1.435 0.155 0.109 1.020 0.311 0.101 0.812 0.419 0.102 1.059 0.293 0.043 0.365 0.716 -0.144 -1.752 0.083 
FAM 0.044 0.407 0.685 0.227 2.164 0.033 -0.010 -0.083 0.934 0.089 0.946 0.347 0.126 0.940 0.350 0.026 0.307 0.760 
LEV 0.059 0.548 0.585 0.015 0.117 0.907 -0.114 -0.952 0.344 0.088 0.814 0.418 -0.087 -0.766 0.446 0.106 1.091 0.278 
EXT 0.093 0.887 0.377 0.171 1.547 0.126 -0.043 -0.398 0.692 -0.036 -0.374 0.709 -0.147 -1.221 0.226 0.162 1.917 0.059 
CROSS 0.053 0.511 0.611 0.083 0.703 0.484 -0.074 -0.627 0.533 -0.092 -0.782 0.437 -0.244 -1.832 0.071 -0.041 -0.491 0.624 
SIZE -0.403 -2.374 0.020 0.129 0.870 0.387 0.197 1.395 0.167 0.219 1.538 0.128 0.057 0.376 0.708 -0.285 -2.501 0.014 
PROFIT -0.051 -0.459 0.647 0.049 0.351 0.727 -0.027 -0.164 0.870 0.054 0.551 0.583 0.089 0.704 0.484 -0.145 -1.439 0.154 
PERFORM -0.024 -0.186 0.853 -0.081 -0.656 0.513 0.055 0.326 0.745 -0.082 -0.851 0.397 -0.013 -0.091 0.927 0.059 0.622 0.535 
RPTN 0.433 4.130 0.000 0.343 3.209 0.002 0.240 2.183 0.032 0.499 4.732 0.000 -0.068 -0.565 0.574 0.504 5.586 0.000 
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Appendix 3C OSCORE Within-Country  
 Australia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
 
Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. Coef t Sig. 
(Constant)   4.932 0.000   5.976 0.000   4.729 0.000   1.996 0.050   6.619 0.000   11.195 0.000 
BIND -0.177 -1.430 0.156 -0.034 -0.309 0.758 0.300 2.234 0.028 -0.050 -0.462 0.646 0.024 0.177 0.860 -0.135 -1.303 0.196 
BSIZE -0.084 -0.650 0.517 0.125 1.064 0.290 0.193 1.431 0.156 0.102 1.048 0.298 0.067 0.526 0.600 -0.089 -0.857 0.394 
BEXP 0.108 0.906 0.368 -0.028 -0.266 0.791 0.004 0.035 0.972 -0.012 -0.113 0.910 0.007 0.054 0.957 -0.022 -0.228 0.820 
ACIND 0.143 0.884 0.379 -0.083 -0.615 0.540 -0.235 -1.647 0.103 0.050 0.496 0.621 -0.156 -0.913 0.364 0.040 0.314 0.754 
ACSIZE -0.046 -0.310 0.757 0.153 1.096 0.276 0.160 1.070 0.288 -0.141 -1.551 0.125 0.128 0.892 0.375 -0.163 -1.419 0.160 
ACEXP 0.108 0.925 0.358 0.023 0.208 0.836 0.026 0.213 0.832 0.073 0.723 0.472 0.042 0.353 0.725 -0.092 -0.998 0.321 
CONC -0.013 -0.116 0.908 0.178 1.653 0.102 0.105 0.827 0.411 0.183 2.192 0.031 0.346 3.154 0.002 0.007 0.088 0.930 
FAM 0.075 0.705 0.483 0.209 1.974 0.052 0.092 0.753 0.453 0.121 1.485 0.142 0.062 0.498 0.620 0.053 0.612 0.542 
LEV 0.026 0.244 0.808 -0.022 -0.176 0.861 0.155 1.272 0.207 0.078 0.829 0.409 -0.053 -0.502 0.617 0.006 0.058 0.954 
EXT 0.177 1.712 0.091 0.187 1.681 0.097 -0.090 -0.806 0.422 0.014 0.163 0.871 -0.109 -0.970 0.335 0.211 2.459 0.016 
CROSS 0.119 1.156 0.251 0.187 1.565 0.121 -0.131 -1.086 0.281 -0.124 -1.222 0.226 -0.265 -2.131 0.036 0.001 0.011 0.991 
SIZE -0.286 -1.703 0.092 0.012 0.079 0.937 -0.041 -0.281 0.779 0.419 3.392 0.001 0.125 0.874 0.385 -0.281 -2.425 0.017 
PROFIT -0.036 -0.328 0.743 -0.041 -0.295 0.769 -0.009 -0.052 0.958 -0.027 -0.315 0.754 -0.063 -0.536 0.593 -0.261 -2.545 0.013 
PERFORM 0.156 1.231 0.222 -0.049 -0.395 0.694 0.086 0.503 0.616 -0.059 -0.700 0.486 0.196 1.444 0.153 -0.059 -0.613 0.542 
RPTN 0.405 3.907 0.000 0.112 1.041 0.301 0.073 0.650 0.518 0.435 4.764 0.000 -0.080 -0.713 0.478 0.404 4.411 0.000 

































































Signif (F)   0.003     0.004     0.635     0.000     0.123     0.000   
 
Appendix 
~ 195 ~ 
 
Appendix 4 Additional Regression Analysis – Replacing Country-Factors with Country-Dummies (N=582) 
RP_DISC  =  
 
β0 + β1 BINDjk + β2 BSIZEjk + β3 BEXPjk + β4 ACINDjk + β5 ACSIZEjk + β6 ACEXPjk + β7 CONCjk + β8 FAMjk + β9 LEVjk + β10 EXTjk+ β11 CROSSjk + 
β12D_AUSjk + β13 D_INDjk + β14 D_PHIjk + β15 D_SINjk + β16 D_THAjk + β17 SIZEjk + β18 PROFITjk + β19 PERFORMjk + β20 RPTNjk + β+21 INDUSjk + εjk                                                                
 
Predicted Sign 
MODEL 1 - MSCORE MODEL 2 - DSCORE MODEL 3 - OSCORE 
Std. Coeff. t-stat Std. Coeff. t-stat Std. Coeff. t-stat 
(Constant) ? 
 
12.665***   10.004***   11.925*** 
BIND + -0.088 -1.520* -0.110 -2.055** -0.072 -1.473* 
BSIZE ? -0.122 -1.944** -0.081 -1.408* -0.083 -1.563* 
BEXP + 0.001 0.024 0.015 0.337 0.040 0.992 
ACIND + -0.002 -0.026 0.009 0.141 -0.045 -0.777 
ACSIZE ? -0.047 -0.894 -0.011 -0.219 0.016 0.367 
ACEXP + 0.064 1.328 0.006 0.126 0.020 0.487 
CONC + 0.004 0.092 0.046 1.094 0.157 4.096*** 
FAM + 0.108 2.434*** 0.089 2.182** 0.109 2.915*** 
LEV ? 0.052 1.116 -0.031 -0.724 -0.005 -0.139 
EXT + 0.120 2.849*** 0.054 1.383* 0.089 2.510*** 
CROSS + 0.011 0.174 0.040 0.700 0.017 0.333 
D_AUS ? 0.116 1.686* 0.125 1.975** 0.330 5.697*** 
D_IND ? 0.014 0.202 0.124 1.915** -0.261 -4.397*** 
D_PHI ? -0.077 -1.065 -0.132 -1.994** -0.207 -3.412*** 
D_SIN ? 0.180 3.084** 0.092 1.707** 0.074 1.511 
D_THA ? 0.010 0.166 0.226 4.029*** -0.071 -1.381 
SIZE + 0.039 0.590 0.042 0.692 0.112 2.030** 
PROFIT + -0.055 -1.161 0.015 0.332 -0.019 -0.466 
PERFORM + 0.021 0.435 -0.004 -0.091 0.050 1.243 
RPTN + 0.189 3.983*** 0.318 7.305*** 0.237 5.926*** 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES + 
 
Included  Included  Included 
F-statistic  
 
3.759   8.079   13.362 
p-value  
 
<0.000   <0.000   <0.000 
Adj R Square  
 
0.117   0.254  0.373 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient is predicted, two-tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted or not in the predicted direction) respectively. 
RP_DISC is the measure of RP disclosure scores, which is Mandatory Score (MSCORE) in Model 1, Discretionary Score (DSCORE) in Model 2, and Overall Score (OSCORE) in Model 3. Five dummy 
variables are included for the six countries (i.e., D_AUS, D_IND, D_PHI, D_SIN, and D_THA with 1 = companies registered in Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, respectively 
and 0 = otherwise). For brevity, the results for industry dummy variables are not shown in the table. All other variables are as described in Table 6.13.
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